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26 January 1983

NEAR EAST/SOUTH ASIA REPORT

No. 2698

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INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

GCC OFFICIAL ON RELATIONS WITH MOSCOW, UK POSITION

GF071420 Kuwait AL-ANBA' in Arabic 6 Jan 83 pp 1, 22

[Report on interview with Ibrahim al-Subhi, GCC assistant secretary general for political affairs, by AL-ANBA' correspondent Fatimah Mansur--place, date not given]

[Excerpts] [Passage omitted] [Question] Regarding the call to the Soviet Union to help stop the gulf war, has the issue of establishing diplomatic relations with Moscow been discussed within the GCC meetings?

[Answer] The fact is that this issue has been dealt with on more than one occasion and we expressed our view on it, the GCC view. It is not yet time to talk about establishing relations with the Soviet Union. However, the Soviet Union has a role in peace and stability in the gulf region. The United States and other countries also have their role. The Soviet Union is responsible for peace and stability and it can, as a superpower, contribute to consolidating peace in the region. [passage omitted]

[Question] What is the stand toward the visit by the British secretary of state for foreign and commonwealth affairs to some GCC countries in view of Britain's refusal to receive the seven-member committee with all its members?

[Answer] As for Britain's receiving of the seven-member committee with all its members, the issue is twofold. The first part is that contacts are being held between the committee's chairman and members, and Britain, and the second part is that there are also contacts in Britain to start preparations to receive this committee. We are waiting for the outcome of these contacts.

As for the visit by the British secretary of state for foreign and commonwealth affairs to the region, I cannot officially confirm that he will visit, except to say that the issue will be discussed with him. However, Arab contacts with Britain are underway to convince it to receive the committee.

The GCC countries have good relations with Britain. That is why they can use these relations to convince it to receive the seven-member committee with all its members. This is the role which the GCC countries can play.

[Question] Does this mean that the seven-member committee will not visit Britain except with all its members?

[Answer] Yes, because the committee is a seven-member committee and not a six-member one. [passage omitted]

CSO: 4400/161

GCC SECRETARY GENERAL DISCUSSES COUNCIL'S POLICIES

GF151140 Kuwait ARAB TIMES in English 14 Jan 83 p 5

[Text] The ultimate aim of the Gulf Cooperation Council is the unity of the gulf and there is no room for individual dominance in the GCC which represents teamwork, the GCC Secretary General Abdallah Ya'cub Bisharah was quoted today as saying.

Talking to a forum organized by Kuwait's AL-ANBA' newspaper, Mr Bisharah summed up the principles of the GCC as the embodiment of the gulf nationals' aspirations and the dispensing with foreign assistance.

The GCC's philosophy is based on making viable and realistic decisions that can be implemented, he added.

Asked if the GCC has formulated a unified stand on various political questions to be adopted by all members, Bisharah indicated "our experience is still short with regard to coordination, nevertheless, there is coordination toward major Arab issues in their entirety."

The coordination process between the six GCC members is gradually gaining momentum and emphasis is being placed on the mechanism of coordination to provide for prompt concerted reactions to rapid developments, he explained.

The GCC, which was set up in May, 1981, groups Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Oman.

Arab Unity

Responding to a question whether the GCC is a federation of rulers or of peoples, the GCC official stressed the popular aspect of the council and reiterated that the basic principles of this regional body found their origin in the interests and aspirations of the gulf nationals.

Asked if gulf unity, as the main objective of the GCC, was a step toward total Arab unity or a substitute, Bisharah stressed that the two unities were directly associated.

He made it clear that in recent talks with Arab League officials on the subject, he found support for close regional ties between peoples and stressed that any unity between two Arab countries will positively reflect on the Arab nation.

"Gulf unit is not a fence barring Arab unity, rather it is an impetus toward that end," Bisharah said.

Furthermore, he went on, oil has helped the region develop into a "commonwealth" and subsequently it is in the Arab interest that Arab Gulf cooperation continues, as such concepts will positively affect Arab policy.

On hardships encountering the unity process, he noted that a major difficulty arises from the individualistic trend in the gulf and that the sacrifices needed to have this unity materialized are not yet fully conceived.

Another difficulty lies in the fact that domestic laws in each member state are "rigid" due to prolonged continuity and that is what makes them hard to adapt to the context of the new GCC laws, he added.

On the internal security pact which is expected to be concluded between the GCC states, the official made it clear that the pact is mainly aimed at coordination of measures to fight crime and regulate the extradition of criminals.

The pact has no political bearing nor is it aimed at restricting freedoms, he added.

Security Pact

Talking of economic cooperation, Bisharah affirmed that the output of the GCC cannot be equally distributed on each individual or institution in the region, and inevitably "there will be sacrifices and victims, not only individuals but institutions as well."

Regretting the eroding away of the huge gulf wealth, the GCC official warned against over consumption, low rate of production and heavy dependence of Asian labor force.

Asked whether the GCC has prospects for the demographical problems in the gulf region, he cautioned that if the foreign influx of labor force into the region kept pace, the political decision of gulf countries will be affected and hazardous repercussions should be expected.

He, however, was optimistic about the new policies of developing indigenous cadres but stressed that gulf nationals' consumptive trend must be curbed.

CSO: 4400/161

GCC AGRICULTURE DATA BANK PLANNED

LD112128 Riyadh SPA in English 1957 GMT 11 Jan 83

[Text] Riyadh, 11 Jan (SPA)--The establishment of a data bank on agriculture and water resources in the gulf region was one of the important recommendations adopted by the GCC Agriculture Ministers, a Saudi cabinet minister said here today.

Agriculture and Water Resources Minister 'Abd ar-Rahman ibn al Ash-Shaykh said the bank would be set up in collaboration with the gulf agricultural development fund.

The agriculture ministers concluded their two-day meeting yesterday by approving a number of recommendations submitted by agriculture under-secretaries.

Mr Ash-Shaykh said the recommendation on the proposed bank was referred to a panel of experts for further study.

Mr ash-Shaykh said the proposed bank would collect data and information on soil and water resources in the region and explore the best ways for the reclamation of uncultivated lands and exploitation of water resources to achieve economic integration in all sectors.

Another recommendation approved by the ministers was standardising land and agricultural laws in member states.

The agriculture minister expressed satisfaction with the council's achievements and said it was set up with the aim of realising complete economic integration of all gulf states.

He said the kingdom had achieved self-sufficiency in poultry as it began producing one million eggs annually.

Mr Ash-Shaykh expressed his country's readiness to cooperate with all member states to achieve self-sufficiency in the field of poultry.

The Saudi minister along with other council colleagues today visited agricultural schemes in Al-Kharj and Harad regions.

CSO: 4400/161

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

BAHRAINI OFFICIALS INTERVIEWED ON GCC, CURRENT ISSUES

LD191846 Kuwait JUNA in English 1117 GMT 19 Jan 83

[Text] Kuwait, 19 Jan (KUNA)--The Amir of Bahrain, Sheikh 'Isa ibn Salman al Khalifah, called on the Arabs to forget their differences and hatreds and to unify, a Kuwaiti magazine reported Wednesday.

In an interview with MERAAT AL OMAH [spelling of name as received] [NATION'S MIRROR] magazine, Sheikh 'Isa ibn Salman al Khalifah said "to forget the differences, and hatred between the Arabs will open a new page in our (?history and) the Arabs should look seriously to important issues."

Sheikh 'Isa said "The establishment of the Gulf Cooperation Council is an accomplishment that we thank God for."

He expressed optimism over the Arab Fes Summit resolutions and hoped that the summit's decisions would be implemented according to schedule.

MERAAT AL OMAH also interviewed Bahraini Foreign Minister Sheikh Muhammad ibn Mubarak al Khalifah, who said, in reference to Iran's spiritual leader Ayatollah Khomeyni that "any leader who wants to spread his principles and ideas to other countries has to first deeply believe in them himself, meaning that if he wants his principles to be popular in the outside world, he has to prove them inside his country and between his people."

Sheikh Muhammad went on "Iran seeks to spread its revolution but, we believe that co-existence in the region should continue without interference in the internal affairs of independent states."

"We can confront any aggression and plots directed against us by strengthening our economic, defensive and security sectors, will weaken the influence of intruders in our countries' affairs," he added.

The Bahraini foreign minister said "the Gulf Cooperation Council converts all the differences in our region into understanding."

"We are in a wealth self-sufficient region which helps us work for the interests of the area and for our people's welfare. This will make us strong enough to face those who desire our destruction," he concluded.

The magazine held another interview with Bahraini Information Minister Tariq 'abd Ar-Rahman al-Mu'ayyad, who said "the information field is the source of strength to the [word indistinct]. And the main change in the media policy of (?the gulf) states is that it focuses on the region's peoples as one who share a joint future."

On the role of the Arab League media, the Bahraini information minister said "regrettable, the Arab League's media is concerned mainly with the opinions of foreign media rather than the Arab one."

On the Chatilla and Sabra refugee camp massacres committed by Israel against the Palestinian people last summer, Al-Mu-ayyad said "do not blame the GCC media if it did not participate more in [word indistinct] public opinion which condemned atrocious massacres committed by the Zionist state. This should have been done through the Arab League media in order to represent the opinion of the Arab masses."

CSO: 4400/161

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

UAE PAPER ON TACKLING GULF IMMIGRATION PROBLEM

GF170906 Abu Dhabi WAM in Arabic 0705 GMT 17 Jan 83

[Text] Ash-Shariqah, 17 Jan (WAM)--[The UAE paper] AL-KHALIJ called for the quick tackling of the issue of immigration to the gulf countries before this issue becomes a major concern and becomes as the Arab proverb goes "The straw that broke the camel's back." The paper added that, so far, there has been no overwhelming or great problem resulting from the imbalance of the huge immigration to the gulf countries; but the accumulation of unsolved problems is bringing the situation on the verge of an explosion.

The paper referred to the appearance of certain phenomena as a result of this problem such as cities where the majority of the population are bachelors and the spread of certain diseases among laborers.

The paper added that the number of immigrant laborers--according to the paper's estimate--are now between 5 million and 5.5 million. The paper said: If immigration continues as it is now then 45.4 percent of the gulf's population in 1985 will be made up of laborers, 58.2 percent in 1990 and 74.6 percent in 1995. By the year 2000 the percentage of immigrants will be 95.6 percent of the gulf's population. In other words, if matters continue at the present rate then in less than 20 years, gulf citizens would make up less than 5 percent of the population.

CSO: 4400/161

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

UAE PAPER ON FOREIGN LABOR IN GULF COUNTRIES

GF161028 Abu Dhabi WAM in Arabic 0650 GMT 16 Jan 83

[Text] Al-Shariqah, 16 Jan (QAM)--[The UAE paper] AL-KHALIJ has noted that the issue of foreign labor in the Arab Gulf countries "is a time bomb ready to explode--to serve vicious goals and plans antagonist to national sovereignty and Arab cultural identity--to become a direct threat to the life and the security of every citizen in the Arab Gulf countries." The paper called for "developing a unified and comprehensive plan to rid the Arab Gulf countries of this danger that lives with us every day and night."

The paper indicated that the seminar currently being held in Kuwait in which the sons of the Arabian Gulf and Arab researchers and thinkers (?are participating) is an advanced step in exploring methods and useful means that could help avert the danger stemming from foreign labor in all the Arab Gulf countries.

CSO: 4400/161

ALGERIA

DEVELOPMENT AND POPULATION GROWTH EXAMINED

Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 14 Nov 82 p 7

[Text] The start of every school year reminds us of the disturbing problem of the galloping demography in our country. Demographic growth has experienced a continued and undisrupted rate of growth since independence. The birth rate registered is one of the highest in the world: From 2.7 percent for the period 1951-1955, it went to 3.4 per cent for 1980. It indicates a very high fertility (the average number of descendants for a married woman aged 15 to 49 is 7 children).

As to the mortality rate, it has continued to decline, verging upon 1.1 percent in 1981.

With the rapid deviation in birth and death rates, the result is a very large natural demographic growth: 540,000 in 1977, 597,000 in 1980, 622,000 in 1981. Thus, the number of Algerians tripled during colonization (1830-1962); it doubled during the last 20 years, and it will probably double within the next 20 to 25 years. This allows us to speak, in the light of the historic conditions in Algeria, of a demographic tidal wave.

The age structure of the Algerian population is characterized by an expansion at the base of the pyramid. At the beginning of 1982, 1 Algerian out of 4 was under 7 years of age, 1 Algerian out of 4 was of school age, 1 Algerian out of 2 had not yet reached voting age (18).

The acceleration in population growth brings about, first and foremost, growth in the younger age population. Thus, at the present stage of Algeria's socio-economic development, this age group presents a number of social and economic problems related to the formation, from the economic point of view, of an unfavorable age structure, where a constantly restricted number of producers provides for the existence of a constantly growing number of categories of persons of unproductive age. Also, even if all the active population (18-59 years of age) were working full time, each worker would have to provide for the needs of 5 to 6 persons.

Along with such a high demographic rate, the Algerian economy, at its present stage of development, is experiencing difficulties in providing schools and employment for all the population of school and working age. Thus, in spite

of the considerable efforts in the education sector, not more than 77.5 percent of the school-age population was in school in 1981, with considerable regional disparities (93 percent in school in Algiers, 54 percent in the Titteri). The employment situation, in spite of the progress noted, also presents problems, because of the effects of the high demographic rate. Indeed, according to its present economic capacities, our country will be unable, at least in the medium term, to provide sufficient jobs for the large number of young people coming into the job market each year and to gradually reduce current unemployment.

From the point of view of historical comparison, the high population growth rate in Algeria is taking place at an earlier stage of the country's economic development than it did in the currently industrialized countries. In Great Britain, for example, the peak of the demographic growth rate coincided with a period in which the country was already strongly industrialized. Further, the highest period of natural population growth in the currently industrialized countries never exceeded 15 per thousand annually, whereas at present in Algeria, it exceeds 32 per thousand, which represents a doubling of the population in about 20 years.

Algeria has opted for planned socioeconomic development. From this option, it follows that any concrete economic and social development should be worked out, taking into account at the same time the objective possibilities, needs, economic and social constraints and priorities of each stage of development.

All observations are in agreement in indicating that at the present stage of Algerian development the high demographic growth rate that the country is experiencing is of no help in accelerating its economic and social development. On the contrary, it is probably an obstacle in this respect. Indeed, the rapid growth of a population whose needs must be met drains revenues which could more usefully be devoted to long-term investments in the fields of production equipment, education or other forms of fixed capital.

Consequently, the reasons for regulating these births are today sufficiently strong in our country to have a policy planning these births worked out and applied. Even if economic and social development in itself undoubtedly leads to regulating the growth in the birth rate, the direct need for intensive family planning programs is widely known today. The position which consists of denying the need for any intervention aimed at lowering the current birth rate seems hardly tenable, so great are the socioeconomic difficulties caused by our country's too exuberant birth rate.

There are some who affirm that the Islamic religion is opposed to a reduction in the birth rate. To our knowledge, Islam indeed allows the prevention of births when this would appear necessary. And at the present stage of our country's socioeconomic development, this prevention is necessary if it is to emerge rapidly from its underdevelopment.

ABU GHAZALAH INTERVIEWED BY 'ROSE AL-YUSUF'

PM181457 Cairo ROSE AL-YUSUF in Arabic 17 Jan 83 pp 6-11, 70

[Interview with Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defense and War Production Marshal 'Abd al-Halim Abu Ghazalah by 'Adil Hammudah, presumably in Cairo--date not given]

[Excerpts] [Passage omitted] [Question] Is it part of the Egyptian military schools' new ideas to build roads and repair telephones and sewage systems? I tell you very frankly that there are those who maintain that the army's participation in civilian affairs would take us back to the era of Marshal [Abd al-Hakim] 'Amir, when the army had a hand in everything from buses to soccer and from agrarian reform to the committees for the liquidation of feudalism. Are these fears justified or are they just figments of imagination?

[Answer] What the armed forces are doing in the field of civil services is only meant to serve the national interest. I never had in mind an ambition to achieve fame or reach a certain position. All I ask of God is to enable the armed forces to accomplish their mission for the good of this homeland. [passage omitted]

[Question] There is another criticism. It is directed at your desire to activate the arms industry in Egypt. Some people maintain that this would turn us into arms merchants and that, despite our long experience in military production, we would never be able to compete. They add that even if we manage to compete, where are the markets for such products, particularly since the Arabs still prefer to purchase arms from the West, even at a higher price than ours?

[Answer] There is a very important issue. I maintain that military industry is very important for the Arab nation. I also say that Egypt has the main prerequisites for such industry, such as experts, an industrial base, and the necessary technology, which we either have or could easily import from abroad. All we need is finance and marketing. As far as finance is concerned we are in a somewhat tight spot. For such industry to succeed it must rely on foreign markets because the Egyptian market alone is not enough to make it a profitable industry. [passage omitted]

[Question] There are still other issues on which you have been criticized and we need an answer from you. I hope that you have enough patience for the next attack.

[Answer] Go ahead.

[Question] I refer to the issue raised by American journalist Jack Anderson relating to commissions on the transportation of U.S. arms to Egypt.

[Answer] That is unfounded and the answer has already been given.

[Question] Why has this matter been raised now? The incidents Anderson spoke about are 4 years old.

[Answer] When analyzing this issue one should bear in mind two important points: the first point is that under U.S. law a journalist does not have to reveal his sources of information. This right is frequently exploited by journalists when they publish false reports. They say: We heard or learned such and such from our private sources. In this particular case Anderson did not have any substantiating documents. He just relied on his legal right not to reveal his source of information. When we asked the U.S. Justice Department to clarify matters its reply was that the investigations revealed nothing to discredit the Egyptian side in any way.

The other point is this: Egypt now and then some people try to mine and blow up the bridges of U.S.-Egyptian relations and they time this to coincide with a visit by a ranking Egyptian official to the United States. This is definitely a part of the work of and pressure exerted by Egypt's enemies.

[Question] How could Egypt's concept of national security be fulfilled against the background of superpower conflicts and vital interests in the region?

[Answer] We study the world strategies and try to accurately read the strategies of the various powers in the region. Each side certainly has objectives which it hopes to achieve in the area. We try to chart our course in the light of these strategies and objectives in such a way as to benefit from them and resist what is against our interests.

[Question] In theory, these are beautiful words, but practice is quite a different matter.

[Answer] Naturally these are obstacles. There are factors which impede the implementation of this policy. For example, the Arab attitude prevents us taking advantage of the conflict between the superpowers in this region and in other inflammable areas in Africa. This is why we say that it is very important to turn to the Arabs, but this should be a reciprocal process. Egypt should move toward the Arabs and the Arabs should move toward Egypt. In Africa, we should defuse the bombs in areas of tension and remove the explosive elements because this serves our interests and ensures our progress in Africa. What do we do when we see African states getting together with other African states? The Africans believe that Egypt contributed much to

their independence. Therefore we must extend our hand to them. True, our economic position is difficult but there are numerous ways of cooperation. Experts are one example.

[Question] What are the obstacles standing in the way of Egyptian-Arab rapprochement?

[Answer] The Palestinian question is the main obstacle. There is also what is happening in Lebanon, and the gulf war, not to mention the tension between Somalia and Ethiopia and South Yemen and Oman, and more. If we could play a part in all this there would be no problem of rapprochement between Egypt and the Arabs.

[Question] But these problems and obstacles are difficult to solve and surmount.

[Answer] This is a reality and we must overcome it. The Arabs blame us for having peace with Israel. If the Palestinian problem was solved Arab-Egyptian estrangement would be meaningless. Look also at Egypt's role in Lebanon. A settlement of the Palestinian question would add to Egypt's weight. Iraq and the other Arab states are well aware of Egypt's weight and of its support for Iraq. Egypt's aid for Iraq has eased the boycott, which had been complete, and has opened the way for contacts. This is because the Arabs realize that an Iraqi defeat would place Khomeyni in a position to threaten the other gulf states.

The Egyptian man in the street must believe that this military aid is beneficial not only to Egypt's national security but also to Egypt's economy. In view of Egypt's attitude toward Iraq, the Arabs have now increased their investments in Egypt, having realized that Egypt's role is indispensable.

[Question] At any rate we will dwell on these troubles in detail later, but before we leave the superpower plans, allow me to ask: Why has Egypt refused to take part in the U.S. rapid deployment exercises? Does it have anything to do with the tension in U.S.-Egyptian relations?

[Answer] No. We postponed the exercises, because if one year we see no advantage in holding the exercises, we do not hold them. Last year we were very busy and we had training commitments, so we said: We do not want these exercises this year. We agreed to postpone them, but this has not harmed our relations with the United States. As usual, some people have tried to exploit the postponement by claiming, with emphasis, that U.S.-Egyptian relations are in trouble, but our relations are excellent.

[Question] Let us go back to the tensions in the region. Perhaps the important question on the mind of every Egyptian, since the announcement that half of Israel's forces are deployed on its borders with Egypt, despite its invasion of Lebanon and its peace with Egypt--this announcement and Israeli propaganda have aroused the anxiety of the Egyptian man in the street and given rise to questions about the possibility of a new Israeli invasion of Sinai and our ability to repulse such an invasion.

[Answer] All Egyptians should rest assured that Egypt is not Syria or Lebanon.

[Question] What are your expectations regarding the future of the Palestinian resistance?

[Answer] If the Palestinian problem is solved and the West Bank and Gaza are given to the Palestinian state the word resistance would be meaningless. I expect this problem to be solved and expect that there will be a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza linked in one way or another to Jordan, especially if the Palestinians get together and agreed with King Husayn.

[Question] Let us shift to the gulf war. Many foreign news agencies and Western papers have claimed that there are North Korean experts in Iran's operations room and Egyptian experts in Iraq's operations room. The most moderate of these agencies and papers say only that Iraq changed its military plans as a result of advice by Egyptian experts. What is your comment?

[Answer] Words are one thing and the truth is quite another. We have had contacts with Iraq. We do not deny this. Everybody knows it, but there isn't one Egyptian in the Iraqi operations room. The war is completely run by the Iraqis themselves.

[Question] This war has been raging for a long time. Nobody seems to understand it anymore.

[Answer] The war has continued for a long time because the powers behind it do not want to settle it. This is certain. If they wanted to end the war they would have supported one side to the point of enabling it to win. This has not happened and will not happen in the near future. The superpowers have interests in Iraq as well as in Iran. The Soviets and the Americans want to put their affairs in order in the two countries before putting an end to the war. [passage omitted]

CSO: 4500/59

EGYPT CLAIMING COMPENSATION FROM GULF COUNTRIES

PM190915 Cairo ROSE AL-YUSUF in Arabic 10 Jan 83 p 7

[Majdi Muhanna report: "25 January: Date for Hearing Case of Arab Industrialization Authority"]

[Text] on 25 January 1983 the northern Cairo court will hear the case filed by the Egyptian Government against the Arab countries that are members of the Arab Industrialization Authority.

Egypt is demanding from the 3 member states [Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar] compensation totaling \$125 million, 30 million Egyptian pounds and 30 million pounds sterling plus 4 percent annual interest from the date the case was filed in 1979 up to the date the compensation is paid, because of the withdrawal of the 3 countries from the Industrialization Authority on 13 May 1979.

The Egyptian Government's claim is based on the fact that the withdrawal of the 3 countries was in violation of the founding agreement establishing the Arab Industrialization Authority on 29 April 1975 because the decision dissolving the authority was not taken unanimously by the 4 member states and was not issued in accordance with the provisions of the agreement.

CSO: 4500/59

OFFICER DISCUSSES POLICE PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT

Cairo AL-AMN AL-'AMM in Arabic No 99, Oct 82 pp 37-41

[Article by Maj Hamdi Sha'ban: "Human Relations in the Police"]

[Text] Modern administrative statutes in all organizations are proceeding to devote attention to the human element in their organization, with the goal of attaining the highest possible degree of production and success. Management scholars underline the importance of devoting attention to the human role in management. The individual and the group (which are the basis of the human element in any administrative organization) are not just mute instruments manipulated by automatic buttons in order to produce what is desired of them -- rather, they are human beings made of flesh and blood who feel happiness, pain, fear, and devotion, are happy and get angry.

Therefore the early pioneers in human relations, as a new science, have sought to investigate human conduct through study and analysis, in hopes of finding the appropriate scientific and practical solutions to all problems of society and management. That does not mean that human relationships, in themselves, are a new innovative branch of management science. Rather, in reality, they are very longstanding elements in the world of man, because the satisfaction of man's social and psychological needs is based on relations with others and is the result of interaction among individuals.

The Nature of Human Relations

Human relations, in the lexicon, mean "relations or bonds among people." There is no doubt that human relations have the goal of improving and strengthening such relations, so that intimacy and brotherhood among the members of the society or the organization may be prevalent. This is as far as the lexical aspect goes.

In terms of the scientific aspect, many scholars have made their own efforts to set out definitions of these relations. The most important of them are:

1. The fact that human relations seek to create harmony in administrative activity between individuals and the organization and to prepare a proper climate in which individuals may function in a group atmosphere at high productive competence.

2. Some people have said that these are "the type of working relations that make each party view the other as a human being, that is, a reacting cognitive being, more than a logical, rational, methodical being, one who feels and moves, is agitated, hesitates, is afraid, loves, and hates for reasons which might be valid or might be attributable to illusory factors which exist only in their imaginations."

3. There are people who define human relations as "adapting individuals to work locations, providing psychological satisfaction for them, and motivating them to cooperate, exert maximum effort, increase output and raise the level of service performance."

4. There are people who have defined them as "relations with one or more persons which involve a solution to a certain problem afflicting one of them, with the goal of raising morale and creating an orderly atmosphere within the organization."

From the all of the foregoing, we can spell out a comprehensive definition of human relations, as follows:

"Human relations are spontaneous mutual relations between two parties in the organization, where the first party (management in the organization) is concerned with providing material, psychological and social needs so that the second party (the individuals) may work securely and in confidence about the present and future and thus will proceed to perform the work with the utmost capability and effort through their own choice and conviction."

The Importance of Human Relations in the Police

The police apparatus is one of the service agencies, that is, agencies that are competent to perform services, of the executive authorities in Egyptian society. Therefore, it is not an agency that produces specific goods. That is an essential difference between human relations in productive economic agencies such as the Ministries of Industry or Agriculture, for instance, and those in service agencies. In the former, wages are an incentive to increase production, and there the problems of human relations are simple and limited, while, in the latter, since wages are not linked to production, the responsibility of human and public relations is greater, since management can offer only moral incentives and individual and group motivation.

In view of the importance of the role policemen play in their locations, in addition to the high level of wages of people working in the public sector and individual activity, and the perceptible leap that has been observed in recent years, in the course of the seventies and eighties, in the wages and salaries of persons working in the public sector and the government, along with the concomitant rise in the prices of commodities and foodstuffs, which has resulted in a perceptible relative decline in the salaries of policemen, their material and social problems as a consequence have increased.

For all these reasons, human relations in the police become an inevitable necessity as a means for helping to provide a suitable atmosphere for people in the police and prompt them to work willingly and with commitment by providing them and their families with health and social care.

Many colleagues have ventured to write about human relations in the police, in the course of a number of articles on a number of occasions, but the recent emergence of the Central Security Agency among other companion Interior Ministry departments and directorates, and considerations of the nature of work in this sort of agency, and similar agencies of internal order, such as the security teams, water surface [patrols] and civil defense, make it mandatory that we shed light on the role human relations can play in this service.

Human Relations in the Central Reserve and Agencies Which Are Predominantly Military in Character

Ministerial Decree 1010 for 1969 regarding the organization and establishment of the General Department of Central Reserve Forces provides this definition: "This is a general security sector agency. It consists of military forces that are composed of battalions, companies and platoons at a high level of training that are engaged in coping with missions, disturbances or acts of unrest that the traditional police forces might be incapable of coping with and that are entrusted to them by the minister of the interior or whoever he delegates in this regard."

Many ministerial decrees have been produced regarding this abovementioned decree, concerned with the organization of the General Central Reserve Forces Department. However, they endorse the substance of the notion in whose context this agency was established, which is that the General Central Reserve Forces Department concentrates on the preparation of specially trained forces to cope with disturbances and acts of unrest that the traditional police forces might be incapable of coping with, and, with thanks to God, they have always taken a favorable attitude toward it and its exceptional personnel.

The central reserves are a military apparatus that is dependent on strong human support. Since this is their nature, their need for good human relations among members is urgent and essential and of a special kind.

It is worth pointing out that human relations in the General Central Reserve Forces Department and similar units which resemble its organization though differing in objectives, such as the security teams, civil defense and so forth, are very important, because these sorts of military formations and units are based on strong (human) support, which are the source of their strength and success. The level of this success grows in terms of the goals assigned to them, as their success in overcoming the problems to which this support is exposed is realized and as their members' material, social and psychological requirements are met.

To describe the operating methods of the human relations positions in police agencies which are predominantly military in nature, we should point out that the human support in these agencies is broken down into a number of levels:

A. Officers.

B. Personnel (warrant officers, assistant warrant officers, noncommissioned officers and privates).

C. Civilian employees.

D. Recruits.

The fact is that human relations services in the central reserve and similar units, in the case of officers, personnel and civilian employees, do not go much beyond the services the Human Relations Department in the ministry provides. Here our role is restricted to being the link between this department and these officers, personnel and civilian employees, in addition to constant direct contact with circumstances of their lives and careful daily followup of their conditions and problems. Describing these functions would require going into details which are not the subject of this article.

The role human relations play in the case of recruits, who constitute the broad base of the Central Reserve Forces and similar military police organizations, is important and vital. We will deal with that in terms of the fields of the health, social and cultural care the recruits receive during their 3-year tour of police service.

Human Relations for Recruits in the Police

The human services which must be made provided for recruits vary as the recruitment stages vary. The more these stages change, the more the recruits' needs, problems and demands change, taking new forms which assume new circumstances as the situations the recruited persons go through assume new directions. No matter what type of service is offered to recruits or their families, they are all means for helping and making it possible to create social harmony for them. Their personnel must have positive, effective attitudes and they must benefit from their resources to the greatest possible degree. We can spell out the functions of human relations for police recruits as follows:

1. Striving to create social adjustment for personnel in the new environment and to provide them with psychological and family stability in the context of human and material treatment.
2. Guaranteeing recruits and their families all the rights citizens in the government enjoy. They are our children and our brothers and are engaged in performing a sacred national duty.
3. Striving to raise the morale of recruits in their positions by offering them all forms of services to guarantee the attainment of a high level of service capability and full-time devotion to it.
4. Eliminating obstacles that might have an effect on their training level.

The purpose behind the abovementioned services is to bring about two basic objectives:

The first objective:

To make optimum use of recruits to achieve the agency's goals.

The second objective:

To raise the personnel's cultural and environmental level in order to benefit from them in the development process, following their return to civilian life after the recruitment stage.

One: Preparatory Stages of Orienting Recruits

Training centers in the police receive recruits as unfinished, naive persons who generally suffer from a number of different types of endemic diseases like bilharzia, ankylostoma and other internal ailments, as well as numerous psychological and social problems resulting from their sudden introduction into military service.

Thus receiving these unfinished persons with exceptional sensitivity and special care becomes a process that is made obligatory and is necessary at the same time; in addition, it is necessary that they be oriented in order to receive doses of the stipulated military training immediately on recruitment, in order that they may be rid of the problems and their psychological state may be conditioned to accept the military life which is new to them, and at the same time different.

If one can say that every drop of sweat exerted on the training field will save much blood during combat and confrontation, we can say that every form of psychological and social attention given the recruit will bring about performance level that is superior to that derived from years of training. Recruits come to us bearing elements of anxiety, tension, fear and apprehension, leaving their civilian jobs and their family lives behind them and weighted down with problems that need care and attention.

Therefore we can summarize the requisite care as follows:

1. The effort to investigate the psychological pressures the new recruits are suffering from, by introducing them to the nature of military life, its traditions and its systems.
2. Informing them of rights, benefits, services, modes of social care and ways of benefiting from them; these include salaries, recreation and various forms of financial aid which the Central Reserves, for instance, or the ministry in general provide them.
3. Adopting the necessary measures for retaining the jobs of certain recruits, if they exist, which is rare.
4. Investigating the various complaints related to medical and family considerations and transferring them to specialists so that they may be studied and looked into rapidly.
5. Presenting special cases to unit doctors and handing them over to the police hospital or the closest public hospital. One should observe that some

officers working in certain police military units are not aware of the procedures regarding the health care the ministry provides for recruits, which deprives recruits of many opportunities for treatment and makes them lose confidence in the apparatus. The following is a summary of the health care procedures followed:

Transfer of sick recruits to unit doctors, who can provide them with the necessary treatment or hand them over to the police hospital or the closest public hospital if the matter so requires.

In cases where sick recruits need review or treatment in outside hospitals, or in refractory cases, the sick recruits' papers are sent along with the clinic forms on which the treating physician notes down the requisite treatment, along with a letter transferring the recruits to the human relations department in the unit, department or bureau.

The human relations officer in this main body will write a letter transferring the recruits to the Health Care Department of the Central Medical Services Department, whose location now is the Police Hospital in al-'Ajuzah.

The Health Care Department transfers sick recruits to the body in which treatment is available for the recruits (the hospital, treatment center, sanatorium, analysis laboratory, medical care center and so forth) at the expense of the Ministry of the Interior.

With respect to security forces departments in which there are more than 1,000 recruits, the ministry (human relations) will provide token compensation to a local health physician to solve the problem raised by the impossibility of appointing a resident physician to these departments.

Two: In the Security Forces Camps and Departments

After the recruits' first training stage, which takes between 3 and 6 months, if the abovementioned health and social care has been provided for recruits during this period in the preparatory stages, the recruits will become more settled in terms of their psychological state and their health, and they will have become adjusted to their military life and will perform their duties as thoroughly as possible.

After this period ends, the recruits are distributed to Central Reserve Forces camps, security forces departments and similar bodies. At this stage, proper influences on the recruits' personality are necessary and they need to be transformed into strong recruits who have the training and physical fitness that will fully qualify them to perform their duties. That requires the following:

A. Good models.

Here the unit leaders are the most important sources of models as far as recruits go. The prime responsibility for providing strong influence for the

personalities of the recruits, through what their eyes can see and the conduct they can sense, lies on them. Here the role of the platoon or company commander remains of a higher order than that of the battalion or area commander throughout the entire period of contact and interaction.

It is in this period that recruits acquire proper appearance, freedom, order, sincere cooperation on the job and accuracy in performance from their commanders.

B. Social and cultural care.

This constitutes the overall social and cultural care given the recruits and the solution to family problems which cause the constant anxiety or tension, disrupt their thinking or prompt them to flee service or be absent without permission.

The element of contact and companionship here constitutes the main portion of the care recruits receive, and requires that the officer, as a commander, stay close to his recruits, be apprised of their problems, live closely with them, work to solve their problems and offer them affection and good treatment through his close presence.

C. National guidance.

It is of the utmost importance that recruits be given a form of national guidance that is aimed at developing the spirit of nationalism and patriotism among them, implanting the spirit of allegiance to the nation and the agency, simplifying information and informing them of development in national and international events which are unfolding and developing around them every day.

D. Religious guidance.

Religion is not just a matter of performing rituals and delivering exhortations -- it is a comprehensive system which includes the principles and the organization of religious and day-to-day conduct. We may find that religious inhibitions are strong and violent in the overwhelming majority of our recruits. Here it is the role of the commanders to organize this orientation, simplify the rules of religion, purify them of the flaws which might be fixed in the recruits' minds regarding them, and, by seeking the aid of specialists in the Ministry of Religious Endowments, al-Azhar and other bodies to which the task of Exhortation, guidance and the most important principles of religious guidance have been entrusted, explain [the following] to them:

A. The performance of religious rituals.

B. Celebration of the various religious occasions.

C. The connection between military traditions and religion.

D. The description of simple religious rules which possess profound spiritual significance, such as cleanliness in devotion, obedience and its relationship to order, friendship, compassion, trust and so forth.

D. The elimination of illiteracy.

One of the most sacred missions officers must perform in the military and training field is that of eradicating illiteracy among the personnel under his care, through his own efforts or through recourse to the anti-illiteracy programs which the training sector in the Training Department or the Ministry of Education organizes, and of monitoring recruits who make progress and rewarding them with leaves or token bonuses.

Three: Upon Completion of the Recruits' Service

It should be observed that the recruit's marginal utility, if one may use the expression, reaches its peak at the end of his third year of service. Therefore, the following must be observed:

Continued health and social care for the recruit.

Continued supervision of meals given the recruit in terms of quantity, type and sanitation.

Ascertaining the circumstances of the recruits' civilian life following their release from service. Few recruits have the ability to return to agricultural work, and therefore the recruits here need to find other work at which they can make a living; they can be assisted in this regard by being directed to companies, factories and ministries that need them for guard and security services.

It is also necessary to exert substantial efforts to entice a number of them to work in the police so that one may benefit from their expertise in training and so forth, in order to meet the obvious shortage in the numbers of privates first class.

Following up on the conferring of certificates of completion of service, ascertaining that they are devoid of errors and offering aid to recruits who have been discharged in this area, in order to gain their colleagues' trust.

Following up on the disposition of bonuses and other financial entitlements that are given out to recruits upon their completion of service.

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DISCIPLINARY HEARING PROCEDURES REVIEWED

Cairo AL-AMN AL-'AMM in Arabic No 99, Oct 82 pp 21-26

[Article by Maj Gen Ahmad Fu'ad Kamil: "Disciplinary Trial Procedures"]

[Text] The legislative authorities have deemed it appropriate that management should retain its traditional power to impose certain light penalties on workers, in order to cope with violations of minor importance or limited effects. Meanwhile they have, in the case of severe penalties - those in which these authorities' estimation should exceed deductions from salary - established disciplinary bodies which are formed specially to guarantee greater assurances that these sorts of punishments, which might reach the level of termination from one's position, are imposed.

These judiciary bodies issue decrees which are not subject to review by the administrative authorities and indeed do not require approval by them.

One can state that the disciplinary authorities here are at times administrative and at times judiciary.

Areas of Competence of the Disciplinary Courts

The areas of competence of these courts are purely disciplinary. Therefore these courts do not deal with matters like civil rights claims before criminal courts, and workers cannot demand compensation before them. Workers may also suffer material or moral damage because of the allegations made against them in the decrees submitted [to trial].

The Central Accounting Agency may not demand that a verdict regarding a worker be handed down, alongside the penalty, stating that the government will be compensated for the harm inflicted on it because of financial violations.

In addition, the court may not rule that a worker who has committed a violation must offer compensation for other persons or return the government property he has wrongfully appropriated.

Compelling workers to pay money for their obligations and collecting money from them by garnishing their salary against their will are matters that are ruled on in civil disputes which enter into the areas of competence of the judiciary bodies and are outside the jurisdiction of the disciplinary authorities, which have the right only to impose disciplinary penalties. (1)

Employment Jurisdiction

The jurisdiction of the disciplinary courts is restricted to employees who have been appointed to permanent positions. The criterion in defining permanent positions, as the Higher Administrative Court has presented it, is based on the job description that appears in the budget and the source of disposition of payment for the position, the person occupying the position must not occupy a special or basic grade which is fixed or unfixed. (2)

The jurisdiction of these disciplinary courts does not extend to groups of workers in whose respect investigation and disciplinary action are regulated by special laws, such as the members of university faculties and members of the judiciary, the Council of State, the Office of the Administrative Prosecutor and special bodies such as the police and the armed forces.

Specific Areas of Competence

The essential point is that the disciplinary courts' areas of competence are determined in accordance with the employees' employment levels at the time the disciplinary suit is filed. (3)

If their level at the time the violation was committed was different from that at the time the suit was filed, the new grade will be taken as the frame of reference for determining the competent court.

If a number of workers are involved and they occupy different grades at the time the suit is filed, the court that is competent to conduct the trial of the person occupying the highest grade will be the one that is competent to try them all, since that will offer a greater amount of guarantees and no prejudice will befall people of lower grades if they appear before such a court.

It has been ruled that if a number of persons are accused of committing a single disciplinary offense, and each of them is at a different employment level, it is mandatory that they be brought together for trial before a single body, in accordance with an obvious point of logic which is required by the public interest: it is no secret that a proliferation of trials will probably lead to conflicting verdicts or penalties, with the resulting prolongation, repetition, waste of time in procedures and other aspects which are not in keeping with the public interest.

Jurisdiction will pertain to the disciplinary court that has competence to try the persons involved who occupy the highest grade. (4)

If the persons being tried belong to different ministries, the court to which the greatest number of employees belongs will have jurisdiction. If these employees are equal in number, the competent court will be appointed by decree of the chairman of the Council of State.

If a number of persons are being tried and they belong to a single ministry but their places of residence differ, the Office of the Administrative Prosecutor will determine the competent disciplinary court.

Local Jurisdiction

The principal which holds in the case of discipline in general, whatever the nature of the authorities that impose the penalty and the nature of the legal status of the accused person might be, is that the accused person's trial will be carried out with attention to the fact that he is considered subject to the body in which the violation occurred, if he is subject to another body at the time of trial.

Workers to whom a single violation has been attributed, or to whom interrelated violations have been attributed, will be tried and punished before the court under whose jurisdiction the abovementioned violation or violations occurred.

If it is not possible to determine this, a competent court will be appointed by decree of the chairman of the Council of State. (5)

Jurisdiction in Cases of Delegation and Loans

If an officer is delegated to occupy another position within the ministry, the [relevant] disciplinary body will be the one he was appointed to work in.

However, if he was appointed or loaned out to work outside the ministry, the disciplinary authorities in the Ministry of the Interior will be competent to discipline him if any act occurs by his initiative in the body to which he is delegated or loaned out that is prejudicial to the stipulations of this law or the dignity and good repute of the police.

In this case, officers will be considered to have been attached to the last body in which they were working in the ministry before they were delegated or loaned out. (6)

It has been ruled that the laws and bills have brought the disciplinary trial of government employees into conformity with government disciplinary statutes, so that it is not permissible for any authority except the government to adopt such measures against government employees. In this case, it is not permissible to impose penalties; rather, it is up to the non-governmental body to which these employees have been loaned to convey the matter to the lending body so that the latter may adopt the appropriate legal measures in cases of this sort.

To have it otherwise, as well as harming the nature of relations between government employees on loan and the non-governmental bodies to which they are on loan, would subject the government employees who were to be disciplined to numerous non-governmental bodies, each of which have their own disciplinary system and each of whose laws have their own labor contracts, which include procedures which are deleterious to relations between government and public employees, putting them in the position of private employees who have special relationships with special non-governmental bodies.

That is a distortion and disfiguration of the relationship which is not in keeping with the employees' affiliation with the lending body and it robs them of the

guarantees consolidated or analogous disciplinary statutes in the government and government branches, along with the public bodies attached or subordinate to them stipulate. (7)

It should be noted that all rules related to the jurisdiction of disciplinary courts are related to the general statute, and they can be defended in all situations in which cases are raised against them. This is permitted to employees as it is to the Office of the Administrative Prosecutor, although it is the latter that files disciplinary cases, if, after they have been filed, a mistake has appeared in the assignment of the jurisdiction. In addition, it is permissible, and indeed is incumbent upon the court to rule, of its own accord, that it has no jurisdiction, if that is called for, because whether the jurisdiction related to the person of the worker or to the location where the violation occurred, it is determined in accordance with considerations dictated by the public interest alone, which cannot be ignored.

Disciplinary Councils in the Police

One: the preliminary disciplinary council.

This is competent to try police officers except for those at the rank of major general.

It consists of two department heads or their equivalent, who will be chosen by the minister of the interior annually, after the opinion of the Higher Police Council and an assistant counsellor from the Ministry of Interior Rulings Department in the People's Assembly has been taken.

The department head who is senior rank will chair the council. Before 1 October of each year he will issue a decree forming the council and the decree will include the selection of two standby members.

Decrees handing officers over to this council will be issued by the minister or assistant minister, and the prosecution before the council will be represented by an Interior Ministry inspector. (8)

Two: the disciplinary appeals council.

This is competent to review appeals presented by the ministry or officers regarding decrees issued by the preliminary disciplinary council.

The minister of the interior may appeal a preliminary disciplinary council decree within 30 days of the date on which it is issued by his own decree, in accordance with a request from the General Inspection and Surveillance Department.

Officers will have the right to appeal preliminary disciplinary council decrees through reports which they may present to the competent assistant minister within 30 days of the date on which they have received a notice of the decree which includes the reasons for the decree. They must convey this report to the disciplinary appeals council within 15 days.

The appeals council will be composed of the first assistant minister of the interior, as chairman, and the counsellor of state for the Ministry of the Interior and the public attorney as members.

The prosecution before this council will be represented by the director of the General Inspection and Surveillance Department or his assistant. (9)

Three: the higher disciplinary council.

This is competent to try officers at the rank of major general and above.

This will be composed as follows:

The chairman of the Cairo appeals court as chairman, with the following as members:

The public prosecutor.

An assistant minister of the interior, to be chosen by the minister of interior.

The Interior Ministry's counsellor of state.

A delegate to be chosen by the Higher Police Council, who will be one of its members.

Transfers to this council will be by decree of the minister of the interior, and the director of the General Inspection and Surveillance Department will represent the prosecution before it. (10)

Disciplinary Procedures

Decrees transferring persons to disciplinary trial will contain a statement of the charges directed against the officers. After the chairman of the court has determined the date for the trial session, the officers will be notified of the transfer decree and the date of the session through registered letter with return receipt or through their supervisor's office, and will sign the notification of receipt at least 15 days before the date specified for convening the council. The director of the General Inspection and Surveillance Department must also be informed by the same date.

Officers who are transferred to disciplinary council may read the investigations made and all papers related to them, and may make copies of them. They may request that secret annual reports on their competence or other papers be attached to the file on the disciplinary case and they may also attend the trial sessions, present their defense orally or in writing, and delegate lawyers to act in their behalf. They may choose persons who are police officers to take charge of their defense.

If any of the causes for withdrawing from reviewing the case stipulated in the law on Legal Proceedings apply regarding a disciplinary council member, he must withdraw, and the officer transferred to the court may request that he withdraw.

If any factors exist which might impede the competence of any of the members of these councils, the body to which they belong or the body which has chosen them will choose a replacement for them.

The disciplinary council may order the performance of an investigation, and it may assign the task of doing so to one of its members. (11)

If it is ruled that the accused persons are to appear before disciplinary court, if the case is delayed by the lack of their physical presence, and they fail to appear at subsequent sessions, of whose date they are perforce considered to have had knowledge, no protests that their defense was not heard, will be accepted from them as long as it was easy and feasible for them to attend but they did not do so. As a consequence, the trial will be held to have been properly carried out, in accordance with the law. (12)

If the accused persons totally fail to appear and do not appear in person or appoint anyone to appear in their behalf, the court may proceed with the trial procedures and issue a sentence against them in absentia.

The sessions of disciplinary trials will be secret unless the chairman of the court decrees to the contrary. However, the sessions will be secret only as far as the public is concerned and not as far as the accused, persons acting in their behalf, witnesses or the representative of the Office of the Administrative Prosecutor go.

One point worth mentioning is that the general law governing procedures in disciplinary courts is not the Law on Legal Proceedings but the Law on Criminal Procedures, and that reference must be made to the latter regarding every point for which provisions are not available, as long as that does not obviously contradict the nature of the disciplinary system. The condition that applies to the Procedures Law in this regard also applies to the Law on Legal Proceedings in the case of administrative judiciary bodies.

From a reading of the stipulations in being governing discipline, these, in their totality, are aimed at providing guarantees that a proper investigation will take place and facilitating the means by which the body conducting the investigation may complete it, out of the desire to realize the revelation of the truth, on the one hand, and, on the other, to enable accused employees to become apprised of the elements of the investigation and the evidence in the charge, so that they may present their defense on the matters of which they are accused.

These stipulations contain no conditions that require that the investigation be completed in a specific form or specifically detailed condition. In addition, no compensation will result if the investigation is invalid as a result of negligence in carrying it out in a specific manner. All that is necessary is that the investigation occur within the limits of general principles and that basic guarantees be observed whose logic is based on the fact that guarantees, sound practice, impartiality and the search for the truth be present, and that it be aimed at protecting the employee's rights to a defense in order to realize justice. If the facts constituting the disciplinary infraction are gathered together; if the elements of the accusation are derived in a lawful manner from their proper sources, contain papers supporting them and are supplemented by the statements of witnesses in the form of employees and others or by investigations, statements or reports presented by them; if the employee transferred to disciplinary trial is presented with all this, whether through

interrogation on these facts, through his discussion of them, or by being notified of them, so that he may present his observations or reply to them; if he is unable to read the investigations that are carried out and the papers related to them or make copies of them, if he wishes; if a response is made to his request regarding the hearing of witnesses, the inclusion of papers or reports, or the performance of procedures; and if he is permitted to present his statements, defense and observations in writing, by memorandum, or orally, in the form of a statement or legal procedure, by himself or through a person acting as his attorney - if all this is observed without disruption, then the objective which the legislative authorities had as their goal through the provisions bearing on disciplinary procedures in this regard will have been realized.

Therefore, it is essential to state that a decree transferring a person to disciplinary court is invalid if one can state that it was not preceded by an administrative investigation or investigation into the subject of the charge directed against the employee, and there will be no justification to carrying out the decree of the court if it has not heard the testimony of the administrative supervisors of the employees who are handed over to disciplinary trial.(13)

There is no dispute over the fact that disciplinary bodies may seek assistance from the opinions of experts and that appointing the latter to appear before bodies is a special task which is to be considered an investigative procedure that does not entail anything that will prevent recourse to the views of a body specializing in rules regulating the discipline or trial of employees from revealing the truth and attaining the proper results. (14)

Decrees of the Judiciary Councils

A decree will be issued by the disciplinary council, containing the reasons on which the decree is based, and it will be conveyed to the officers within 15 days of the date on which it was issued through registered letter, accompanied by return receipt, or through the officers' supervisors, after they have signed for receipt of it.

Decrees issued by the preliminary disciplinary council may be contested only through the appeal process.

If the preliminary disciplinary council rules that an officer is to be removed from service, he will, as soon as the decree is issued and until it becomes final, be suspended from his job and half his salary will be paid him. If the appeals council gives a ruling other than that the officer is to be removed, it must rule on the matter of that half of the salary whose disbursement has been suspended during this period, determining whether it is to be disbursed to the officer or he is to be deprived of it wholly or in part.

The disciplinary appeals council may not make the punishment more severe if the appeal is filed by the officer alone. If the officer and the ministry appeal the decree issued by the preliminary disciplinary council, the entire issue will as a result be presented before the disciplinary appeals council, which may make the punishment more severe or reduce it. The decree issued by the higher council will be final. The penalties which may be imposed are:

1. A warning.
2. Censure.
3. Transfer to retirement.
4. Removal from the position, along with deprivation of one-quarter of pension. (15)

The higher administrative court has considered that the matter of giving cause for disciplinary decrees is made mandatory by general legal principles and that a legislative provision stipulating that is not required. It has ruled that if the administrative decree originally specified that the cause was not to be given, the law nonetheless stipulates that such cause must be given, and disciplinary decrees, to the contrary, are decrees of a judiciary form, since they provide rulings on matters with which the judiciary is essentially concerned, and therefore must give cause.

The court is under no compulsion to pursue the particulars and details of the accused person's defense, in order to reply to each, if it has brought forth the arguments making up its opinion in general form, meanwhile stating the documents on which the defense is based. (16)

The decree will be issued by the disciplinary council, if the discipline assumes the form of a court before a body that has been formed in a special manner, in accordance with specific conditions and procedures, as set forth by law, commitment to which is binding. The decree will be founded essentially on the fact that notification of the charge directed against him was given in advance to the employee, and he may defend himself against this charge as one would in judiciary trials before the disciplinary decree is issued against him. When it is issued, the disciplinary council's jurisdiction will lapse and it will refrain from withdrawing or returning the decree, although it may be contested before another body which might be at a higher level in the appeals process or be in charge of a higher level of legal prosecution in the judiciary context, or through a differentiation or form corresponding to a contestation before the higher administrative court. (17)

Higher administrative courts will have no opportunity to effect oversight over the verdicts of disciplinary courts, except in the following cases:

1. If the contested verdict is based on a violation of the law or an error in interpreting or applying it.
2. If a defect in the verdict or a defect in the procedures leads to an effect on the verdict.
3. If the verdict is issued contrary to a previous verdict, the force [sic] of the objection which the ruling is made is permissible, whether it has used this defense or has been defended.

If none of these situations apply, if the verdict is founded on true facts which have fixed bases in the form of papers, and if the formulation is sound and the conclusions are well formed, there is no need for the higher administration court to follow up on the verdict. (18)

There is no harm in having the disciplinary council, if it has drawn on the criminal investigation that has taken place, accumulate under it the elements of the charge, with all their concomitant conditions and circumstances, because disciplinary charges are a different matter from criminal charges. Each of the two charges has its own scope and elements of which it is composed. In addition, the failure to impose criminal punishment does not prohibit disciplinary trials. (19)

The verdict that is being contested is not impaired merely if it imparts a criminal character to the act attributed to the person making the contestation, as long as the fact that it found him guilty was founded on a basis where this act was attributed to the disruption of the duties of his position and the violation of its requirements and the verdict imposed penalties that are in keeping with the gravity of this act, because it has described the act that has been committed by him as being a deviation from upright morality and proper repute and it is a sound description with which one cannot take issue. (20)

If it is ruled that it has been proved that the disciplinary court has derived the conclusions it has reached in a well-formulated manner, from principles which it has followed in the material and moral sense and has shaped in a proper form, and that this conclusion justifies the conviction on which it has built its case, there will be no scope to comment critically on it, because the court has the freedom to form its opinion from any element of the case and may to that end adopt the approach it is confident in.

The court is not to be censured if it has established its verdict of finding the contestant guilty by adopting the statements of those witnesses, if they have the effect of leading to conclusions on which the verdict has been ordered and if it has put confidence in those statements in a manner showing that it has set out the defense the contestant has presented before it, by which he had the objective of casting doubt on the validity of those statements. The points the contestant raises in this regard will be no more than an attempt to resume the controversy over the appraisal and weight of the evidence in the case. In fact, for him to raise that controversy before this court, if the testimony and the conclusions the court has reached are balanced, is an objective matter in regard to which the disciplinary court can reach independent judgment, as long as its assessment is sound and its marshalling of the evidence is well-formulated. (21)

Footnotes

1. Of verdict of the Administrative Judiciary Court of 13 February 1956, 10/205/216.
2. Of verdict of the Higher Administrative Court regarding case 1696 for year seven of the 21 December 1957 session.
3. Of verdict of the Higher Administrative Court regarding case 171-5 (6 June 1959).
4. Of verdict of the Higher Administrative Court regarding case 288-5 (16 May 1959).

5. Of Article 18 of Law 47 for 1972 regarding the Council of State.
6. Of Article 51 of the abovementioned Law 109 for 1971.
7. Of verdict of the Higher Administrative Court, 26 January 1963, 353/7.
8. Of Articles 57 and 58 of the abovementioned Law 109 for 1971.
9. Of Articles 60 and 61 of the abovementioned Law 109 for 1971.
10. Of Articles 62 and 63 of the abovementioned Law 109 for 1971.
11. Of Articles 58, 59, 60, 61 and 63 of the abovementioned Law 109 for 1971.
12. Of verdict of the Higher Administrative Court regarding case 177-9 (22 March 1961).
13. Of verdict of the Higher Administrative Court regarding Case 1004-5 (27 February 1950).
14. Of verdict of the Higher Administrative Court regarding case 1456-8 (23 January 1967).
15. Of Articles 59, 60, 61Q and 62Q4.
16. Of verdict of the Higher Administrative Court regarding case 1203-11 (28 January 1961).
17. Of verdict of the Higher Administrative Court regarding case 8-2 (26 April 1960).
18. Of verdict of the Higher Administrative Court regarding case 1004-5 (27 February 1960).
19. Of verdict of the Higher Administrative Court issued on 1 May 1955 for year 9R.
20. Of verdict of the Higher Administrative Court regarding case 1230-9 (8 April 1967).
21. Of verdict of the Higher Administrative Court regarding case 1930-9 (8 April 1967).

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EXPERT DESCRIBES SYSTEM OF PUNISHMENT IN DOMESTIC PRISONS

Cairo AL-AMN AL-'AMM in Arabic No 99, Oct 82 pp 76-78

[Article by Dr Edward Jurays Bishay: "Increase You Knowledge of Egyptian Prisons"]

[Text] 1. The first prison Muhammad 'Ali constructed in Egypt after assuming power by order of the Ottoman sultan was the one he established in his place of residence in the Citadel. He called that the al-'Anabtiyah Prison.

In addition, various other prisons had existed in Egypt in eras prior to that of Muhammad 'Ali.

2. On 10 February 1884, the Department of Prisons was established by decree of the Council of Overseers.

3. The first director general of the Department of Prisons was Dr Harry Cruikshank Pasha, who was appointed on 21 February 1884.

4. The first Egyptian director general of the Department of Prisons was the late Col Mahmud Sami Bey, who was appointed 12 June 1924.

5. The first legislative bill regulating activity in Egyptian prisons was issued by plenipotentiary orders on 12 March 1885.

6. On 12 April 1885, the Department of Prisons was designated an inspectorate general subordinate to the Ministry of the Interior's Department of Audits and Assessment. Cruikshank Pasha was appointed its inspector general. It remained an inspectorate general headed by an inspector general until it was separated from the Audits and Assessments Department on 21 October 1889 and attached directly to the Ministry of the Interior. Its head was called the director general of prisons.

7. On 20 August 1939, the Prison Department was made subordinate to the Ministry of Social Affairs, which was established on that date.

8. On 30 November 1947, jurisdiction over the Department of Prisons was transferred from the Ministry of Social Affairs to the Ministry of National Defense (subsequently the War Ministry).

9. On 14 March 1956, a Council of Ministers decree was issued severing it from the War Ministry and restoring jurisdiction over it to the Ministry of the Interior.

10. In 1955, prisoners were emancipated from leg irons.

11. Prisoners are placed in administrative grades when they are put in prison:

Grad One.

Grade Two.

Grade Three.

At the outset, prisoners are put in Administrative Grade Three, and then they are promoted if their behavior and deportment is good and the whole period of their appointment to the grade has elapsed.

With respect to people who are sentenced to jail, a year must elapse.

With respect to people who are sentenced to hard labor, 3 years must elapse.

However, people 55 years of age, on being put in prison, are put in Grade Two at the outset.

People 60 years of age, on being put in prison, are put in Grade One.

The grade system is used as a means of reform and a way to encourage prisoners to improve their conduct. If their behavior and deportment are good, they will be promoted after spending the stipulated period for their eve of punishment; they may be demoted to a lower grade if their behavior is improper.

With each grade of promotion, the prisoner is given a greater amount of benefits with respect to the following points:

- A. Beds, covers and furniture.
- B. Access to the food their visitors give them during visits.
- C. The right to keep books, magazines, newspapers and family pictures.
- D. An increase in the sums they are permitted to spend in the canteen.
- E. The right to keep lights on in their rooms after the stipulated time, at their own expense.

12. Government and free crafts in the prisons.

Government crafts are financed out of the government budget; these produce the accessories and clothing required for the prisoners' living conditions.

Free crafts are essentially financed out of the profits of the prison canteen, and they now are in possession of private revolving capital. They produce goods that are sold to the public.

If the prisoner works in a government craft, he is entitled to a fixed daily wage. Prisoners who work in free crafts are entitled to a percentage of the profits from the sales of products.

Among the government crafts in the prisons are textile, weaving and soap production, plumbing, mechanical work, carpentry, shoes, brooms, and brushes, and the production of the bread required by prisoners and guards.

Among the free crafts are furniture, rug, shoes, women's ornaments, and porcelain product production and the production of the bread needed for security groups or bread sold to the public.

13. The Prison Stocks.

In every prison there are stocks. These are a wooden instrument with two arms and legs installed on a base on which a prisoner who is to be disciplined by being flogged stands. He is fastened to it, his arms tied to its arms and his legs to its legs. In the front of the instrument's head is a round opening through which the head of the offending prisoner protrudes.

The flogging is done by means of a whip consisting of a number of thin ropes. In each rope in it there are equidistant knots at intervals of 1 inch. These ropes are attached to a thick stick by a stout knot.

Before this whip is used, the guard who wields it makes sure to put the ropes of the whip into a vessel containing water in which salt and lime have been dissolved, so that if it is used subsequently the ropes will be as dry as the stick.

To carry out the punishment of flogging, a fearful display is put on in the prison. The prisoners are lined up on three sides of a rectangle, with the stocks set in the middle of the rectangle. The executive committee consisting of officers attend the order to carry out the punishment, along with the guard who wields the whip, the prison doctor and a nurse.

Before the flogging takes place, the prison doctor performs a medical examination on the offending prisoner to ascertain his physical state, especially that of his heart, so that he can endure the lashing inflicted upon him.

The process is carried out by having the officer ready the order for execution - "one, two" and so forth. At each count, the guard wielding the whip brings it down on the back of the offending prisoner, and a drop of blood emerges from the place where each of the knots on the ropes has landed. The officer continues to order the count in this fashion, and the guard wielding the whip follows him by delivering the blows. The drops of blood continue to come out, and the back turns blue and red in color until the number of lashes that have been decreed has been reached. The nurse then proceeds to salve the back with some unguents and the offender is taken down off the stocks.

We might point out that the maximum number of lashes that can be decreed, no matter what the crime or violation might be, is 36.

Flogging, although it might seem cruel, is a necessary punishment, and it is applied only in the case of grave violations such as cases of:

Escape or the initiative to escape; mass mutiny by prisoners; theft or the reproduction of prison keys; the deliberate loss of prison records or prisoners'

papers, or the introduction of changes in them or the initiative to do that; acquisition or ownership of objects which prisoners are not permitted to possess, since it is likely that harm to the prisoner, to others or to prison security might accrue from them; physical aggression against prisoners, if that causes wounds that require treatment; aggression, or the initiative to take aggression, with a sharp or lethal instrument against employees assigned to preserve order in the prison, employees who come into the prison to perform work related to their jobs, or official visitors; the lighting of fires in cells or the acquisition or ownership of inflammable materials; destruction of part of the prison building or objects that constitute prison property, if their value exceeds 1 pound; the deliberate effort to start a fire in the prison.

A rapid review of the violations for which the punishment of flogging is stipulated shows how great their danger to the security of the prison and the prisoners is, and this makes it permissible to carry out such a penalty.

We should not fail to mention some of the prisoners' jokes on the subject of this punishment. They term the time for the execution "deflowering time."

In light of the notoriety of one of the guards who performed the flogging operation, who was named Ahmad al-Akhdar, the prisoners call the stocks "al-Akhdar's girl," and call the prisoner on whom the flogging is to take place "the bridegroom of al-Akhdar's girl."

In conclusion, we call upon God to sentence al-Akhdar's girl to destruction, so that we need not find any grooms among the prisoners who might celebrate a nuptial feast with her.

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EGYPT

EGYPTIANS' INCOME IN SEVENTIES STUDIED

Cairo AL-AHRAM AL-IQTISADI in Arabic No 724, 29 Nov 82 pp 32-35

[Article by Dr Mahmud 'Abd-al-Fadil of the College of Economics and Political Science: "What Happened to Income Configurations in Egypt in the Seventies?"]

[Text] There has been much discussion recently about the question of income distribution in Egyptian society. The discussion revolved particularly around whether the distribution of personal income among individuals was becoming more equitable or better, or whether it had moved away from becoming more equitable and taken a turn to the worse in the seventies. What is meant by the distribution of personal income among individuals or families is the distribution of disposable income among persons, regardless of the sources of that income: income earned for work performed; profit earned from private activity; or gains made from financial assets or property.

To settle the dispute about the extent to which the distribution of personal income in Egyptian society has tended to be more equitable in the seventies or was becoming worse and less equitable--to do this on scientific and methodological bases--we must first have a reliable sketch of the distribution of personal income in Egypt. Unfortunately, however, everyone, mainly senior officials, concurs that we do not have that important sketch which would show income distribution and determine the relative positions of the various income brackets and groups. (See the interview granted by the minister of the economy to AL-MUSAWWAR Magazine No 3030, 5 Nov 1982).

Those who analyze questions of change in income distribution in Egypt can only rely on some observations, impressions and incomplete statistical evidence. Then they become engaged in a guessing game in order to reach approximate and improvised conclusions that are in every way questionable. Under the best conditions we find researchers trying hard to base their conclusions on data about spending which are commensurate with spending brackets that are derived from a sample study of family income. They do that in order to make a sketch of income distribution in Egyptian society, but such a sketch would be approximate and faulty because the sample used in the study is small and errors of bias are common in the data of such studies.

Despite these problems that have to do with insufficient data, it seems to us that the question of changes which occurred in income distribution in Egyptian society in the seventies is one that is extremely serious both economically and

politically. It cannot become the subject of conjecture or deductions that are not based on proper scientific methodology. [A sense of] scientific responsibility requires one to confront in a scientific manner the generalizations and deductions that are made about the real changes in income distribution in Egyptian society in the seventies and which are beginning to crop up in some recent literature and statements.

Although none of us has that reliable sketch containing data about personal income distribution in Egypt during the seventies, we will attempt here to make some methodological observations about some of the evidence that was mentioned and the conclusions that were reached in some of the recent literature and statements that have been made on this subject. We can thus come as close as we can to the essence of scientific truth to which we all aspire, and we can stay away from fanciful, hasty and simplified impressions about the reality of income distribution in Egyptian society.

What concerns me primarily is what was mentioned in an article by Dr Muhammad Sultan Abu 'Ali entitled, "The Just Distribution of Income: Fact and Fancy." This article was published in AKHBAR AL-YAWM on 6 November 1982. The author [of that article] believes that the mode of income distribution in Egyptian society improved in the seventies. To provide evidence that his conclusions are accurate, the author cites a number of statistical and logical evidence that we would like to discuss here. We would like to subject this evidence to a scientific examination so we can reach the scientific truth that we are all looking for.

1. Regarding the Usefulness of Data and Family Budgets for Making a Sketch of Income Distribution in Egypt:

The author [of that article] mentions that proper statistical analysis of data on family budgets--he means data on family budgets in 1974-1975--shows that the distribution of personal income tended to become equitable during the seventies when compared with data on family budgets in the mid sixties.

Although we accept the fact that for many Egyptian and foreign scholars looking into questions of personal income distribution the only way out of the predicament of the unavailability of data on income distribution is to resort to using data on family budgets in order to make an approximate sketch of income distribution in Egypt at different points of time, we do have numerous reservations about how much these data can be relied upon in reaching conclusions that are absolutely indicative of the changes that are taking place in the configurations of income distribution in Egyptian society.

First, the family budget sample is usually very small. (At any rate it was not more than 15,000 families in rural areas and in cities). This raises [the likelihood of] a random error in the sample resulting from chance discrepancies between the units of the base community from which the sample is taken and those units or families which by coincidence became parts of the sample that was chosen at random. There are also errors of bias. These result from bias in recording data on spending. It may be known that among the errors of bias that are common in this regard is that poor families and families that have limited incomes tend to exaggerate the data they provide on the volume of their consumer spending, whereas wealthy and well-heeled families tend not to disclose all the items of

their consumer spending. Consequently, records of what these families spend show amounts that are less than what they actually spend. Thus, the degree of equality in the distribution of consumer spending among the various sectors of society is exaggerated.

Second, it has been scientifically established that the mode of distribution of consumer spending among various income groups is usually more equitable than that of income distribution, that is, after taking into account the "margin of savings" for each income group. An important aspect of the absence of equitable income distribution in a certain society is basically due to vast differences in "the margin of savings." These savings are included in the incomes of individuals and are not used for consumer spending purposes.

It is true that most scholars in this field are trying to overcome this problem by estimating saving functions in a manner that parallels each category of spending so they can make an estimate of these margins of savings which are not included in information on family budgets. But no matter how good they are, these estimates cannot help us make a reasonable and a realistic estimate of the volume of savings for some income groups, especially those whose incomes are high and who are squarely seated at the top of the distribution scale--the top 10 percent in income. These estimates also cannot give us a reasonable estimate of how much money is taken out of savings, or in the case of low income groups who are in the bottom 20 or 30 percent of the distribution scale, how much money is borrowed.

It goes without saying that not knowing the real margin of savings (the positive and the negative) of the highest and lowest [income] groups has a considerable effect on determining the relative positions of various income groups on the scale of personal income distribution and hence on measuring the degree of equality or inequality in distribution.

We go even further than this and claim that in a society like Egypt's we cannot get a hold of accurate statistical information about the real income conditions of 10 percent of the poor who are at the bottom of the distribution scale. This is because most of these people are marginal groups who have no shelter and no fixed, set income. Accordingly, they are not counted in income distribution computations that are based on family budget information. On the other hand, high income people--let us say the wealthiest five percent--who are squarely seated at the top of the distribution scale receive "declared and undeclared" incomes, and these are difficult for us to get a hold of. This is a result of the fact that they avoid paying taxes on most of their income, and the ratio of their spending to their real incomes is very small.

All this adds to the problems of relying on information about family budgets as a proper basis for constructing an approximate sketch of the scale of income distribution in a society like Egypt's. [These problems remain] no matter how devoted the efforts are and how truthful the intentions.

Third, in order for us to compare the degree of equity or justice in income distribution at different points of time, we must agree on a clear standard for measuring the degree of equity or inequity in the distribution of personal income in a given society. Perhaps the common standard that comes to the writer's mind and to the minds of other scholars is that of the GINI indicator. However, what

is important and worth noting here is the fact that it is possible in general to get to different trends about the change in "the over-all degree of inequity" if one compares two or more [patterns of] income or consumer spending formed according to different measurements of the degree of disparity or "inequity" and the relationship between the cases where recognized statistical measurements of the degree of "disparity" yield conflicting results, particularly when the Lorenz income distribution curves intersect.

Among the over-all measurements of the degree of "inequity" which are widely used in statistical studies is the variation coefficient of AE. This [coefficient] gives equal weight to changes in distribution that occur in different levels of income. [Another measurement is] the standard deviation of logarithms which gives greater weight to changes that occur at lower levels of income. Interquartile measures reflect changes that occur among middle income groups--the middle 50 percent of the people who earn income.

In the final analysis the GINI coefficient gives greater weight to changes that occur at the center of distribution itself, compared with the changes that occur at the ends of distribution. In other words, it is biased in favor of improvements in the conditions of middle income groups.

To put it briefly: there isn't a single, unbiased, over-all measurement that would summarize for us the degree of equity (or inequity) in the distribution of personal income. This is because each of these measurements and general abridged indicators is affected by the different [degrees of] significance of various income groups that are at the top, in the middle or at the bottom of the distribution scale. This requires that caution be observed in interpreting the results of some statistical comparisons of the degree of improvement in income distribution when these results are based on the GINI indicator alone, as most current studies in that field tend to be.

Finally but not finally we have one superficial observation that has to do with the points about temporal comparisons. If we want to find out the truth about developments that occurred in the income distribution scale among individuals in Egyptian society in the seventies, it would be better for us to compare the results of the study of family budgets in 1964-1965 with the results of the recent study on family budgets in 1981-1982. Or we can compare the results of the 1974-1975 study of family budgets with the results of the 1981-1982 study of family budgets, that is after economic open-door policies were set in place, from the mid seventies and not before. In spite of that all the reservations I have expressed about relying on information about family budgets as a basis for constructing an income scale for Egypt stand undiminished.

B. The Relationship between Work Time, Leisure Time and Income Distribution

Let us now move away from these boring technical details with which we have burdened the reader and discuss some logical arguments that are being proposed by the author. These are arguments about phenomena that have been observed in practical life and what they indicate with regard to questions of income distribution in Egypt. In this regard the author states, "It's been noticed in Egypt's rural areas, where traditionally most of the poor can be found, that the number of work hours for individuals has regrettably undergone considerable decline. Whereas individuals in rural areas used to work from sunrise to sunset, work hours now

are at best from 9 a.m. to 1 p.m. However, when we consider this part [part of the situation] from the standpoint of income distribution, we find that it indicates a major improvement in the incomes of low income people." What other evidence do we want after that that that disparities in income distribution are being reduced?

Let us reply immediately that rural areas in Egypt no longer "traditionally" harbor most of the poor people of Egypt. The continuing migration [of people] from rural areas to cities and the growth of the "marginal activities" sector--the unregulated sector--in Egyptian cities has caused a large number of poor people to move to urban areas.

Although we go along with the author that the falling labor supply curve demonstrates the fact that an individual prefers his leisure time after his income reaches a certain level and that accordingly his work time decreases, [we state] that that happens only after an individual is earning an income that satisfies at least his basic needs. Let us then raise questions about the nature of the phenomena that we are seeing every day in Egyptian cities!

I may not be guilty of too much overstatement if I were to say that it has been noticed that in the mid seventies social and professional groups with fixed incomes--skilled workers, semi-skilled workers, government employees and public sector employees--spent more hours working than they did before. They spent most of this time in places other than their official places of employment. These people now give up their traditional leisure time so they can earn money from additional or occasional work after official work hours. They do that so they can increase their monetary incomes and stabilize their real earnings in the wake of the continuing rise of the cost of living. By using the same logic that the author uses, we can say that this broad phenomenon is considered evidence that relative income conditions are not improving and that they are rather declining for wage earners and for an important segment of self-employed individuals in urban areas.

If we were to shift to rural areas, [we would find that] despite the soundness and accuracy of the observation that the work day in agricultural labor was reduced to almost 5 hours, this did not mean that a self-employed farmer or a farm worker who works for a wage has more hours of leisure now starting at 1 p.m. What has been observed is that as a result of the multiplicity of economic activities in rural areas in the seventies, most of these people who stop working at 1 o'clock p.m. are engaged in other work in the afternoon. In fact, some of them may commute to neighboring districts to engage in additional economic activities: services and trade. This was disclosed by a survey of rural poverty that was conducted by the International Labor Office in more than 12 Egyptian villages. The National Institute of Planning took part in this survey which was done in 1977.

The results of this survey indicate the importance of the phenomenon that the sources of the Egyptian peasant's income in 1977 were numerous. Whereas the average daily wage he could earn from employment outside the village was about 1 pound, the wage that same individual could earn from engaging in farm labor in the village for others was about 57 piasters a day. At the same time the income he could generate from non-farm employment in the same village averaged between 1 pound and half a pound a day.

Thus the Egyptian farmer and the Egyptian farm worker are now increasing their hours of work--but not necessarily in farm work--and they are enjoying fewer hours of leisure because they are trying to improve or stabilize their standard of living and the standard of living of their families. And here too we do not find ourselves prepared to accept, by relying on this rationale alone, the conclusion that the author reached about the improvement in the relative distribution of income in Egypt's rural areas in the seventies.

C. Confusion between Improvements in Average Individual Incomes and Improvements in Relative Distribution of Personal Incomes in Society as a Whole:

Many scholars resort to making comparisons about the improvement or the decline that occurs in the relative share of wages since wages are considered the return of labor on the GNP. They do that so they can reach some conclusions about the fact that the share of wage earners in the distribution of national income has declined. We believe, however, that this indicator loses its relative importance as an indicator of income distribution in the wake of the enormous disparity in the makeup of paid wages, similar payments and material benefits and in the wake of the open-door policy since the mid seventies.

The lesson here--from the standpoint of the disparity in income distribution--lies in the degree of disparity or difference which prevails within the structure of wage and salary distribution in Egyptian society. When there are vast income differences among people for the same kind of skill--those who receive a wage of 200 pounds a month and those who receive a wage of 2,000 pounds a month--or when there are vast differences among recent graduates of the College of Business, with the one who works for the Tax Administration receiving no more than 60 pounds a month while his colleague who went to work for a foreign (or a joint venture) bank receives a salary of 200 pounds a month, then the relative rise that is occurring in the share of wages in the national revenue is itself an indication of a decline in the degree of disparity in wage distribution among individuals in society.

And here we would like to refer to an important methodological point that is usually the source of confusion in generalizations that are made about improvements in the distribution of income among individuals. This point has to do with the confusion that is made between noticeable improvements in monetary income levels and the fact that living conditions in the seventies were strenuous for large numbers of people and for certain economic, professional groups in rural areas and in cities and between the improvement (or decline) in the relative distribution (that is, the relative positions) of incomes in the context of a general scale of income distribution in Egyptian society in general.

Improvements that may occur in the average monetary incomes of individuals and different professional groups do not necessarily contradict the rise in the degree of inequity and disparity in the relative distribution of personal incomes in society as a whole. The problem here has to do with the different relative weights by which improvements in the monetary income levels of various groups occur--high, middle and fixed. The lesson then, in the final analysis, lies in the final outcome of the relative distribution of incomes in society where the discussion about disparity or equity in the distribution of income and wealth comes to mean everything all of us had in mind when we talked about the equitable distribution of incomes and wealth.

D. How Do We Acquire an Accurate Scale of Income Distribution in Egypt?

Let us finally ask [the following question]: Has the time come for us to have an accurate scale of income distribution in Egypt? It is not acceptable that minister who are responsible for the economic sector should come one after another and say that we do not have such important data. This makes it possible for people to make independent judgments and engage in conjectures that are improvised and impressionistic. Is it scientifically or statistically impossible to get a reasonable scale of income distribution in Egyptian society?

It is our judgment that this is achievable if numerous government and statistical agencies join forces for this important effort which numerous developing societies have already carried out. Statistical data that are available to numerous agencies such as the Ministry of Finance, the Tax Administration, the Ministry of Social Insurance, the Ministry of Agriculture, the Development and Agricultural Credit Bank, the Central Agency for General Mobilization and the Census and the Ministry of Planning can all be pooled together to serve the effort whose objective is to construct an accurate scale of income distribution in society, and this must be overseen by a coordinating committee of the highest level.

A series of surveys by samples can also be conducted. These surveys would be designed specifically for that purpose so as to survey the income conditions of some classes and groups that are not covered in the statistical data which are available through various official agencies and organizations.

Our limited research experience in this area indicates that such an effort can succeed. By using information about wages paid to state employees and to people employed in the private and public sectors according to wage categories, and by using tax information on different kinds of income and insurance information on occasional and marginal workers, we were able to construct an approximate sketch of personal income distribution in urban areas in 1970-1971. This was as summarized in the 4th chapter of our study of the changes in the structure of employment, in the distribution of income and in the social makeup of Egypt's urban areas from 1952 to 1972. This study, which was published in English as a book, is entitled, "The Political Economics of Nasirism" (Cambridge Publishing House, 1980).

There is also another possibility for compiling a considerable amount of information about personal income distribution in a country like Egypt if that information is compiled along with information on the population census, which is conducted every 10 years. We have in this regard a trailblazing experiment in a developing country like Argentina where information about individual and family income was gathered in the course of conducting the 1961 population census. The result of this wealth of information was a splendid study about development and income distribution in Argentina. The study was published in English by the United Nations in 1969.

The importance of this method lies in the fact that information about income distribution which can be gathered during the general census of the population permits one to make different individual income classifications and multiple population distribution classifications according to income brackets and professional groups in the manner indicated by the table [below], which we include for elucidation purposes only.

The Professional Group:

Government employees who work for a wage

People employed in the public sector

People who work for a wage in the regulated private sector

People who work for a wage in the unorganized private sector

Self-employed workers in the private sector--salesmen, craftsmen, industrialists

Self-employed farmers

Self-employed professionals

Annual income bracket:

Under 500 pounds

500 to 1,000

1,000 to 2,000

2,000 to 3,000

3,000 to 4,000

4,000 to 5,000

5,000 to 10,000

Over 10,000

All that we are hoping for is that officials in the Public Agency for Mobilization and the Census give special attention to this question when they design the statements and forms for the next general population census, which is to be conducted in 1986, so we can get out of this vicious circle in which we have been going around for many years, [wondering about] the accuracy and precision of personal income distribution information among individuals and groups in Egyptian society. We hope officials will do this so that statistical facts can become evident to anyone who is discerning. We hope these statistical facts can be removed from the realm of fancy so we can get to the truth.

In conclusion we must caution that getting an accurate scale of income distribution in Egypt is not a luxury that would be of interest to intellectuals in their discussions about social justice, poverty and wealth. This has become a scientific necessity so that elements of the economic policy can be set on the right course in areas of public spending, taxes and consumption; so that savings can be stimulated; and the right course for imports and other such matters can be set. In the absence of such a proper scale of income distribution in Egypt, those who design economic policy will continue to act and to flounder in the dark, unable to see clearly the most important facts about the economic and social situation in the country.

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EGYPT

PROBLEMS PERTAINING TO AL-BAHRIYAH OASES DISCUSSED

Cairo AL-AHRAM AL-IQTISADI in Arabic No 725, 6 Dec 82 pp 22-25

[Article by Kamal Jaballah: "The Spectre of Isolation Is Hounding 40,000 Citizens in al-Bahriyah Oases"]

[Text] The cultural effect of the iron mine awakened residents of the oases.

The mining law is honored in the al-Bahriyah Oases.

What happened to UN contributions for populating the oases?

The region's utilities are threatened by a shut-down because technicians are not available.

About 350 kilometers from Cairo and after a drive that lasted about 5 hours in the heart of Egypt's western desert to visit the iron mines in the al-Bahriyah Oases, [the correspondent of] AL-AHRAM AL-IQTISADI is presenting this provocative report whose stimulating nature stems from this evident contradiction in the life that the people of the region are leading. This includes those who work in the mine and who have the amenities of life and the desire to challenge and conquer the unfriendly desert and take out its treasures, and it includes the original inhabitants of the al-Bahriyah Oases who are almost 40,000 persons. Many of those still live in almost total isolation from the world despite the fact that civilization, [represented by the mine], has come to their doorstep and despite the fact that the surface road between them and Cairo and all the other oases has been paved.

120 Million Tons of Iron

The al-Bahriyah Oases region is very rich in natural resources, particularly iron ore. The area [where iron abounds] in the region of al-Jadidah alone is 6 square kilometers; this is in addition to areas in Ghurabi, Harah and Nasir. Because the iron ore in al-Jadidah is superior--according to chemical tests it is 52 percent iron and 6.7 percent silica--because confirmed ore resources are high and amount to 120 million tons, and because the nature and quality of the ore are good, which would make economic extraction of that ore easy--the thickness of the layer of ore is 11 meters on the average--it was decided that the ore in this region would be used to provide the Iron and Steel Complex with all the iron ore it needs. Maximum production capacity of the mine is 3.2 million tons a year, compared with half a million tons only which are produced every year by the mine in Aswan.

Whereas the cost of producing 1 ton of iron in Aswan amounted to about 9 pounds, the cost of producing 1 ton in al-Bahriyah Oases was only 2 pounds. In addition, the Bahriyah Oases were relatively closer to the Iron and Steel Complex in Hulwan. All these were advantages that made everyone anticipate attentively and enthusiastically the course of work in the mine and the efforts that were being made by the state to encourage workers in the mine to produce, to settle in the region and to make it flourish. However, before going into the lives of those who work in the mine, let us explain briefly how the iron ore is extracted. Engineer Mahmud al-Harras, general production manager at the Iron and Steel Company says that the ore is extracted from the mine by bulldozers whose capacity is 4.6 cubic meters. It is then shipped on trucks whose capacity is 27 tons per truck. The iron ore is transported from the mine to a crusher where it is crushed into pieces smaller than 80 millimeters. After the ore is sorted, it is shipped on rail cars which carry the ore to Hulwan for a distance of almost 350 kilometers.

About 931 workers are employed in the mine. The company has provided for them a complete housing community with utilities, schools, theaters and all means of recreation. One can easily notice the impact Egyptians have when they are provided with the wherewithal for working and producing and a suitable climate to prove their excellence. In only 10 years, for example, this barren desert has turned into a self-sufficient industrial stronghold. It relies on the vegetables and fruits that are produced in its own farm which is about 60 feddans. It also has cattle farms and poultry farms so it can be self-sufficient. Despite this rosy picture that visitors can notice, the picture is hardly complete without a complaint.

Problems Requiring Solutions

Ahmad 'Abd-al-'Azim Muhammad, a public relations [official] says that the most important problem in the mine which employees are facing is that of the unavailability of teachers for the mine's private school. Is it reasonable that there be one school for the elementary, preparatory and secondary stages that does not have the necessary equipment and furnishings? Also only 1 of the 14 articles of the Mining Law has been applied. This is the one that deals with salaries--the average income for a miner is 150 pounds. The remaining articles of the law, most important of which is a regular physical check-up every 6 months, have not yet been put into effect. This is threatening the miners. In addition, there is a problem with nutrition, especially regarding quantity and quality.

Mr Ahmad 'Abd-al-'Azim Muhammad adds that the decision to pay a monetary allowance to those who work in remote provinces has not been applied to those who work in the mine since 1979.

Due to the importance of the health condition of those who work in the mine I asked Dr 'Abd-al-'Aziz Sulayman, the head of the medical section at the mine about the danger of not having a physical check-up for mine workers because silica in the mine is less than 8 percent of what it was in Aswan, where it is 20 percent. It is known that silica causes the lungs to become infected and this causes death. So far no such case has been reported. In building the housing development, care was taken to keep it at some distance from the dust. However, there are no surgeons and physicians in the region in general. In the long run this in itself is dangerous to the health of those who work in the mines and their families.

The Isolation of Oases Residents

The number of physicians in the mine is not enough, and this constitutes a problem in the region of al-Bahriyah Oases as a whole. Faraj 'Abd-al-Wahab Muhammad, vice president of the Mines Elementary School and a native of the oases also talks about this problem. He says there are only two physicians in the area serving 40,000 persons in all areas of medicine. It is possible for these two physicians to be away from the region, and the al-Bahriyah Oases would be without a single physician! After residents sent telegrams and complaints to officials, a few physicians who are recent graduates of Umm al-Misriyin hospital were recruited to serve area residents. But is this enough?

Because the area does not receive television broadcasts throughout the year, the state decided last 13 January to build six relay stations in the area. Since that date these relay stations have not been built and construction has not even begun.

Residents of al-Bahriyah Oases talk about the residential allowance that is paid to those [who live and work] in remote areas. People who have been living in al-Bahriyah Oases used to receive that allowance when that area was under the governorate of Marsa Matruh. However, after the area became part of al-Jizah governorate, payment of this allowance was suspended, and the amount was restricted to only 35 percent [of one's salary] instead of 60 percent.

On the road between the mine and the city of al-Bawiti, capital of al-Bahriyah Oases, there is a sign in one of the areas designated for reclamation. It has been there for about 3 years, in accordance with the state's plan for populating and reclaiming land with the cooperation of the UN Development Program and the Food and Agriculture Organization [FAO]. But the budget of this project remains unknown, and the United Nation's contribution to it is also unknown. No one knows why implementation of that project has not yet begun, and no one knows what happened to the funds that were earmarked for it by the United Nations!

The problems from which residents of the al-Bahriyah Oases suffer are innumerable. We mention, for example, the fact that there are no department stores for consumers. If one wants to buy clothes, one has to go to Cairo. Where are the public sector consumer companies? Also a percentage of the salaries of those who work in the area is deducted for health insurance, and there are no drug stores and no hospitals. There is only one hospital that is not fit for humans; it has no equipment whatsoever!

There is also enough clay in the area to meet Egypt's construction needs. Despite continuous complaints about the fact that top soil is being removed from Egypt's arable land, the state has so far made no plans to use this clay despite numerous statements to that effect by Engineer Hasaballah al-Kafrawi, minister of housing and construction. And according to the law area residents are to receive 15 percent of the mine's returns, but the Iron and Steel Company has not provided any benefits for the area's residents. This amount is designated for Hulwan and al-Tabin where the company is located. What benefit then did the region get from the mine?

What is truly astonishing is the fact that the area where the mine is located, which is about 45 kilometers from the capital of al-Bahriyah Oases, has a power

line from the High Dam. Despite the availability of power systems and funds to connect power to the remaining cities and villages of al-Bahriyah Oases, that power line has not been laid yet. The area receives television broadcasts from Israel, Syria, Libya and from the United Arab Emirates, but it does not receive broadcasts from Egyptian television.

Intervention by Governor Requested

'Urabi Haflah, secretary general of the city council of al-Bawiti adds, "The executive agency of al-Bahriyah Oases is unaware of what officials are doing in al-Jizah Province, and we are under their authority. The shortage in technical workers is threatening projects in the area despite the availability of water and land suitable for cultivation and utilization. This causes people who come to the area to flee from it. The governor of al-Jizah, Dr 'Abd-al-Hamid Hasan must intervene to save the region from the problems it is facing and provide technicians to protect its basic utilities. For example, the area's [supply of] drinking water is full of water moss and parasites. The sister province program between al-Bahriyah Oases and a West German province has been thwarted because of the difficulties it faced and because of transportation. One bakery cannot be enough to feed all area residents. Schools have to be built instead of the dilapidated ones that exist now." There are numerous other complaints which cannot be listed in this context. This should prompt executive agencies to move into this remote area and save it from the isolation in which it lives."

Conventions, Customs, Traditions

But are these problems affecting security conditions in the region? Maj 'Isam 'Abd-al-Fattah, commissioner of al-Bahriyah Oases says that in spite of all these problems, the region is governed by customs, traditions, respect for families and conventions that have been in use for many years. The police station has a record of only one crime, and that had to do with cultivation of (al-banjur) [meaning unknown], which is a narcotic plant. The perpetrators of the crime were apprehended, and they were sentenced to 3 years at hard labor. The commissioner of al-Bahriyah Oases who came to the area at his own request because he wanted a quiet life, adds, "The long road between al-Bahriyah Oases and Cairo comes under the supervision of the Oases Police Station, and this constitutes a major burden because the police station does not have the capabilities [for this task]. Accidents occur often on the road and it is difficult to determine who is responsible for them. It is also difficult to rescue those who are injured in those accidents. Accordingly, jurisdiction over the highway must be restored to al-Haram Police Station."

Food supply questions are the most widespread in the region, particularly [those that have to do with] smuggling goods even though staples like rice, tea, sugar and detergents are available. Because animal resources are available in the area, the price of 1 kilogram of meat does not exceed 210 piasters. Maj 'Isam 'Abd-al-Fattah called for the establishment of a club to look after newcomers in the area and encourage them to settle. The club would also encourage residents of the valley and the delta to move to the oases and bring civilization to area residents. He also called for care from [the Ministry of] Religious Trusts and from al-Azhar because preachers in the mosques of some villages were still praying for King Faruq!

Tourism and Women

One cannot visit al-Bahriyah Oases without seeing its tourist and archeological attractions. This area which is visited daily by about 10 foreign tourists abounds in antiquities that have been discovered and those that have not yet been discovered. There are hot and cold water springs in the region which arouse the admiration of visitors. The climate is distinguished by its dryness, and by the fact that the sun shines in the middle of winter. This makes the area one [suitable for] tourists. The only thing that is needed is the attention of the state and providing some amenities that would encourage tourists to stay.

"Women too have an opinion about the problems that are happening in al-Bahriyah Oases," as Mrs Shamah Muhammad, member of the local council says. She thinks that prevailing traditions in al-Bahriyah Oases are reactionary and backward, and she is trying hard to raise the consciousness of women there and to inform them about their rights so they can play their part alongside men, especially since the rate of divorce is quite high in al-Bahriyah Oases. This is due to the fact that marriage is easy. This woman is facing several difficulties in communicating with her colleagues, the members of the local council in the region who do not believe that a woman is seated with them on the council to consider the affairs of al-Bahriyah Oases. As she says, "One thing that attracts attention is the fact that the rate of mental retardation in the region is quite high because vitamins are lacking [in the diet], and education for girls is still restricted." All these are difficulties that women in the area are facing.

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PROBLEM OF REMOVING, USING FERTILE SOIL TO MAKE BRICKS UPDATED

Cairo AL-AHRAM AL-IQTISADI in Arabic No 726 13 Dec 82 p 16

[Article by 'Azzah 'Ali: "The Fact That Soil Removal Is now a Crime Has not Prevented the Crime; So That We May Not Waste Egypt's Fertile Soil To Solve the Shortage in Housing and Bricks"]

[Text] Despite the fact that laws and ministerial decrees have been issued making it a crime to remove soil from arable land, to use it to manufacture bricks or to build on arable land, the crime continues to be committed. We are still losing about 60,000 feddans of highly fertile land every year. The reason for this quite simply lies in the fact that we were satisfied with the enactment of laws on paper; we did not provide alternatives for baked bricks; and we did not execute adequate production lines for clay bricks and sand bricks.

What if production at all brick kilns were to come to a standstill? These kilns produce over 5 billion bricks a year, and this represents no less than 80 percent of our consumption. Government has resorted to making it a crime to remove soil from arable land and has put brick makers who own these kilns behind bars just like other criminals.

The questions that are still being raised by AL-AHRAM AL-IQTISADI are [as follows]:

Before making this decision did the government provide alternatives to baked bricks, notwithstanding the experiments that began in 1973 in an attempt to find alternatives to brick? Are the kiln owners responsible for the fact that they were not able to develop their kilns and change them into factories that produce clay bricks and thus save hundreds of thousands of pounds? Did the government fail to offer [them] technical experience?

The meeting that officials in the governorate of al-Jizah convened may be a new beginning for a solution to the problem. The meeting was attended by a number of researchers in the Institute for Construction Research and the National Research Center. It was also attended by a number of kiln owners and by representatives of companies that produce clay bricks.

Kiln Owners

At the outset Samah Sabih, a kiln owner wondered, "What if production at 200

kilns in the governorate of al-Jizah alone were to stop? This would mean that we would lose 20,000 bricks every day, which is the average production of these kilns. What would be the result of this policy? The policy that the government is pursuing with kiln owners can actually lead to this. If kiln owners do not have the funds to develop their kilns, why doesn't the government help them? What are kiln owners to do when banks charge them high interest rates and refuse to give them the same treatment they give food security companies, even though the brick industry is just as important as cultivation of the soil? What are they to do if these kilns represent the means by which they earn their living?"

Mustafa Shatili, a man who owns one of these domestic kilns says, "I am now here with you at this meeting, but I may find myself under arrest a few minutes after I leave here. I may be charged with the crime of removing soil from the land. This has happened and is happening every day."

Dr Hasan Fahmi, professor at the College of Engineering of Cairo University reviewed the problems that were involved in one of the experiments that was carried out by some research centers with the cooperation of the Ministry of Reconstruction and an Austrian company. The purpose of the experiment was to develop one of the kilns that produce burned bricks into a plant for producing clay bricks. These problems manifested themselves in the fact that the Ministry of Reconstruction has not yet built central quarries that would provide the plants with desert clay. The project also had a problem with the banks and with high interest rates. Banks refused to do business with the project on the basis of a low interest rate limited to 7.16 percent, like that of food security projects.

The proprietor of this project related his story with the government. "The government did not help us. In the beginning it stood by us until we completed 50 percent of the project. But when production experiments began and the process of drying the bricks failed, the government abandoned us. Officials in the Ministry of Reconstruction said that the process required a drying room whose costs would amount to a quarter of a million pounds. I do not have this kind of money, and the experiment failed."

The Burned Brick Industry Is Vanishing

If the burned brick industry is on its way to becoming extinct after decisions were made to consider it a crime to remove soil, it is also being threatened with extinction because the deeper one has to dig to remove soil, the more inadequate that soil is for the burned brick industry. This is a point that was raised and corroborated by researchers at the Institute of Research on Construction. If our figures indicate that by 1990, that is 7 years from now, we will have to produce about 10 billion bricks that would serve as alternatives to the burned bricks that are produced now, have officials thought of the problems that the clay brick industry in Egypt is facing?

The question was raised by Dr Hamid al-Qirsh, a representative of an investment firm and an appointed [board] member of that company. He raised the [point about the] problem of the high rate of viscosity in desert clay and the fact that this rate varies from one location to another. This requires that the experimentation period be prolonged to a period of up to 2 years so that maximum production capacity and the required quality can be achieved. There is also the fact that this

clay is usually available in areas that are somewhat remote from inhabited areas, and this requires that transportation and roads be provided to serve these plants. One of the consequences of the nature of the raw material [in this case] is the fact that the rate at which equipment would be eroded and consumed is high. This requires that the measures that are necessary for importing spare parts be simplified and eased so that [the lack of spare parts] would not cause shut-downs in production.

In addition to all this the length of the period that is required to build a plant--from the period of study until production begins, which is between 3 and 4 years for a plant that produces on the average from 20 to 40 million bricks a year--constitutes a marginal problem.

Because of the needs generated by consumer demand, with clay bricks replacing baked bricks, government must promptly use all its capabilities to encourage all sectors--public, private and joint--to meet this need, and it must remove all obstacles by offering subsidized loans or by subsidizing energy costs for investment companies just like the public and private sectors.

This meeting ultimately produced several recommendations that were presented to officials. Chief among these recommendations were [the following]:

--It is necessary to establish a central quarry in both Kafr Hamid and in Wadi al-Hayy. This is to be carried out by a public sector company. Until this quarry is established, one of the producing companies is to provide desert clay to plants that will be built in the coming period.

--Proprietors of kilns are to apply to the Industrial Development Bank for loans to develop their kilns into plants.

--A professional commission is to be formed under the supervision of the Ministry of Reconstruction. It is to consist of professors from the College of Engineering, from the Institute for Research on Construction and from the National Research Center. This commission would go to any plant to help it with the appropriate technical methods.

Before We Import Bricks

Before bricks become one of the commodities we import--and this does not appear to be unlikely--the Ministry of Reconstruction or the Committee for Production Policies, which assumed the responsibility of issuing the decision to make removing the soil and using it to make bricks a crime, must solve this problem which manifests itself not only in the fact that hundreds of workers who are employed in this profession all along the Nile Valley might lose the source of their livelihood without there being an alternative source of income for them, but also in the figure which states that we are now producing about 5 billion baked bricks from the silt of the Nile. So far there is no alternative to producing these baked bricks.

DETAILS OF COMMUNIST LEADER'S TRIAL REVIEWED

Paris AL-YASAR AL-'ARABI in Arabic No 49, Dec 82 pp 16-19

/Article: "Al-Tijani al-Tayyib Puts the Sudanese Regime on Trial"/

/Text/ About 2 years ago, the doors of the Sudanese National Security's secret offices closed behind one of the bravest and strongest progressive nationalist fighting men in the Arab world; at that time, al-Numayri's police imprisoned al-Tijani al-Tayyib Babakr (56), a founding member of the Sudanese Communist Party, one of the leaders of the national anticolonial struggle in the forties and fifties, and one of the leaders of thinking and the press in the Sudan.

Al-Numayri's military court issued its verdict imprisoning the heroic fighting man for a period of 10 years. Al-Tijani had already spent 2 years in the dungeons of the Sudanese National Security offices.

Al-Tijani had previously been imprisoned in Egypt, in the era of the monarchy, and was imprisoned for 5 years during Ibrahim 'Abbud's dictatorship in the Sudan.

AL-YASAR AL-'ARABI herewith publishes the entire text of the trial of our comrade al-Tijani al-Tayyib as a historic document and a living model of the firmness and altruism of the communist nationalist leaders. It calls on all the forces for liberation and peace in the world to raise their voice to condemn this tyrannical regime and to demand the release of the heroic Sudanese fighting man and the release of political prisoners in al-Numayri's prisons.

Al-Tijani al-Tayyib's Defense before the State Security Court

Mr president and members of the state security court:

At this trial, I am once again standing in the long ranks of Sudanese nationalists and democrats whose ideas and positions have brought them before courts since the colonial era as a consequence of laws repressing democracy and turning the pursuit of such natural rights as the right of organization and expression into crimes for which one can be punished. For a long time our people struggled against colonialism and its oppressive laws and offered many sacrifices for the sake of a free, democratic Sudan. Our people in no way suspended the struggle for democracy, after independence, as they were fighting for social change. The fact is that the history of our people's political and social movement over the decades is the history

of their struggle for their rights and freedoms, and their revolution in October was the greatest event in their modern history. It was a revolution for the sake of democracy, which is the true aspiration of our people.

The current regime is striving, by all ways and means, to repress this will through individual rule, and the single-party regime, the state security law, the trade union and press laws and the various agencies of oppression.

Among the most conspicuous of these ways and means are the state security law and the government security apparatus, through which the authorities engage in an unparalleled repression of the citizens and try to strip them of their humanity and turn them into beasts of burden, and through which the authorities perennially persecute all citizens, invading the sanctity of their persons and homes, putting their livelihood in jeopardy, imprisoning them for unlimited periods of time and using violence against them, up to the point where they shoot them in order to kill them if they take part in sitdown strikes or demonstrations, no matter how peaceful. They have a free hand against accused citizens, who are deprived of the right to be released on bond, no matter what the charge might be, and are dealt with, even when the investigation into them begins in a worse manner than convicted prisoners are dealt with. The citizens are often exposed to physical and mental torture in order to compel them to divulge information or make confessions. The authorities are free to express themselves against citizens as accused persons, prisoners or members of the opposition by using forms of slander that would be punishable in countries where the rule of law holds sway. They also try them and condemn them in their media. These are all facts which public opinion is aware of and which I have witnessed personally in the course of the past 20 months.

Directly after my imprisonment, the newspapers published statements which they attributed to officials in the state security apparatus accusing me and the Communist Party of being agents of foreign bodies. Last 20 July the newspaper AL-SAHAFAH published an interview which the chairman of the agency gave to the Egyptian press in which he said "The communists have always received their instructions from foreign bodies."

As a citizen who has devoted his life to freedom for his nation and people, I can find no way to describe these slanderous statements except to state that they are cheap and cowardly. I have presented the investigating committee with hundreds of documents which concern the domestic and foreign policies of the Communist Party. The investigator has also presented you with copies of them as evidence, but he did not ask me a single question, even indirectly, about instructions coming from abroad or accusations of working as an agent. The statement of charges did not make any mention of that.

The Communist Party has a well known history in our people's struggle. This August it completed the 36th year of its life. The communists have clashed with many governments and have stood up a great deal, as leaders and as members of the base, in court. However, they have absolutely never been brought before the judiciary on the charge of working as agents, not only because no proof existed but also, simply, because such proof does not exist and cannot exist.

The Communist Party has been the subject of numerous domestic and foreign studies, far more than any other Sudanese party, and has found a distinguished place in a number of books and articles about the Sudanese, Arab and African political and trade union movement. Anyone who has followed these studies, and the history of our country, can see that the Communists have always been in the forefront of the nationalists in the Sudan and that theirs is the only Sudanese party that is truly independent of all foreign influence. The Communist Party has a broad international presence. It has well known relations with communist parties and democratic organizations, parties and movements which are based on true independence, friendship, solidarity and a joint struggle for common, noble goals, and it enjoys true, deep, broad respect in the Arab, African and international contexts of a sort which only genuine parties enjoy, and these are embodied in broad campaigns of solidarity with the party.

Mr president and members of the court:

The statement of charges describes the Communist Party as a prohibited party, which it indeed is. Parties in our country are prohibited, and that is one of the most obvious manifestations of the repression of democracy. The prohibition is founded on the fact that the constitution decrees that the Socialist Union is the sole political organization, stating that it is founded on the alliance of the working forces of the people and consequently unites all Sudanese and causes them to avoid party rifts. However, reality disproves this allegation, because the Socialist Union is not an alliance of the people but just another party belonging to the capitalist classes and groups. The policies that are applied in its name only represent the interests of these classes and groups and are totally in contradiction with the interests of the working class and the overwhelming majority of the ordinary people. The composition of its leadership reflects the fact that it is a party for the rich, for groups that are close to the authorities and the major officials. It has changed its facade many times, but it has not done more than that. Although the authorities have spent tens of millions of pounds of public money on it, have disrupted the scene of legitimate activity on its behalf, have enriched it with officials appointed from the government system, and have dissolved organizations in which workers have built up reserves through their efforts over the decades, the Socialist Union remains an intellectually crippled and isolated party in terms of the masses. It has not amounted to more than a creature of the authorities. We have all seen how its chairman dissolved its higher councils by individual decree (in spite of the statements made that the councils were elected) and how an alternative council was established in its place in the name of this inadequate party which is isolated in terms of the masses and absent from all mass struggles by an individual decree which has no more substance than the one which preceded it did. The railway strike, the Darfur uprising, the January demonstrations this year, and other activities on whose account party activity has been banned have proved that the Socialist Union is only a sample of the anti-democratic phenomenon known as the single party which represents one of the foundations of individual rule. Speaking in the name of the nation is monopolized, the repression of the freedom of organization and expression and the banning of party activity are justified, and its permanent chairman is the automatic head of the authorities, under the aegis of this party.

However, notwithstanding the constitution and the law, there are parties which exercise their activities with varying degrees of openness, such as the Republicans and the Moslem Brothers. At a meeting of the Central Committee of the Socialist Union, on the evening of 22 June 1982, the chief of the authorities acknowledged that parties had been restored in the south and that even right-wing opposition parties were operating with relative ease on the basis of interconnected economic and social relations with the forces of the right, although the authorities were monitoring this activity, using it in their struggles and in areas that were of use in strengthening their positions and weakening their adversaries, and setting limits for it which it could not go beyond.

The fact remains that the prohibition has been strictly imposed only in the case of the Communist Party, and this is discrimination, although it is natural, given the context. The Communist Party differs radically from the others, for it alone is truly aware of the current policies of the authorities, which are totally in contradiction with the interests of the people and the nation. The prohibition is stringently applied also because the existing regime is totally in contradiction with democracy. In fact, the behavior of any regime vis-a-vis the Communist Party constitutes a true criterion of its attitude toward democracy. When the October revolution triumphed, it expressed its total harmony with democracy by giving freedom to the Communist Party, and this was the period of the greatest bloom of democracy in the history of our people and the richest period in terms of political, intellectual and innovative production. To the contrary, when the right-wing parties were legalized in the course of the regression from the October revolution and the crackdown on its historic achievements, especially in the context of democracy, the most severe blows were directed against the Communist Party. This is a fact that numerous Sudanese circles which have not always been on good terms with the Communist Party, such as the Republicans, have realized; they have defended the party's legitimacy by defending their own right to legitimacy. The strict prohibition of the Communist Party is only one more manifestation of the existing regime's enmity toward democracy.

Mr president and members of the court:

The statement of charges accuses me, and accuses the Communist Party, of acting to break up national unity. The representative of the accusation in his final speech gives evidence of that, in addition to his charge, which has been refuted, that the Communist Party is functioning as an agent, by stating that this party is working to bring the working class to power and is consequently seeking to have one class dominate society and stir up internecine conflict among the classes.

Isn't it astonishing that this charge should come from a representative of authorities which express the interests and the will of the smallest social class in our country but nonetheless claim to be representing the nation, while imposing their rule on the majority by force and subjecting all the labor of the people and wealth of the nation to their narrow selfish concerns and the interests of the imperialist and reactionary circles that are behind them?

It is true that the Communist Party seeks to have the working class lead political power in our country, but it is not true that it thereby wishes to establish a

regime of internicine class struggle. The total opposite is true--when it succeeds in its task, it will be the first time in the history of our country that the authorities will truly be expressing the interests of the broadest segment of the masses: power will be based not on violence and terror but on the will of the overwhelming majority of the people, and true, firm national unity will be established for the first time.

The working class does not exploit anyone else but (there is an unclear passage in the letter received from Khartoum) it confronts it with a unity which transcends national, racial, religious and ethnic chauvinism. It cannot struggle for the sake of the least of its demands without strong unity. Therefore, its enemies are working, so far as they are able, to divide its ranks. Now can it reach its long-range goals of ending capitalist exploitation except through a broad, firm federation with all the class, social and ethnic elements of the population in order to end all oppression, exploitation and discrimination. Unity is vital for the working class, as far as its own class demands and general national goals go.

The history of our country underlines the fact that the workers established a trade union movement against whose unity all the divisive conspiracies devised by colonial authorities and, later, right-wing circles were dashed. They extended the hand of disinterested aid to farmers and students in their struggles, to the policemen in their strike in 1951, and indeed to capitalism in its demands related to the independence of the domestic economy. In general, the history of the Sudanese working class is characterized by a stubborn struggle for the sake of its unity and the unity of all the people on behalf of national liberation, democracy and social progress.

The Communist Party has proceeded under the guidance of a class ideology. It is a party in which the firmness of national unity is embodied, since it extends all over the nation and is not confined to a region, an ethnic group or a religion, and since its program propounds solutions to the issues of all the Sudan. It is well known that it is the only party in which leadership positions have been occupied, through true democratic elections, not /illegible/ decrees or factional signals, by personnel in the form of workers, intellectuals, people from the south and /illegible/ from all areas of the country, not just from the capital or from /illegible/ or a specific religion, who were nominated only by devotion to the cause of the people, /illegible/, intellectual firmness, combativeness and morality.

The party has striven to unite the masses in their various formations through its unions, its approaches and its cultural and social organizations. It has also striven to encourage an alliance among the masses of workers, farmers, students and intellectuals for the sake of our common causes. From the premise of its understanding of the objective motives that led to the emergence of regional organizations--most important of which were the feeling of discrimination, backwardness and neglect--it has refused to brand these with racism but has sought to cooperate with them and has called on them to undertake general national action and to ally themselves with the working class and the other democratic powers for the sake of a Sudan where discrimination among regions will be eliminated and the banner of national unity will rise on high.

In general, the Communist Party has been known to have been the greatest common denominator of Initiative and activity in all fronts, efforts and groupings that were aimed at unifying the masses, from the Front of the Struggle to Resist the Legislative Society, in 1948, up to now.

One of the Communist Party's most prominent acts on behalf of national unity was its agreement on the issue of the south. In the 1953 elections, the notion of the "special status" of the southern provinces was propounded on the Sudanese stage for the first time, in the recognition that a difference existed and to emphasize national unity. When an uprising occurred in August 1955, it was the only party to be free of fanaticism; it did not lose its head but offered an objective analysis of what had happened and called on the army and the government to exercise self-control in containing the uprising and to avoid heeding invitations from people calling for revenge on behalf of the northern victims of the uprising. It demanded that the death sentences against the rebel leaders be reduced and that those leaders who were prisoners be given good treatment in order to eliminate conflict. At its third conference 6 months after the uprising, the Communist Party, for the first time in Sudanese politics, raised the slogan of "regional autonomy," and it developed that at the round table conference and the fourth conference in October 1967.

In the realm of ideas, the Communist Party, since 1958, alone has issued a supplement in English, titled ADVANCE, in its Arabic newspaper AL-MAYDAN, and has issued numerous brochures in English, defending the unity between the north and the south and calling on the people of the south to link themselves to the working class and the democratic powers in the north and struggle with them on behalf of a national democratic Sudan.

Out of the program of the Communist Party, specifically, came the 9 June statement which the martyr Joseph Gring formulated. A reading of the text of the statement will underline this fact. Merely giving deep thought to this central comment in the statement--"We consider that it is of utmost importance that the movement of democratic socialism grow in the south, for the sake of the attainment of our common progressive goals, so that this democratic movement in the south may assume the reins of power in this beloved section of our country, in order to stop colonialist activity as a basic condition for the sake of the sound scientific application of the principle of regional autonomy"--will make it clear that this comment, in terms of its idea and expression, was issued by the Communist Party. The fact is that the authorities totally denied that, and in fact are proceeding on totally the contrary basis now; that is one of the most important roots of the current crisis in the south.

First, the threat to national unity comes from the regime, because it is repressing democracy, while national unity, by its nature, is democratic and flourishes only in a democratic climate; if that is missing, unity cannot be provided.

Second, since it is a regime which follows the capitalist platform, and capitalism is concerned only with guaranteeing worthwhile profits for Arab and foreign capital and its local agents and ignoring the hemorrhaging of the traditional sector and the destruction of its economic and social foundation--while ignoring regions, areas and projects which do not yield adequate profits--discrimination among regions,

as a consequence, is becoming aggravated, the bad situation in the south is becoming worse and tribal attitudes in the rich savanna area, into which capital is rapidly flowing, are becoming intensified and are turning into endless bloody clashes. The regime is trying to give the impression that these problems can be solved by changes in administrative patterns and what is called decentralization, by which it hopes to rid itself of the thorny problems of the regions, so that the people in those regions will be busied by them and it can benefit from the game of playing the groups in these regions off against one another in order to strengthen its central grip. It is from that, and not from the working class or the Communist Party, that the threat to national unity comes.

Mr president and members of the court:

The statement of charges talks about the propagation of false and tendentious news and statements that are aimed at deceiving public opinion. When this charge comes from the authorities it reminds one of the Arab proverb "she threw her disease at me and molted." These authorities have surpassed all previous governments in the art of delusion, through their monopoly of the means of publication and the media and through their suppression of the information, facts and statistics they deal with, as if those were strategic secrets. The authorities' measures in this regard would fill volumes. Let us simply remember what has been constantly said and written, year after year and day after day, about development, democracy, the transfer of power to the masses, the stabilization of security, the education and health revolution, the policy of concentration, the revival programs, the reasons for removing commodity subsidies, and so forth, in order to see the daily brainwashing that our people face, which has led to a broad credibility gap between the authorities and the masses because of the obvious difference between what the authorities say and the bitter reality. Therefore the laughable confessional slogan, the slogan "making the truth the property of the masses," has made its appearance. What did the masses own before that, then, lies? However, the people have also exposed this slogan and have learned that it is only a prelude to new campaigns of delusion, and this has actually been proved.

In another area, what benefit does the Communist Party gain from lying? Its relationship with the masses is totally different from that the authorities have with them. It has no way to win them over except persuasion, and, if it appears that it is lying, and the reins on lies are short, it will not just be a matter of the masses developing an aversion toward it--its enemies will dismiss it as well.

However, we know, from the Communist Party's documents and publications, some of which have been submitted to you as evidence, that it demands freedom of expression, freedom of the press, the issuance of a multitude of papers, and open legitimate publicity and political activity, and it would be appropriate for the authorities to respond to these demands if they really do want to combat lies, expose them before public opinion, and thwart them with the facts--indeed, prosecute them by methods to which no one could object under the libel law, bearing in mind that the representative of the indictment has not presented a single item of evidence regarding the lies of which he is accusing the Communist Party.

Mr president and members of the court:

The statement of charges talks about opposition to the authorities. The law prohibits opposition, although the right of opposition, like the right of support, is a natural one and is automatically derived from citizenship. They are both a natural result of the citizens' thoughts concerning matters that affect their lives and the life of their nation and its citizens. Prohibiting this right is contrary to human nature and deleterious to the humanity of the citizen.

The right of opposition is a comprehensive one which guarantees open free expression of the rejection of the authorities' programs and policies--the rejection of the authorities, in essence, and the demand that they be changed. In reality, if we proceed from the premise that the Sudan is a nation that belongs to all the people in it, and that the people are all equal, what gives the authorities, not to speak of individuals, an eternal right to monopolize the formulation of this nation's destiny and to dictate that other citizens either offer support though conviction or under compulsion, be turned into passive onlookers, or be in opposition and have different forms of punishment visited on them? No matter where we look, we will find no support for such discrimination except force alone, and that can not eliminate the realities that have marked and are marking our society and stirring up conflicts and disputes within it. The authorities, through their reliance on the principle of force, bear the responsibility for the fact that others have tried, and will continue to try, to acquire the trappings of force in order to seize the keys of power.

The greatest praise one can give is to express our people's resistance to conditions that it opposes and to speak of our three triumphant modern revolutions, the al-Mahdist revolution, the revolution of independence and the October revolution. The elements of their triumph matured through protracted opposition to the regime under whose aegis they occurred and to its laws.

However, the present authorities do not seem to be concerned with the lessons of history. In opposition they see only a threat to themselves, all of whose manifestations must be crushed. They are not interested in the reasons for and roots of the opposition, to say nothing of the legitimacy or even reasonableness of its demands, and it seems that they are not asking themselves about the elements behind the persistence and expansion of the opposition in spite of the repression. When numerous questions are raised about that domestically and internationally, we find a simplified answer in the refrain about international conspiracy and domestic agents.

The experiences of different peoples, among them ours, indicate that all forms of opposition have objective roots which it is impossible to rip out. By objective roots I mean conflicts connected to the political, economic and social platform which emerge from differences or contradictions in the interests of various social forces. Although such differences are normal and inevitable in a society of numerous classes, ethnic groups, elements, religions and cultures, such as that of the Sudan, it is unfortunate that opposition in our country has been legitimate only for a period of less than 8 out of more than 26 years, and this is a patent injustice to the Sudanese people.

The present government is not the first Sudanese government against which opposition has arisen. Since the dawn of independence, struggles have arisen among the parties of the classes holding power. However, a deeper, more radical struggle has also arisen: while the quasi-feudalistic forces and various capitalist groups have sought to preserve the legacies of the colonial powers, in the form of economic and social laws and platforms, and to proceed along the capitalist path, the masses of workers, revolutionary intellectuals and progressive masses in the cities and areas of modern agricultural production have sought to turn independence into a means for a change for the better in all areas of their lives and to take part effectively in creating the new nation. That is, they have called for a democratic national road to the development of the nation which would bring it to socialism.

This radical struggle has proceeded gradually to constitute the main features of our life and to lie behind every political crisis, every coup, every alliance and every rift. In the course of the struggle, the various programs of the political powers have become clearly specified. Although the roots of each form of opposition and each form of support have extended to this struggle, which has been going on up to this moment, it has been an objective struggle which has basically resulted from a contradiction in the positions of the various classes and groups regarding the resource production and distribution process. It is a struggle which one cannot avoid or terminate by decree: it will continue as long as its causes remain.

Following the October revolution, two main programs became crystallized in our country. There was the program of the national democratic forces, whose most important demand was a democratic constitution, liberation of the economy from the dominance of foreign capital, the attainment of social democratic changes, and the pursuit of a foreign policy. Then there was the program of capitalist development, which was embodied in two main demands, a presidential republic and the restriction of people's freedoms and rights, which would furnish these forces central authority and stability, the two indispensable conditions for imposing capitalist development upon our people.

The May authorities came to power by taking a position of opposition to the old regime, and, proclaimed in their initial statements, a program which in many points corresponded with the national democratic program. On this basis, it met with support from the democratic national forces and their organizations and parties. However, in only a short time they proceeded to go back on their programs, and inevitably a dispute occurred between them and these forces. The authorities refused to give others the right to express their opinions, or indeed even the right to an independent existence, and insisted on monopolizing the discussion of every point. Conflict escalated until it ended in the well known result: on 19 July 1971, national democratic forces in the armed forces rose up, were victorious for 3 days, then were defeated. Their defeat marked the granting of permission for a new period to begin in our people's life when comprehensive terror dominated against the national democratic forces, the heroic leaders of the uprising were executed, the leaders of the Communist Party were executed, and the Communists and democrats were imprisoned, expelled from their jobs, and uprooted from their mass following.

In brief, the ground was laid for the capitalist road to gain control, and, just 2 years after they came to power, the powers which had eliminated the old regime had realized their two basic demands, had increased their absolute central authority, had totally and comprehensively suppressed democracy, had indoctrinated the unions and workers' federations, and had driven the democratic national forces, with their organizations, parties and leaders, off the stage of legitimate activity.

Mr president and members of the court:

Now 11 years have elapsed in which the authorities have been granted a freedom to move, make decisions, plan, execute and conduct reviews which was not given to any previous government. All the features of the May society have been crystallized and embodied in facts which are noticeable and apparent to all, and all new additions to which are quantitative, not qualitative. What are the most prominent characteristics of this society?

First, the society's regime is founded on the system of a president with absolute powers. No one has been more eloquent than the person at the head of the authorities himself, who, at the inauguration of the regional People's Assembly in al-Abyad, ridiculing the people who were ignorant of his power, said that Articles 80 and 81 of the constitution permitted him to summon any security official and tell him, "So and so is a traitor, kill him," and the man would kill him. That is the system of a president who turns citizens into subjects and institutions of government into agencies subject to his own conduct--an immune president who cannot be criticized or held to account or, more specifically, replaced.

This system of rule imposes a monopoly on other types of political, media and cultural activity, establishes a repressive police state and deprives the citizen of his will and his individual and collective rights.

Eleven years after the imposition of this regime, our country is going through a permanent state of emergency underneath which daily arrests, persecutions and exclusions from jobs for political reasons have become permanent phenomena that characterize our life and stifle all forms of thought and innovation.

During this period, the opposition has not let up, though the hand of repression has been heavy. Our people never previously knew such numbers of arrested persons, people killed in demonstrations and armed clashes and executions on political grounds.

Second, 11 years, or more correctly 13 years, since the advent of the May authorities, Sudanese society continues to have the same basic features it had in 1969, and no radical change in its economic situation has occurred. We are still exporting the same crops and cotton still occupies the same high proportion among them. We are still importing the same industrial products. If there has been any change, that has taken the form of an aggravation of the diseases and ailments we were complaining of in the past.

The authorities have opened all doors to Arab and foreign capital, multinational corporations and the financial institutions of neocolonialism. Foreign debt has

multiplied twenty-fold rising to more than \$5 billion, which have been squandered on projects which were not carefully studied and on expenditures aimed at inflating the state security apparatus, the Socialist Union, and establishments of luxury and pomp.

All branches of production suffer from incompetence, bad planning, deficient performance, a lack of fuel, spare parts, accessories and raw materials and negligence in the maintenance of public utilities. This has resulted in a perceptible drop in industrial and agricultural production, the ruin of solid organization such as the al-Jazirah project and the railways, the closure of many factories, even new ones, or the reduction of their operation to low rates of capacity, and the suspension of production in entire provinces, such as the Northern Province. The gap of the deficit in the balance of trade and the balance of payments has widened, the budgets have become afflicted with the ills of chronic high rates, the authorities have resorted to covering the deficit through the banking system and then to something more dangerous, that is, foreign financing, and the deficit in the budget for the current fiscal year, 1982-83, has reached about 600 million pounds, all of which has been covered by foreign financing.

In brief, the Sudanese economy is in collapse, as the person at the head of power has admitted. Years ago the authorities handed the keys of the economy over to the International Monetary Fund, which dictated what it called the policy of concentration, then the program of revival. So far, the value of the pound has declined by more than half and consequently and in the same proportion a rise has occurred in the prices of imports along with a drop in the prices of exports and the allocation of an increasing percentage of revenues to intensified debt-scheduling. The 5-year plan, such as it is, has been cancelled, and there has been a trend toward expansion in the fields of activity of foreign capital and foreign banks and investments. A reduction has been imposed in government spending, in particular a reduction in new job opportunities, a wage freeze, and the suspension of all expansions in services. In addition, the dismantling of the public sector has begun, the viable portions of the public sector have been turned over to the private sector, and the role of the rest of it has been weakened. However, these "solutions" are proceeding to deepen the crisis instead of solving it, because they are proceeding along the same road which led to the collapse and are imposing more of the burdens of the failure and inadequacy of the authorities' policies on the shoulders of the toiling people in the form of further indirect taxes, inflation, insane rises in the prices of goods and services, and drop in buying power.

Thus the "May" regime has failed to achieve the very task on whose behalf it claimed to have come to power, which was to move the wheels of development and progress forward. Development does not consist of hollow words and figures--it is an actual state that is reflected in people's lives. The actual state we are witnessing is a drop in production, a paucity of goods, a deterioration in services, a swelling in the armies of the unemployed, the migration of hundreds of thousands of people from rural areas to the cities, and the dispersion of hundreds of thousands of people to other countries. In addition, there are terrible negative phenomena, such as the upsurge in parasitic activities, the expansion of twisted opportunities for self-enrichment (to the point where it has been said "He who didn't get rich in May won't get rich"), the spread of corruption, favoritism and bribery,

and the erosion, by publicly disclosed embezzlement alone, of a million pounds of public money a year. Moral degeneration has become widespread, and people's noses have been clogged with /the stench of/ financial and moral scandals in which senior officials in power have been implicated.

The overwhelming majority of the people are suffering from severe handicaps in their living standard. The costs of minimum food, housing, clothing, medical treatment, education and transportation requirements are constantly increasing. Every day ordinary people, and even people with average incomes, are facing added difficulties in acquiring their requirements, and this has led to a terrible deterioration in the quality of life. Among ordinary people, the burden of poverty, disease and the failure to continue their education is increasing.

In the face of this comprehensive misery, a small handful enjoys the perverted fruits of capitalism and the privileges of power. Alongside the old capitalist groups, new groups have made their appearance, most conspicuous of which are the parasites and adventurers of every form. They do not add new capacity to the economy--rather, they reap great wealth from non-productive activities, banking facilities, government contracts, price differentials, commissions and the corruption of public officials. There are the groups that occupy higher positions in the agencies of power and government, from the president to the members of the People's Assembly and the staffs of the Socialist Union in the various areas. The total number of people in this elite does not go much beyond a thousand. However, the money spent on the allocations to the elite and its privileges is equal to the wages of tens of thousands of people on the bottom of the employment ladder and many times that in terms of the average incomes of Sudanese persons. This fortunate minority obtains everything that money and influence can buy, does not know the sufferings of everyday life, and can easily pay bills for clinics and pharmacies and the expenses of schools, private expenses, consolidation courses for students and summer vacations outside the country.

That is the bitter reality: the overwhelming majority is getting poorer and more wretched while the rich minority is getting richer and enmired in a luxury which the authorities call socialism.

Mr president and members of the court:

I come to the third and final point on the characteristics of the May society. This concerns its foreign policy. It is a policy of the destruction of independence, the neglect of sovereignty, and greater and greater dependence, in coping with the isolation and weakness the authorities sense, on political and military support from Washington, Cairo and Riyadh. Here I will content also myself with three main areas in this policy.

1. For years, the authorities have continued to raise an unrelenting uproar on an imminent illusory invasion which the Soviet Union has been planning from neighboring countries. The Soviet Union is not an aggressor state and it does not claim any interests in our country or anyplace else. Rather, events have proved that it has been the tested friend of our people and the Arab peoples in the past and the present. The authorities are fabricating the uproar over alleged invasion

to justify their violation of the principles of nonalignment and their headlong rush into the embrace of American imperialism. They have repeatedly declared, in the words of their head, that they consider themselves a front-line force in the alliance against the peoples in our region, under the leadership of American imperialism. To underline that, they have given America the right to establish land, air and naval military bases to be used by the rapid deployment forces that were formed to strike out at our Arab and African peoples in order to protect the interests that America has decided to pursue in our region.

2. The authorities have concluded a mutual defense agreement with Egypt stipulating that any internal threat will be considered a foreign threat and compelling either of the two countries to proceed to protect the other, even if it has not been asked to do so. It is clear that what is meant is the Sudan, which thus is becoming an Egyptian protectorate and in this context is entering into what is called political and economic integration, which gives us the lower hand in everything. Joint military maneuvers which have been carried out in the Sudan with American rapid deployment forces and the Egyptian occupation army also enter into the treaty.

3. The authorities have taken off all their masks of deception and hypocrisy and have blatantly joined the Camp David camp, in which, from the beginning, they have played the role of a subordinate appendage. The authorities' audacity has increased with the increasing Zionist-imperialist onslaught on our Arab peoples. The authorities, many years ago, became a pliant instrument in the American scheme of imposing a contemptible capitulation on the Arabs, liquidating the Palestinian people and their cause and asserting the role of the Zionist entity as a strike force for American imperialism which can dominate the land, the resources and the strategic position of the Arabs.

Our people have wrested an honorable independence and have always struggled to defend that against the Middle East alliance, the Eisenhower Doctrine, American aid, the Islamic alliance, and other conspiracies; however, the authorities are sabotaging all this in order to ensure their survival. Our country has become a way station in striking out at the Shaba uprising to protect the agent Mobutu, arranging French military coups in Central Africa, installing the puppet Habre in Chad, and devising aggression against Libya, Ethiopia and Democratic Yemen, whereas we once were a buttress for every Arab and African liberation movement. Our sovereignty is being fragmented, threatening the very meaning of our existence, as a price for the survival of the current regime.

These, on utmost summary, are the main features of the existing regime. While the authorities ban the opposition, they confront the citizens with these policies every day and act like someone who throws a person into the water, prohibits him from getting wet, then punishes him if he does get wet.

Mr president and members of the court:

In the previous session, you raised an important question on the Communist Party's position regarding the reconciliation. I believe that this position has been made clear in a number of documents, including Item of Evidence Four, titled "Democracy

is the Key to the Solution." One can summarize the position in the fact that the reconciliation came about as a result of a profound national political crisis. For the reconciliation to have demonstrated its seriousness, it would have had to address itself to the elimination of the causes that led to the crisis, in the form of policies, legislation and persons. The first step would have been to restore democracy and abrogate the legislation that repressed freedom of organization and expression, so that a dialogue could have started in which all parties, primarily the broadest masses of the people, would participate, in order to arrive at a solution to the crisis. The party, as proof of its good intentions, also called for the rehabilitation of all opposition partyrs, including the martyrs of the Communist Party and 19 July, publication of the circumstances of their trial, the disclosure of their graves and the delivery of their last testaments to their families. It also demanded that the facts of the tortures and trial which they ordered and carried out be disclosed and that the victims be compensated.

Contrary to the rumors that are being circulated, the Communist Party did not reject the amnesty or the principle of holding a dialogue with the opposition. Indeed, it entered into preparatory discussions with certain parties to it, among them Abu-al-Qasim Muhammad Ibrahim and Abu-al-Qasim Hashim, but it has wondered what the authorities' position regarding the communist leaders would be if they came out of hiding and did hold a dialogue with them, and then agreement was not reached. The authorities have offered no answer. How can a dialogue take place between two parties when one of them has the power to muzzle and imprison the other?

What has been called the national reconciliation has not amounted to more than a maneuver which has given the authorities an opportunity to catch their breath and a cover to justify the economic measures the International Monetary Fund has imposed. However, the crisis has continued in a more intense, profound form--a crisis in the regime, the economy, foreign policy, the traditional sector and the south--and the salvation still lies in democracy.

The person at the head of power and his aides, in the time of the reconciliation, admitted that exceptional legislation existed and they promised to abrogate that, especially the State Security Law. However, 13 years after the advent of the authorities and 5 years after the reconciliation, the exceptional conditions and laws are still in effect and meanwhile there are more than 250 imprisoned citizens in the Kawbar, Port Sudan and Madani prisons, and perhaps elsewhere, some of the prisoners have been there for more than 3 years running, and some have been jailed numerous times for periods of up to 4, 5 or 6 years without trial. They are still receiving the same treatment that resulted in the deaths of the martyrs Qasim Amin, 'Abd-al-Majid Shakkak, Hasan Daf'allah al-Shami, Muhammad Mirghani Naqd, Ahmad Fadl al-Mawli and others. The torture which the chief of the State Security Agency described as a vile practice before the People's Assembly in 1978 is still being carried out by the same agency. It was carried out against one imprisoned citizen 2 or 3 weeks ago, and parades and demonstrations are still being met by lethal bullets.

Mr president and members of the court:

Our country is in the midst of an ordeal and a great threat, and this demands that all the sincere persons in it rally around two basic urgent demands in order to save it. First is the suspension of all anti-democratic measures, the release of all political prisoners and the abrogation of all laws repressing people's rights and freedoms, foremost among them the State Security Law. Second is the restoration of our sovereignty through the renunciation of Camp David, abrogation of the agreement with America to build military bases in our country and abrogation of the mutual defense agreement with Egypt and similar agreements.

Victory in realizing these two demands will constitute a major, broad step toward the creation of the Sudan the people are ardently aspiring toward, whose main features are embodied in the following:

First, the restoration of democracy in accordance with a constitution which can provide adequate guarantees for the realization of the free will of the majority of the people and guarantees for individual and collective rights and freedoms, the independence of the judiciary, and the sovereignty of the rule of law, by virtue of which the legislative power will be in the hands of a democratically elected parliament and the executive authorities will be responsible before this council and subject to its trust, and the powers of the president of the state will be restricted to sovereign activities.

Second, the return to our forward position in the ranks of the Arab nation and oppressed peoples and pursuit of an independent foreign policy based on total enmity toward imperialism and neocolonialism and friendship and alliance with the socialist countries and the nonaligned movement.

Third, liberation of the economy from all forms of subordination and foreign dominance, the submission of a long-term development plan which will take basic priorities into consideration--foremost among them the development of the most backward regions and the gradual assimilation of the traditional sector into the modern economy, along with an urgent plan to save facilities and areas which have suffered destruction in recent years--and the submission of a financial policy to alleviate the sufferings of the toiling masses, reform the wage system so that the highest salary will not be more than 10 times the lowest, to provide basic commodities, and to concentrate and stabilize their prices.

Mr. president and members of the court:

This is not the first time I have faced the judiciary. I have been fighting since my early youth, that is for more than 40 years. The credit for that goes to my father and teacher, who was a leader of the 1924 revolution in Shindi and continued to be a proud nationalist until he died a few months ago. The credit also goes to our great generation, the generation of young people who bore the burdens of the upsurge of the modern national and democratic movement on their strong shoulders. I am proud to have been one of the people who took the initiative and one of the prominent organizers of the first demonstration after 1924, the demonstration by students in the higher schools in March 1936. I am proud that I, as a student in

The Moslem Brothers

The role the Moslem Brothers played in the Sudan, in their capacity as a pillar of Numayri's regime, has been noteworthy. Two members of the office of the public prosecutor were in the indicting body. The public prosecutor is Hasan al-Turabi, the general guide of the Moslem Brothers, who was rewarded for his support of the regime by being appointed member of the Political Bureau of the Sudanese Socialist Union.

11887

CSO: 4504/123

ARAB NATIONALIST GROUPING ISSUES COMMUNIQUE ON REGULATIONS

Tunis AL-RA'Y in Arabic 7 Jan 83 p 2

[Text] The Arab Nationalist Grouping Movement has issued a communique in which it promulgated a number of administrative regulations pertaining to its organization and management, the amendment of its statutes, and the approval of a study of a draft charter for Arab Nationalist Grouping Movement.

In its communique, the Movement also stressed several points among which are the following:

1. That the Movement considers itself to be a national opposition having its origins in Muslim Arab Tunisia, that it is independent in its activity both internally and externally, that it uses democracy as its basis, and that it believes in [political] pluralism;
2. The need for the recognition of political movements, for the issuing of a general legislative amnesty, and for the enabling emigres to return;
3. That permission be granted for the publication of the Movement's newspaper AL-NIDA' and that constraints on secretary-general al-Bashir al-Sayd be lifted;
4. That the secretary-general be considered the sole legal spokesman for the Movement.

The Movement then sanctioned the joining of its ranks by the following militants: al-Hadi al-Zaribi, 'Abd-al-Razzaq al-Khaskhusi, Thabit Qawadir, Bu-Bakr Dalham, al-Habib al-Mukhkh, al-Mukhtar al-Salimi, Mansur Dhuwayb, al-'Arabi al-Rivahi, 'Ali al-Najih, Khalid Sarsarah, Mahmud al-Sayd, al-'Awni Samiti, 'Abd-al-Majid Bin-'Abd-al-Salam, Muhammad al-Hadi al-Rudusli, Bashir Zuwayd, 'Abd-al-Baqi al-Shalwati, Muhyi-al-Din Bil-Tayyib, Salih al-Za'Za', and al-Shadhili Bu-Shihah.

CSO: 4504/155

BAHRAINI PAPER INTERVIEWS HEIR APPARENT

GF101810 Manama AKHBAR AL-KHALIJ in Arabic 10 Jan 83 p 3

[Text of interview with Shaykh Hamad ibn 'Isa al Khalifah, Bahraini heir apparent and acting prime minister, by AKHBAR AL-KHALIJ Chief Editor Ahmad Kamal in Bahrain--date not given]

[Excerpts] [Passage omitted] [Question] What is your opinion on finding a particular formula that will ensure popular participation in the activities of the GCC?

[Answer] Undoubtedly, it is important to have popular participation in the various activities. I believe that this cannot be achieved without the establishment of consultative councils in all the countries of the region. These councils have to find the suitable formula for this participation.

[Question] When do you think the comprehensive security agreement will be signed by the GCC countries?

[Answer] I would like to stress an important fact, which is, the existing cooperation among the gulf countries in the field of security exceeds the provisions of the security agreements, whether they be bilateral or comprehensive. What exists among us with regard to bilateral agreements is much less than what has been actually existing for quite a long time. Generally speaking, the bilateral agreements which include almost all the GCC countries are currently being implemented. Now there has been a proposal calling for signing a comprehensive agreement. We supported this idea since it saves time. It is a good symbol of the entity of the GCC. Kuwait expressed reservations on it and now it is up to Kuwait to make its decision on the matter. We are waiting for its point of view. Kuwait has the right to take as much time as it needs since--as I mentioned--that what exists among the GCC countries--including Kuwait--is more than the agreement. What remains is a matter of formalities. I would like to stress that Kuwait's reservations are merely a legal formality that has nothing to do with the crux of the issue. We support these agreements whether they be bilateral or comprehensive.

[Question] The economic agreement was ratified at the Riyadh meeting and it was decided that it would be implemented early this year. Then it was discussed at the Manama meeting and it was decided that implementation would be

postponed until March 1983. At the latest meeting a grace period was given to some of the countries. What is your opinion about these postponements?

[Answer] Bahrain is one of the first countries that supported and signed this economic agreement. Commitment to this agreement is a factual matter for all the countries that signed it. The issue that remains is the implementation [of the agreement]. Actually, economic matters are complicated. It is not easy. But be assured that after the agreement is implemented, matters will take a correct course and a reasonable manner. Let us talk for instance, about the customs tariff which was discussed in Bahrain by the GCC customs directors--in which this discussion centered on its unification among the GCC countries. This matter looks simple but it deals with the philosophy of consumption in a direct way. What type of societies do we want? Do we want consumer societies? Do we want easy consumption without restraints so as to remain all our lives consumer societies that are not productive and that depend on imports and do we want [to] facilitate consumption? Such a matter requires time for discussion and to have its repercussions on the gulf countries and the gulf citizens evaluated. In short, the economic agreement is ratified and signed and the postponement is not in regard to the [implementation] of the agreement but in the program of the agreement.

Proof of this is the establishment of the gulf institution for development with capital of \$2 billion. This is one of the early economic projects that will make good progress whereby we can eliminate one of the major problems we have faced in the past two decades which is duplication of projects among our countries in the gulf. With the existence of this institution the process of economic harmony will be attained. [passage omitted]

To tell the truth, the existing cooperation between Bahrain and Saudi Arabia--which has extended throughout the ages--can be an example for cooperation and coordination. It is also evidence of the good intentions of the leaders of the two fraternal countries. Saudi Arabia is the country that is erecting the [Saudi-Bahrain] bridge and it is the country that participated in the Bahrain Aluminium Company and the petrochemical project in addition to other projects in which it either provided the capital or was a participating partner. Moreover, Saudi Arabia has given--as it still does--huge backing for the GCC. These economic agreements are fruitful because they are based on sound foundations as a result of cooperation and coordination among brothers.

[Question] Has there been an agreement on limited steps in the field of military cooperation among the GCC countries such as the establishment of a unified leadership, or the holding of joint maneuvers, or coordination in the field of armament or training?

[Answer] Our ultimate goal is the joint Arab defense pact and this will always be our goal in this procession, so that we will be associated brothers benefitting from all the factors availed by our nation; so we will benefit from the historical, geographic, one fate and one future element. All this urges us to undertake cooperation and coordination in the field of defense matters. The approval of the military support for Bahrain is an example of the brothers' care and faith in joint defense. Moreover, I cannot ignore the

fact that we continuously receive support from our brothers and that this is more important than money and all material issues. We are studying ways of formulating a suitable defense strategy in order to preserve our gains and achievements and thus deter the ambitious. Moreover, we can never forget what our brothers provide us with. The joint programs are numerous and continuous. They consequently need continuous work and effort. We are moving in this direction with firm determination.

[Question] Your highness has indicated in the past that parliamentary life will return to Bahrain. Bahrain is now advanced in the fields of finance, economics, science and culture. It is an international financial center. It possesses all, or almost all, the factors for progress and development. Do you believe that it is time to have a democratic life or parliamentary system?

[Answer] Belief in participation is a basic principle for completing construction and development programs. His highness the amir and the prime minister have said on more than one occasion that this matter is being assessed and studied so that the best formula and the best results can be reached to ensure the continuity of the country's natural development. I believe that the government and people of Bahrain are able to assimilate the lessons from good and bad experiences and to learn from the past and present and are capable of shouldering the joint responsibility in view of the fact that everyone enjoys full maturity--a maturity that is Bahrain's real and true capital.

To answer your question in brief, yes development is necessary. It is necessary to return to parliamentary life or to popular participation in a manner that is in harmony with our national interests and with the conditions in the GCC countries and the Arab world. We are an indivisible part of the gulf and the Arab nation. Development is part of life.

[Question] How do you see the Iraqi-Iranian war ending, in view of the fact that Iran has turned down all forms of mediations and peace initiatives?

[Answer] With the new year, and with the Iraqi-Iranian war entering its third year, we still hope--as we have hoped since the beginning of the war--to see the day the war ends, and to see an end to the fighting between neighbors. We hope that all the parties will be persuaded that the continuation of the war is not in their interest and we hope that the current mediation--Arab, Muslim and international--to end the war will be successful. We hope that Iran will come to believe that the beneficiary from the continuation of the war are external powers that are searching for opportunities and resources--and I mean our resources and wealth--so that they can exploit them for their own interest and in order to boost their income.

It is well known that modern wars require a great deal of arms, and arms are sold to us by countries outside the region, countries that benefit from the continued use of the weapons they export to us and benefit from the attrition of our wealth and from the cessation of our growth and development. These countries benefit much more from our wars than from our agreement with each

other and peaceful coexistence. There is no doubt that the continuation of the war helps to arrest the area's growth and prosperity and consequently leads to its instability.

Therefore, it is in the interest of all the parties in the war to stop the fighting between the two Muslim countries--and Iraq and the Muslim countries have carried for this--and to channel all energies toward the liberation of Jerusalem. It has become clear that an end to the war depends on the agreement of the other party.

[Question] Lebanon is suffering from continued bloodshed and from Israeli occupation, while the Arabs are incapable of helping it effectively. How do you view this matter?

[Answer] The solution to the Lebanese question is in the hands of the Lebanese themselves. First of all, legality in Lebanon must be consolidated. It must be supported and backed by all the parties. [passage omitted]

[Question] How do you view the U.S. stand toward Arab issues, and what is the way to correct it?

[Answer] The United States is a great power. Undoubtedly it wants or seeks decisions from the Arab countries that are commensurate with their size. That is, we as a nation should not be divided and disunited and then ask for solutions to our causes from the United States. We are also required, when we turn to the United States, or to any other party, to be united and in agreement on a view or decision that is equal to the events. If we do this we may find a listening ear in view of the fact that our nation has potential that makes it one of the most influential nations in the world.

Perhaps if we are able to correct ourselves we will be able to correct the stand of the United States.

Incidentally, the United States is not the only country that does not agree with us and with our national aspirations. There are many forces that are pursuing the same line because we are disunited and unable to bridge the gaps that exist throughout the Arab homeland. I hope that we will be able to clarify the map of the Arab homeland and show it in its natural face--which is supposed to be without borders so that it will be an impregnable fortress and deterrent force in the face of all those who covet ambitions in our homeland.

CSO: 4400/160

BRIEFS

HIGH UNEMPLOYMENT IN SINAI--In El-Arish and other areas of the Sinai which were returned to Egypt in the context of the peace agreement, unemployment figures for the last few months indicate severe economic strife. After the Israeli withdrawal, the Egyptians planned to build large-scale projects in the area, to create employment opportunities for the local population, now cut off from their places of employment in Israel. But most of the projects were never actually undertaken, causing severe economic situation in the territories under Egyptian control to the growing incidence of infiltrators crossing the borders into Israel these last few months, to seek employment or steal. These sources indicate that Egypt could, if she wanted to, prevent infiltrations into Israel. They claim that along certain portions of the international border the Egyptians maintain sparse forces, clearly insufficient to block the border. The same sources claim that the force is logistically limited and is apathetic about infiltrators penetrating even via checkpoints. Last month, the numbers of infiltrators was reduced in the western Negev area, they say, following various preventive actions taken by the security forces. Most of the crossings, they say, now take place in a 30-kilometer segment along the international border, between the new Pithat Shalom settlements and the international border station at Nitzna. [Text] [Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew 5 Nov 82 p 2] 9811

CSO: 4423/50

ECONOMIST EXAMINES 1983 ECONOMIC TRENDS

Amman JORDAN TIMES in English 29 Dec 82 p 5

[Article by Fahd al-Fanek, vice president of Royal Jordanian Airline: "Year Ahead May See New Financial Policies"]

[Text]

Talking about the main indications for the Jordanian economy in 1983 is obviously thorny and difficult. One cannot offer more than an intelligent guess, based on certain assumptions that may or may not come true.

Even for 1982, it is too early to come up with an accurate evaluation of economic performance in the absence of statistics which have not appeared yet.

However, we shall take this difficult path and take the liberty of speculating about the possible state of affairs of the Jordanian economy in 1983.

The unknowns

Lots of relevant factors, events and possible courses of action -- in the political, economical and legal fields and at the local, Arab and international levels -- can, for good or bad, affect the Jordanian economy. But we cannot determine with any degree of certainty the outcome of these effects. For instance:

— Will the present government continue in office all through the coming year 1983 or will it be replaced by another government with slightly or substantially different policies?

— Will Arab countries pay the expected financial support to Jordan, or more, or less?

— Will the so called peace process for the Middle East crisis stall or go ahead, and in which direction, and what would be the role of Jordan in this political process of which we know very little?

— Will the Iraq-Iran war come to an end soon, or will it drag on indefinitely?

— Will the present deep depression in the economics of the industrialised world continue, or shall we see the long-awaited economic recovery?

— Will the price of oil drop as a result of the miserable situation of OPEC or, through a miracle, will the producing countries be able to control the volume of production and consequently the prices?

— Will Israel withdraw from Lebanon early in 1983 and allow the massive re-construction of the country to start, or will the civil war continue in new forms to justify the occupation?

— Will any surprise moves take place in the Arab or international arenas, or between the two superpowers, or will the status quo be maintained?

Each one of these issues has a direct bearing on Jordanian economy, yet we are unable to know how and when and to what extent.

Under these variables, the situation of the Jordanian economy could range from excellent to very bad. Between these two extremes we shall try to explore the main features and outlook.

Inflation

It is very unlikely that Jordan will experience high inflation and price hikes in 1983, whether for domestic products or imports. Indications are that inflation will not exceed 7 per cent.

This does not necessarily mean that a reduction in inflation will be achieved in response to governmental policies in the financial, monetary, or food supply fields. Inflation is going down worldwide due to strict monetary policies accompanied by economic depression in the industrialised countries, which will be reflected in the prices of imports, which form a very substantial portion of domestic expenditure on both consumption and investment.

During the first 10 months of 1982, inflation amounted to only 6 per cent. For the whole year it will be 7.5 to 8 per cent. This is a big improvement compared with previous years. A year ago, no one dared to hope for such a low rate of inflation. The current Five Year Development Plan hoped for a 10 per cent inflation rate in 1982 and 1983, dropping to nine per cent in 1984 and 1985.

The Stock Exchange

The Amman Stock Exchange witnessed a buoyant market and very high prices, which were sustained for 12 months ending in the last week of May 1982. Prices have declined since then, and the volume of turnover has dropped considerably. This happened due to political developments in the Gulf (Iran-Iraq war) combined with the Israeli invasion of Lebanon. These developments triggered the expected downward trend of shares already overvalued.

It is our belief that the next cycle of acceleration in share prices will not start before mid-year 1983, as the cycle in Amman's financial market seems to take around 24 months.

However, even in mid 1983, I do not expect share prices to go up dramatically, as prices are still on the high side if evaluated by advanced market standards.

Price earnings ratios over 15, and net yield is below 5 per cent.

Share price fluctuations in 1983 will be more selective, in that certain shares will go up while others will decline. Accordingly making money in the stock exchange will take more financial analysis and information than was the case in the second half of 1981 and the first half of 1982.

Economic growth

We estimate the growth of the Gross National Product in 1982 to be around 6 per cent in real terms. 1983 will witness a continuation of this trend but at a slower pace. The general mood in 1983 will be more conservative and inclined to waiting and postponement.

Despite all that has been said about the encouragement of commodity production, Jordan's economy is heading towards more production of services. Jordan is a services centre, well qualified to provide excellent services to the whole area, whereas it cannot compete with the commodities of industrialised countries in Arab markets, neither from the quality nor from the pricing points of view.

Gross Domestic Product in 1983 will reach around JD 1550 million in current prices, while Gross National Product will increase from JD 1466 million in 1981 to JD 1678 million in 1982 and JD 1900 million in 1983, all in current prices.

The population of Jordan (East Bank) is growing at 4 per cent a year, and will reach 2.5 million by the end of 1983, thus making the per capita annual income around JD 760, or \$2,100, which is a good average for Third World countries.

The budget

The government budget for 1983 amounted to JD 795.4 million, of which JD 491.4 million will go to recurring expenses, JD 55.3 to non-development capital acquisition and repayments, and JD 248.7m to economic development.

We suspect that actual current recurring expenses will reach JD 540 million, or 10 per cent in excess of the budget figures. Capital acquisition will reach JD 60 million or 8.5 per cent over the budget limit, and development expenditure will not exceed JD 190 million or 24 per cent below the level envisaged by the budget. This will make the total expenditure of the government some JD 796 million, slightly below the official estimates of the budget.

It is well known that the easiest way to reduce government outlays is to cut down on development investments.

The current expenses that we think will exceed the budget are those listed as general, contingent, various or others; that is, expenses with names that are not indicative of their exact nature.

Public debt

It is my rough estimate that the government will borrow during 1983 around JD 100 million locally in bonds, treasury bills, and overdraft facilities from the Central Bank.

External debt, on the other hand, will rise by some JD 100 million, mostly in development project financing, and possibly Euro-dollar loans as a last resort.

The rise in public debt is due to the decline in Arab financial support, and the government's unwillingness to make corresponding reductions in its public expenditure, in order to avoid any drop in the level and activity of the domestic economy.

Imports and exports

Imports have had an unbroken record of acceleration every year. However I do not expect imports to rise in 1983 due to three factors: less need for capital equipment, stability of prices, and abundance of stocks (the owners of which will be reluctant to import more merchandise until they dispose of a major part of what they already carry.)

Exports on the other hand will rise overall. Phosphate rock exports will not decrease in absolute terms, yet their relative importance in the national exports will decline.

Balance of payments

The balance of payments for 1982 is expected to break almost even, with only a slight surplus or deficit which will not affect the size of our adequate reserves in gold and foreign exchange. These reserves are the safety margin for our economic stability and for the relative strength of the Jordan Dinar and its easy convertability.

Nevertheless, 1983 will be a transitional year, and will witness gradual changes in concepts and policies. The excessive government expenditure and domestic borrowing -- which will be translated to foreign currency outflows by way of import financing of goods and services, -- may result a moderate deficit in the balance of payments.

This deficit, if incurred, should be looked upon as a normal matter. No balance of payment can end up with a surplus year after year for ever. In essence, balances of payments should almost break even, and whatever deficit occurs in a given year should be covered by a surplus in another year and vice versa.

However, it is important not to allow the deficit in the balance of payments to become a persistent trend, in which case foreign reserves will be depleted, and the country will become more vulnerable to external influences. This phenomenon is normally accompanied by a rise in the inflation rate, decline in exchange rate of the national currency, and mounting external debt etc.

These negative features have not happened in Jordan in the past, and the government should not allow them to happen in the future. This is possible only by making certain sacrifices, which the government cannot indefinitely avoid applying.

Interest rate

The interest rate on the Jordan Dinar is currently almost equal to that of the U.S. dollar or the Sterling Pound. It is higher than the interest commanded by Japanese yen, German mark, Swiss franc, or Dutch guilder. Therefore, it is very unlikely that interest rate in Jordan will continue to rise any further.

These circumstances may encourage the Central Bank of Jordan to float interest rates, and abandon regulating the base and ceiling rates for interest charged to borrowers or paid to depositors, and leave it to the forces of the free market. Should this happen, we expect that interest paid on deposits will rise while interest paid on bank loans may drop, which will reduce the present extremely high profit margins of Jordanian banks.

In this case the market will see a wide range of interest rates charged to various borrowers in accordance with the risk attached or the quality of the borrower concerned. This is a healthy sign because risky projects should be required and able to pay more interest than the conventional low risk low return investments.

Flood of the market

Many observers are especially concerned about the level of activity in the market place from the importers' and traders' points of view.

In this respect we expect rather quiet markets, but we look at it as a healthy sign. "Good" markets from their point of view mean much more importation and consumption, while what we really need is exactly the opposite, even if this is seen as a recession from the trade sector point of view.

On the other hand, a recession is of course relative to expectations. The volume of merchandise that will change hands in 1983 will definitely be more than double the level prevailing five

years ago, but our trading sector is now accustomed to almost 40 per cent growth every year, which cannot continue forever and must lend itself sooner or later to the levelling-off process.

Likewise the currency issued, money supply, size of deposits, bank facilities etc. cannot continue to grow at 25 per cent a year, as was the case for ten consecutive years, and must stabilise at the still reasonable growth rate of 10 to 15 per cent a year. This in time will result in fiercer competition among banks to lure depositors and attract good borrowers.

We should see the end of a Jordanian banking community where the difference between a successful bank and a unsuccessful one is that the first grows at 50 per cent or more a year, while the second grows at only 15 per cent. We expect the balance sheets of certain banks to shrink during 1983, because other more aggressive and growth-oriented banks will seize a larger share of the market at the expense of others who fail to respond to the changing circumstances in the market place.

New policies

New policies will emerge during 1983, such as the curtailing of subsidies to companies, projects and consumer commodities. The government will request certain weak projects to establish themselves as viable projects, able to reach self sufficiency on their own.

Among institutions that may be caught by this new policy we can see the Ministry of Supply, both Civil and Military Consumption corporations, big companies such as the Phosphate Mines Company, Arab Potash Company and Jordan Fertilisers Industry Co. which are using Aqaba's port facilities, railways, roads, without fairly contributing towards the capital cost or the maintenance and running costs of these facilities, even when they are constructed solely for

their own use. In other words, the institutions that claim to be profitable will have to look for other means of survival, and will not find them except by the rationalisation of their activities on a sound economic and financial basis.

Problems will no longer be soluble at the expense of the government, which used to foot the bill. Instead, managements should find ways and means to reduce cost and waste, and finally produce surpluses and make a positive contribution to the national economy. Many projects now make, in real terms, a negative contribution to the national economy and must be singled out, corrected or left to disappear.

In conclusion, this review comprises neutral projections, optimistic thinking and pessimistic fears. It is addressed to both the general reader and the decision makers, hoping that their action in 1983 will help positive points to materialise and negative ones not come true.

NEED FOR AUTOMATION IN INDUSTRY NOTED

Amman JORDAN TIMES in English 29 Dec 82 p 4

[Science and Industry column by Dr Awn Rifai]

[Text]

The difficulty in running industrial establishments in Jordan is understandable. Jordan, like many other developing countries, has been learning the art of industrial management the hard way. Starting with a society dependent mainly on agriculture and trade, and exposed extensively to the latest industrial innovations, the country has had difficult conditions to cope with in a relatively short period of time. The situation has not allowed the decision-makers sufficient time to draw up a long-term industrialisation policy.

The absence of a long-term strategy for industrialisation has induced the single-handed policy exercised without proper coordination in many industries, and even in their sub-divisions. It is therefore essential that the owners of any industrial establishment take proper measures to secure the efficient running of their business by top-qualified people.

As for the production technologies adopted in the factories, more automation should be introduced, in particular in the newly set up industries. Many factories will not have changed during the

next decade, in the same manner that many have not changed since the past decade.

A marked prediction however is that most of the automated factories will be owned by big financial corporations, due to the inability of smaller organisations to make the investments needed in order to achieve a high standard of automation. The industrial management should take this into consideration in their development and improvement plans.

The amount of automation to be incorporated in the production lines depends on the nature of the manufacturing process. Some processes are almost continuous, as in the chemical or petrol refining industries, while others are of mass production type, such as in the engineering industries.

A third type occurs in the production of special orders or limited-quantity items and a fourth type deals with production of original equipment or items of rare usage. As concerns the fourth type automation in the factory becomes less feasible in both economic and technical sense.

Other factors which influence the degree of automation

are increases in the cost of energy, the depletion of raw materials, the quality and skill of labour, and the utilisation of computers and other technological innovations.

Automation should be introduced in the running of production processes, in the assembly and testing stages, and in materials handling and storage. For example, the technical specifications of the components, materials, and products, could be stored in coded form in a computer memory. The design plans could be handled by a computer, which can also be made to control production line operations. More use should be made of the automatic control equipment and of computers to carry out the various operations of designing, planning, quality control, selection of optimum procedures and their scheduling, and dispatch tasks.

The technological improvements that can be introduced in the factories are numerous. The industrial establishments should take the initiative and draft a strategy for the introduction of updated production technologies in a coordinated manner.

BRIEFS

ESTIMATE ON EMIGRANT WORKERS--Amman (J.T.)--Above 40,000 to 50,000 workers are expected to emigrate from Jordan by the end of 1985, a study by the director general of the Jordanian Vocational Training Institute, Munzir Al Masri, indicates. The study, published Tuesday, was conducted on educational and vocational standards of the newly emerging manpower in Jordan. It said that the total supply of manpower during a specific period of time and the general educational and vocational standard of manpower are a major indicator for comparison purposes between supply and demand. The study indicates that most emigrant workers in these coming years would go to Arab countries and since there are positive as well as negative aspects of such emigration, attention should be paid to regulate this and to ensure accurate information about it so that vocational training programmes could be adapted to deal with the situation in the best possible manner. The study also showed that there was a shortage in Jordanian manpower in the last few years with a flow of foreign manpower to the country, information derived from the Ministry of Labour shows that well over 100,000 non-Jordanian workers, mostly Arabs, are now employed in Jordan. This also should be regulated, the study said. [Text] [Amman JORDAN TIMES in Engl sh 29 Dec 82 p 2]

CONTROLS ON FOOD IMPORTS--Amman (J.T.)--The government has banned the import of canned foodstuffs if they do not have a shelf life of more than half their original shelf life as indicated on the cans at the time of their entry into Jordan. The regulations, issued by the Ministry of Industry and Trade, stipulate that the duration of the fitness of the foodstuff imported, will be calculated from the time of its manufacturing until its actual entry into Jordan. This came in a decision issued by Industry and Trade Minister Walid Asfour regarding Jordanian standard specifications for the duration of fitness of foodstuffs for human consumption. The measure will be enforced three months after its publication in the Official Gazette. Representatives of concerned ministries and departments participated in drawing up the standard specifications. The instructions specified the duration for the consumption of various items as under: luncheon meat three years; corned beef, four years; corned mutton, three years; canned sausage, two and a half years; meat and vegetable cans, two years; sardines and tuna fish with oil, four years; sardines and tuna fish without oil, two years; other canned fish, one and a half years; cream, two years, local cream, one year; butter, 9 months; canned cooked cheese, one year; dry cheese, one year; cheese preserved in salty solutions, one year; frozen

and preserved vegetables, one year; other vegetable cans, two years; tomato paste, one year; canned pickles, 15 months; soup powder or blocks, one year; canned fruits, two years; pasturised milk, six months; powder milk, two years; cooked frozen food, three months; and ice-cream, six months. [Text] [Amman JORDAN TIMES in English 29 Dec 82 p 2]

CHANGES IN DIPLOMATIC REGULATIONS--Amman (Petra)--A royal decree was issued Monday approving an ordinance amending the diplomatic corps ordinance. The new ordinance bans employees of Jordanian diplomatic corps from marrying non-Jordanians except after obtaining cabinet approval and empowers the cabinet to dismiss from service Jordanian diplomats who marry non-Jordanians without cabinet approval. It also fixes monthly allowances given to Jordanian ambassadors and other diplomats assigned to work at missions abroad. The ordinance also provides for housing allowances to diplomats as fixed according to the country they are serving in with the exception of ambassadors whose housing allowance would be decided by the cabinet. The new ordinance gives the diplomats a monthly education allowance of JD 50 for the Foreign Ministry under-secretary, JD 25 for the chief of protocol, and JD 20 for each employee of the Protocol Department. The new ordinance also fixes specific allowances for diplomats in case of transfer from one post to another, transport of their furniture, and their recall to headquarters from abroad for official purposes. [Text] [Amman JORDAN TIMES in English 29 Dec 82 p 4]

CSO: 4400/150

FINANCE MINISTER ON COUNTRY'S ROLE IN INTERNATIONAL FINANCE

Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 44, 20 Dec 82 pp 4-5

[Interview with Sheikh Mohammed Aba Al-Khail, in Riyadh]

[Text]

As guardian of the public purse in Saudi Arabia, Finance Minister Sheikh Mohammed Aba al-Khail is accustomed to deal with world financial and economic problems as well as those that concern only his own country. And Saudi Arabia's role in international finance is likely to grow, as is made plain in the following exclusive interview with *An-Nahar Arab Report & MEMO's* Randa Takied-dine last week in Riyadh. The interview follows:

Q: What is the amount of the Saudi loan to France and where is the money deposited? The French media have indicated it could be more than \$ 2 billion. What is the truth about this loan? Can you confirm this figure?

A: What has been published is exaggerated. Since the French Finance Minister Jacques Delors is coming here next Monday, I expect that we will have clearer information on this question after his visit. But I would like to mention that investment in government bonds issued by industrialised countries is a principal channel for investment for monetary institutions and for countries with financial surpluses. In other words, bonds issued by the French Treasury are similar to those issued by other Western industrialised countries in that they are a secure investment tool giving a good return to investors.

Q: Does this mean that your loan to France will be only through bonds?

A: What has been examined up until now was within this scope. In any event, relations between France and the Saudi Kingdom concerning this matter are not new. Last October I visited Paris for one day and met Mr Delors. We talked about these questions and about other subjects related to bilateral relations in the monetary field between France and the Saudi Kingdom. The visit to Riyadh by Mr Delors next week returns my visit and we will finalise some questions which we debated during my previous visit to France. It will also be an opportunity to discuss new developments related to the international monetary situation.

Q: It was reported recently that Saudi Arabia has been asked by Western governments to contribute to a huge expansion of the IMF's lendable resources. Can you confirm this?

A: The idea which the IMF is now considering is to expand the GAB (General Arrangements to Borrow) agreement. This subject is now being examined in the IMF after the Group of Five met to study it and after the Group of 10 had examined it. Among the ideas being studied is one to expand participation in the GAB, which is still limited only to the 10 nations making up the Group of 10 (major industrial nations, of which the Group of Five are the largest) in addition to Switzerland, which is a participating country without being a real member. Expanding the GAB would enable other countries outside the Group of 10 to raise loans from the GAB's financial resources (currently about \$ 7 billion). Expansion of the GAB agreement envisages the potential participation of other borrower countries.

Q: Such as?

A: No country was mentioned by name. The principles are under study now. The Saudi Kingdom cannot adopt a specific position on this before having a clear idea of what has been decided. All that we have until now is what is being published in the press on the matter. No official contacts have been made. Next week the IMF will continue to examine the question.

Q: In 1982, Saudi Arabia's oil revenues have been lower than those for 1980 and 1981, according to SAMA (Saudi Arabian Monetary Authority) figures. Will this reduction affect the third Saudi five-year plan?

A: We are now in the midst of the third five-year plan. I would like to assure you that the five-year plan will be implemented as it stands and without any change. What has been decided for the next two years - 1983 and 1984

and be implemented as planned. We do not think that we will meet obstacles to implementation. But for after 1985 it is difficult to predict how the oil market will be. The current assessment of the oil situation will be, but we are optimistic and we believe that economic recovery will occur before the end of 1983 to prevent oil prices from falling and that demand for oil will pick up as a result.

Q: On the eve of the OPEC ministerial conference in Vienna, can you comment on some critical issues? Saudi oil producers are giving big discounts for their oil sales, and if the conference fails to reach an agreement on this issue, how would Saudi Arabia react to the problem of pricing? We know that Saudi Arabia has already made it clear that it will do its utmost to defend the current \$ 33 per barrel OPEC market price. But what will happen if other countries such as Iran and Libya stick to their present positions?

A: The current agreement on the oil price is of great importance to us. The Saudi Kingdom and other OPEC producers will do their utmost to defend the \$ 33 market. It is hoped that other producers who are giving discounts will realise that it is in their own interests to abide by the official oil price and we do hope that this will be realised.

Q: What if this is not realised? Is the Saudi Kingdom, together with other Gulf producers, ready to reduce its oil price?

A: The enthusiasm of Gulf countries will not cool down if confronted by such a possibility.

Q: To what level can Saudi Arabia afford to keep down its oil prices?

A: We do not have any fixed or arbitrary ranges of levels of production. The Saudi Kingdom increased its oil production to a maximum and because of its adequate reserves can also sustain it for the long term.

Q: The Financial Yearbook of the OPEC Fund stated in 1982 that lower oil revenues will affect the amount of aid received by Third World countries from oil-producing countries with surplus revenues. What is your comment?

A: The Saudi Kingdom's aid to developing countries is strong. It is permanent and it is strong as ever. But of course the amount of aid is often related to the financial resources available. Because of the world economic recession, it is natural to expect that some countries will reduce the aid channelled to the needs in 1983 because of some difficult economic problems which some countries are facing. This will then be less than what it used to be in the past.

Q: There is talk the probability of the \$ 4 billion resources of the OPEC Fund. That goal has not yet been reached. Can you discuss some of the member countries have changed their shares in the Fund? What has been done about this?

A: The meeting of the OPEC Fund in February and the problem will be discussed there. We hope to reach an agreement. In any event, the Saudi Kingdom has fulfilled its commitments and it is now the biggest contributor to the Fund. The participation constitutes more than 15 per cent of the Fund's capital. Furthermore, countries which are members of the Gulf Cooperation Council have also fulfilled their commitments (Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Qatar as well as Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and Oman are members of the GCC but not of OPEC). We hope others will follow.

Q: Speaking of aid, Lebanon needs a lot of financial aid for reconstruction and President Gemayel visited Saudi Arabia recently. Has anything been set up to channel aid to Lebanon?

A: Saudi Arabia is keen to participate with others in the reconstruction of Lebanon. It is our responsibility and it stems from our close bilateral ties. It is hence natural and crucial that we offer our assistance to your country. I think that the studies and assessments that are being undertaken by the World Bank will be the framework within which all efforts to aid Lebanon will be channelled by the Saudi Kingdom. We expect the World Bank to complete its assessments and studies within a short time.

Q: Do you believe the Gulf Cooperation Council will achieve a common market like the one in Europe?

A: That is definitely the aim, the establishment of a common market in the Gulf to constitute a unified economic bloc. The GCC has various committees which meet regularly for consultations and to decide on common measures. There is a permanent committee for economic and financial cooperation made up of the Finance Ministers of the GCC countries and this committee was holding meetings even before the ratification of the GCC economic agreement and has also created the Gulf Investment Organisation. The economic committee of the GCC will meet next week in Bahrain to examine the implementation of a unification of customs duties and the elimination of these duties on goods produced locally. The other committees of the GCC are those comprising GCC Oil Ministers, Ministers of Industry, Transport, Ministers and Trade Ministers. It is only a question of time and we hope to be able to achieve our goal, the GCC common market.

Q: Can the causeway between Bahrain and Saudi Arabia be considered as an example of GCC cooperation even though the project precedes the formation of the GCC?

A: Yes, definitely. Work on the causeway has started and is expected to be completed at the end of 1984 or the beginning of 1985. The contractor is Dutch and the cost of about \$ 600 million is being financed by Saudi Arabia.

VIEWS ON TRIPOLI FIGHTING, LEBANESE TALKS

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic No 307, 8 Jan 83 p 31

[Article: "Syria Considers America Its Number One Enemy Whether in Lebanon or in the Arab Region"]

[Text] Official Syrian sources expressed to AL-MUSTAQBAL their concern and displeasure with the continuation of the bloody fighting in Tripoli and the Shuf and its negative repercussions on the Lebanese situation in general, and with the position of the Lebanese negotiator at Khaldah and al-Khalisah (the settlement of Qkiryat Shemona). These sources confirmed that the responsibility for the fighting of these two Lebanese regions falls on agents who are igniting the fire of civil strife and rekindling it after every sincere attempt has been made to extinguish it. Information reaching the Syrian capital concerning Tripoli indicates that, after every cease-fire agreement, these agents have tried to blow up the situation anew and have succeeded more than once in destroying agreements and causing tension. It has been reported that following the two visits by President Asad's envoys to Tripoli and their meetings with (former prime minister) Karami during which they laid the framework for a permanent cessation of hostilities by restraining the various pro-Syrian elements and the local Tripoli leadership, certain parties proceeded to ignite sedition through the armed resistance of certain Syrian soldiers and officers on the one hand and through random firing on several sections of the city so that each side believed that it was the target of the other side. The message which Syrian Minister of State for Presidential Affairs 'Abd al-Karim 'Adi conveyed to Karami included many details on this matter so that the sincere local parties, led by Mr Karami could begin to treat the cause of the dispute and the source of trouble. This certainly has served certain parties who would like tension to continue.

In another matter, Damascus has been following with extreme interest the development of the talks between Lebanon, Israel and the U.S. The Syrian media has been highlighting "the unlimited Syrian support for the position of the Lebanese negotiator." It has also focused on the continuous adherence to Lebanon's initial position that the withdrawal of the Israeli invasion forces be a priority and that all conditions which affect Lebanese sovereignty be rejected.

In response to questions by AL-MUSTAQBAL concerning Syria's position toward a broad spectrum of current developments in the Lebanese arena, an informed

...and will fully and actively supports President Amin al-Jawhri and all the legitimate positions of the Lebanese Government, noting that the political and military situation and his government have been met by clear opposition to any type of partition and which have been conspiring to undermine the independence of Lebanon, after realizing that the U.S. had adopted the Israeli conditions, he urged the U.S. to be the number one enemy whether in Lebanon or in the entire Arab world. The source hinted that Syria "would continue to support Lebanon" and would make every effort to provide anything that would strengthen the legitimate position in the face of the Israeli conditions which have been adopted by the American partner and would fulfill any request which Lebanon felt was necessary with regard to the Syrian forces, whose presence in Lebanon is legitimate. He also hinted that Syria "would not deal with its Arab allies in the event that an agreement is imposed on Lebanon with the objective of implementing Israel's conditions and which is viewed by Syria as an encroachment on its interests and security." He indicated that the Israeli conditions, as conveyed by Habib during his last visit to Damascus, at which time he was not received by President Asad, are completely rejected by Syria because they affect Lebanese sovereignty, the common interests of Syria and Lebanon in all spheres especially those relating to security as well as national interests.

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UAE PAPER: GULF WAR AFFECTED UNITY OF OPEC

GF171204 Manama WAKH in Arabic 0705 GMT 17 Jan 83

[Excerpt] Manama, 17 Jan (WAKH)--[Passage omitted] The UAE paper AL-WAHDAH has noted that the Iraqi-Iranian war negatively affected the unity of OPEC and that the continuation of this war implies continuation of the OPEC crisis.

Commenting editorially, the paper added that the crisis which OPEC currently suffers from is not a crisis of prices or production, but it is actually a political crisis that exploded as a result of the differences that prevailed among the oil-producing countries. AL-WAHDAH believes that the current OPEC crisis exploded after the appearance of the oil glut in the market. The paper stressed that "the political differences, the wars and tension among the member countries made some of these countries raise their production, exceeding the highest production limit and thus inundating the market."

This consequently affected the other countries which were later forced to lower their prices, thus causing mess in the region. The paper continued: The crisis is close to solution, particularly after the elimination of some of the tension among the OPEC members, but we stress that the continuation of the Iraqi-Iranian war, is a continuation of the crisis. The paper urged the oil-production countries to work seriously in the direction of ending the Iraqi-Iranian war and of participating in the efforts exerted to end it "if they want to overcome all the obstacles to end the war and conclude this dispute in one of the most sensitive and wealthy areas in the world. [passage omitted]

CSO: 4400/163

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

UAE PAPER CRITICIZES U.S. ROLE IN LEBANESE-ISRAELI TALKS

CF181310 Abu Dhabi WAM in Arabic 0615 GMT 18 Jan 83

[From the press review]

[Excerpt] Abu Dhabi, 18 Jan (WAM)--[Passage omitted] The UAE paper AL-ITTIHAD commented editorially on a report broadcast by the enemy radio indicating that Philip Habib had made a commitment to Israel--during a meeting attended by [Israel's] foreign and war ministers--that if Israel and the United States reach an understanding among themselves on the basic issues then Habib will shoulder the responsibility of convincing Lebanon to accept this agreement. The paper added that "if this is true, then this could be one of the most grave statements that has been made since the start of the negotiations between Lebanon and the Israeli enemy with Habib representing the U.S. side."

The paper stressed that what takes place indicates that Habib again plays this ominous role which Henry Kissinger played. This role has proven to be thoroughly in favor of the United States and Israel.

Concluding this editorial, the paper called on Lebanon to grasp the lessons of the experience of the negotiations that have taken place with Israel at the hands of Henry Kissinger or at the hands of somebody else whether this be in the negotiations for the disengagement [of forces], the Camp David negotiations or the peace agreement. The paper pointed out that the first lesson to be learned is that it is wrong to count on the full partner and authorize it to deal with all the cards of negotiations. [passage omitted]

CSO: 4400/163

UAE PAPER ON ENDING ARAB INVESTMENT IN WEST

GF111900 Al-Shariqah AL-KHALIJ in Arabic 11 Jan 83 p 1

[Editorial: "The Doomed Assets"]

[Text] It may be strange that the rich Arab countries should prefer to invest their surplus funds outside the Arab homeland, but what is even stranger is that these governments know beforehand that their "investments" in Western countries are doomed to loss as a result of factors which--at best--are the octopus of inflation, erosion and the continued slump in the value of the principal Western currencies. At worst, Western governments may seize these assets and totally expropriate them or restrict their use if it is politically opportune to do so. Both the United States and Britain have set well-known precedents in "freezing assets."

Perhaps what is even stranger is that the governments of the rich Arab countries are continuing to increase their investment in the West despite their awareness of these great dangers. The volume of these investments has increased from \$23 billion in 1974 to \$104 billion in 1980, and according to studies are expected to rise to \$200 billion in 1985.

Since the governments of the Arab oil-exporting countries do not want to use their growing external investments as a political weapon to tip the balance of international relations in favor of the Arabs, let them at least desist from investing more assets in Washington, London, Paris and Tokyo, and let them direct the surplus of their new assets toward development in the Arab homeland.

It is truly painful that hundreds of billions of dollars should remain as deposits in Western banks or as treasury bonds of Western governments while the rich Arab countries are incapable of developing to a stage of self-sufficiency--even self-sufficiency in producing a loaf of bread--while the peoples of the poor Arab countries are facing famine. It is the right of the Arab citizens everywhere to ask: If the surplus Arab funds do not help in safeguarding "food security" on the domestic level, and do not support the Arab cause on the external level, then what is their use?

The question may become an accusation when the Arab citizens realize that only 10 percent of the revenues of the oil-rich Arab countries suffice to achieve the desired agricultural development in all the countries of the entire Arab homeland.

The pretext to which Arab investors--government and individuals--invariably resort whenever investment in the Arab countries is mentioned is "the political risks" in the Arab countries. To these we say: In the worst circumstances "political risks" in the Arab countries are probabilities, whereas the risk of inflation and erosion in the West--where 80 percent of Arab investment is doomed--is inevitable.

CSO: 4400/163

BRIEFS

CONTRACTING FIRMS FORMED--During its meeting this morning under his Highness Shaykh Maktum ibn Rashid, deputy prime minister and Dabai heir apparent, the cabinet agreed to grant GCC citizens the right to work in the contracting field in accordance to the GCC's Supreme Council resolution encouraging GCC citizens to work in agricultural, industrial and fishing industries and contracting fields. The cabinet approved a memorandum by the Public Works and Housing Ministry to implement this bill in the contracting field on the contracting field on the condition that the percentage of shares will be 75 percent for the GCC citizens and 25 percent for UAE citizens. [passage omitted] [Excerpt] [GF101350 Abu Dhabi Domestic Service in Arabic 0930 GMT 10 Jan 83]

NATURAL GAS RESERVES DISCOVERED--Abu Dhabi, 15 Jan (WAKH)--New reserves of natural gas have been discovered in UAE territorial waters. The Abu Dhabi Marine Areas Company [ADMA] published a special bulletin saying that this discovery was confirmed after engineers undertook several experiments in the upper part of the well of NASR 7. This new discovery will increase the UAE reserves of natural gas. [Text] [GF151833 Manama WAKH in Arabic 0700 GMT 15 Jan 83]

DEDUCTIONS FOR PALESTINIAN ISSUE--Abu Dhabi, 17 Jan (QNA)--The committee for the support of Palestine in Dubai Emirate has taken many executive measures to organize an operation to deduct 5 percent of the salaries of all the Palestinians who work in the Dubai Emirate for the Palestinian issue. [Text] [GF171120 Doha QNA in Arabic 0830 GMT 17 Jan 83]

CSO: 4400/163

REPORTER ON TWO MONTHS SPENT WITH INSURGENT GROUP

Rotterdam NRC HANDELSBLAD in Dutch 27 Nov 82 Supplement p 2

[Article by Aernout van Lynden: "Yagh Dara: Caves of Afghan Resistance"]

[Text] The free-lance journalist Aernout van Lynden recently returned to the Netherlands after a stay of 2 months in Afghanistan.

As a rare exception he saw a chance to campaign with the Afghan "warriors of God" who are fighting the Russian occupying forces.

The guerrillas were under the leadership of Abdul Halim, a fearless leader and an impressive speaker. He was Van Lynden's host during the exciting weeks that preceded the attack on the army post near Bala Hissar.

Reporting from the occupied area.

Little cut-out paper flowers hang from the thin threads hanging loosely across the ceiling. They are the only decoration. The walls are bare, unpainted, uneven mud walls, on which the chiaroscuro of flickering oil lamps casts moving shadows. The decoration may seem meager to European eyes, but in Afghanistan it is of some significance: the son of the house was married that day, and the wedding feast is in full swing.

Zabit Abdul Halim is neither the bridegroom nor a well-wishing uncle who addresses a few well-intended words to the bridal pair. The bridegroom himself is not present; he is probably toiling in the kitchen for the first and last time with his bride and the other womenfolk. That is the Afghan tradition: a wedding means a feast for the guests.

And so Abdul Halim is the center of interest. In a country where conversation has been raised to the national sport and at the same time to an art, Halim is a talker without a peer. Power radiates from his words, power of persuasion and an innate feeling for drama that change his hearers into silent, nodding beings. A unique experience, for although Afghans like to listen, they like best to listen to their own voices.

"The jihad, the village, and the parties!" Halim, still bending forward, taps three times with one finger on the carpet. "Nothing else is important."

This is a *jihad*, a holy war, and as it is written: 'Have faith in Allah, fight in his name with all your wealth, with all your person and he will help you and give you an early victory.' But we are forgetting the holy task that has been laid upon us, we are shirking that task." For a moment Halim is silent, lays his hands on his knees, looks round the room, and then says slowly and with emphasis: For us Moslems such a thing is impossible. Nobody can draw back from a holy war. Everyone has a task." The finger again taps the carpet, producing two tiny dust clouds. "The village and the parties. Everybody has a duty to do something, but that does not mean that it is necessary for him to become a *mujahed*, a warrior of God. No, of course not; then the village would die, and the village forms the real base of the parties. It gives them life, manpower, food, support. Without the village the parties are lost. But everyone must sacrifice, give something of himself. For neither can the village do anything without the parties, for without the parties there would be no jihad and without jihad no Islam." Halim falls silent, looks to see the people's reaction, and nods. Everybody stands up; the evening is over.

Outside in the wind--the first chill sign of an approaching autumn--Halim's mujahidin are already standing waiting. "Harakat, raza." The daily return trip to the hills can begin. Two hours later we have reached our destination, a barren, almost vertical mountainside: Yagh Dara.

Halim leads the way up. There is hardly a path, and half the time we are forced to climb the rocks on our hands and feet. Halim's men go before us like supple mountain goats. After a punishing half hour Halim points upward: "Looking, come, come." Straight above us a little flame is burning; that is where Halim's base of operations is located.

That base consists of some 30 small natural caves hidden under enormous rocks. Halim has chosen for himself a somewhat larger place, not exactly a cave, but with protection against nature, where you can stand erect eye to eye with an enchanting view of the thousands of lights of the Afghan capital far below.

There is not much comfort to be found in this crude sleeping place. As my host, Halim does what he can for me and the French-educated Afghan biologist acting as interpreter, but a thin mattress and two blankets offer little comfort on the hard, uneven ground against the cold of the night. The biologist, who has obviously gotten used to soft French beds, is quite upset: "*Oh, mais putain, c'est impossible!*" (French: "Damn it, it's impossible!"), and he lies the rest of the night twisting and turning in an obviously vain attempt to find a soft spot. Halim, on the other hand, is in a deep sleep within 5 minutes. So goes the night in a center of resistance on the threshold of Kabul.

Life in Yagh Dara has little more to offer in the daytime than at night. The mountainside is just as steep, it takes at least a quarter of an hour to reach a little brook flowing nearby, and there is practically never enough to eat. But to Halim the caves of Yagh Dara are a symbol of all he has accomplished. Yagh Dara is his discovery, his creation. His community, his following, may perhaps live and dwell in the southern outskirts of Kabul, but Halim himself refuses to spend the nights or the greater part of the day anywhere else.

"Yagh Dara," he explains with unmistakable pride, "is practically impossible for the Russians to take. They have tried everything. But tanks cannot get up the

mountains, and an infantry attack is simple for us to repel. So they come two or three times a month with their combat helicopters and MIG's, but they get nowhere with them, either."

He points here and there around him; on the heavy, dark rocks the scars of the bombardments are plain to see--superficial damage. "They have bombed us over 20 times, but only once has a cave collapsed. To run us out of here they would have to risk the lives of thousands of men."

This insight has not remained confined to Zabit Abdul Halim; twice the Russians have tried to surround Yagh Dara with between 4,000 and 6,000 soldiers. The mujahidin were no match for such numbers; they withdrew to another camp 30 km south of Kabul, convinced that the Russian commanders could not leave their men in Yagh Dara forever. And indeed, both times Halim could return after a few days to his beloved windy cave.

While the caves and the steep mountainside offer relatively safe accommodations, the continual air attacks, the daily false alarms, and the clandestine night marches have left their marks. The young faces are conspicuous for old, tired eyes which show tension, pain, and incomprehension.

Hassan, for example, is barely 19. He is the clown, the joker that will not stop. All day long, from sunup to sundown, his laughter is heard, but Hassan's eyes no longer laugh. As is the case with many a clown, Hassan hides the pain that he has never been able to assimilate in an unending farce. It was just before my departure from Yagh Dara that I finally got to hear his story: in a counterattack by the mujahidin after the unsuccessful Russian encirclement of Shiwaki earlier this year, both of his brothers were killed. A tank shell blew the two youths literally to pieces; Hassan was unhurt.

The development of the Yagh Dara center of resistance plays a central part in the theory that Halim expounded during the wedding feast: the village and the parties. Wherever you go in Afghanistan it can be seen everywhere that the villages have had the worst to endure. There is practically no village that is undamaged; many have completely flattened by bombings.

The devastation constitutes the most important reason for the seemingly unending stream of refugees toward Pakistan and at the same time one of the most fundamental problems with which the resistance is struggling after 3 years of war. For empty villages mean empty fields and empty fields mean food scarcity.

Halim: "Of the 300 men now under my orders, a majority still live in Shiwaki and the other villages. They can hardly do otherwise; they are forced to stay to provide for their families and to work in the city or on the land. I understand that, but I am against it. Their presence puts the village in danger. Village and parties, the resistance, must remain separate. If the mujahidin live there, the chance of an air attack, of destruction of the village, is much greater. So far Yagh Dara has restrained the Russians from that."

The long days in Yagh Dara give Halim the chance to devote more attention to his generally young mujahidin. Hours are devoted to training in the handling of weapons, to lessons in tactics, and to long monologues during scanty meals. With

his impetuous, unequalled energy, Halim plays the principal rôle in everything that is done. It is a feat that you get tired of; you do have to respect it, but at the same time it is Halim's greatest shortcoming. The man cannot delegate; he has too domineering a character ever to turn anything over to anybody else. A shortcoming that will eventually cost his resistance fighters dear.

At 1530 hours Halim gives the order to go down the mountainside. It is a daily ritual. The mujahidin know that their Russian adversaries do not attempt anything after sundown, that in their tanks and armored vehicles they would be too convenient targets for the mujahidin.

"In the daytime the countryside and the city are in their hands, but at night it is our Afghanistan. We are the night birds," Halim says high-spiritedly. On the way to the suburbs he jokes with his long column of heavily-armed men about who will take up what task once the godless enemy from the north has withdrawn. "Nanboy (literally Breadboy--he was formerly a baker), I have decided that you shall be minister of transport." Roars of laughter. Although he is one of Halim's most loyal men, it is a generally accepted notion that the good youth is not blessed with an overabundance of brains. "But I can't read," is the serious answer. "No need; you give the orders, the people in Peshawar carry them out."

After 2 hours of Afghan humor (and criticism of the big shots who live high and dry in Pakistan), we are again sitting in a house in one of the suburbs of Kabul. While Halim, as seems to be the case practically every evening, can exercise his vocal talents on yet another group of local notables, we get a relatively passable meal put before us: rice drenched in oil with little bits of boiled (everything is boiled in Afghanistan, more's the pity) goat or lamb and a salad of tomatoes and onions.

Such were the days and nights of the man with whom I was to spend 7 weeks, until the night that he died in a desperately brave attack. With his black beard, dark skin, and flaming eyes, Halim reminded me of the Spanish buccaneer of old: hot-tempered, impetuous, unafraid. A sort of Afghan Errol Flynn, but without the women. A man that cold North Europeans would not readily accept as leader had for that very reason developed within the Afghan environment into one of the most important leaders of the resistance.

For however impetuous and temperamental, Halim was a man of intellect and education, one of the few Afghan resistance leaders who understood that in a guerrilla war the guerrilla fighter's political task is just as important as his military one.

Until last year Halim was involved mostly in the eastern provinces, bordering on Pakistan, in the popular revolt that broke out in Afghanistan after the communist power take-over of April 1978. But last year he decided that the time had come to return to his native village of Shiwaki to extend the fight to the capital, less than 8 km further up. In the 15 months since his return he had attained his goal and been able to build up a center of resistance to the Soviet-supported régime in Kabul.

On 30 September Halim's group went into action. That evening he forced his way into the city at the head of 36 of his warriors to attack the military transport depot of Karte Nau in eastern Kabul.

However chaotically and sometimes terrifyingly the evening developed, the attack succeeded. Thanks to much inaccurate firing on the government side, the depot was reached, and after some delay (matches could not be found at first), fell in a sea of flames.

Such actions formed the third leg of Halim's triangle: the village, the parties, and the jihad. And under his leadership the jihad in Kabul was undoubtedly greatly advanced. The short, not very purposeful attacks on military posts far from the cultivated basin, to which the resistance had restricted itself in the past, have had to give way to nocturnal operations to within a few hundred kilometers of the center. Halim thus called the attention of the resistance in general to the tactic that is most effective: waging war at precisely the places where the present rulers and their friends from the north think they are strongest.

Just before the attack on Bala Hissar, Halim told about the dream that had him in its grip night and day. "The plan is ready," and with a smile he tapped his head, "hidden until the day that we have beaten the Russians. It is the plan of the only real attack on Kabul, the last attack, the attack on the palace." Then Halim fell silent, but you could see him thinking, dreaming of the magic day that he would lead his men into the palace. At that moment the victory of Islam would be a fact.

Two days later Zabit Abdul Halim lost his life at the heavily damaged walls of the army post near Bala Hissar, less than a kilometer from the palace. His dream died with him, but the Afghan resistance continues unbroken.

8815

CSO: 3614/22

INTERIOR MINISTER DENOUNCES COUNTERREVOLUTIONARY TERRORISM

AU101509 Prague PRACE in Czech 6 Jan 83 p 2

[Article by Sayyed Mohammad Golabzoy, minister of interior of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan: "The Afghan Counterrevolution Will Not Succeed; Terror and Diversion"--passage between slantlines published in boldface]

[Text] The enemies of the new Afghanistan are striving to confuse world public opinion and therefore trying to depict the subversive and terrorist actions against the revolutionary power as a "holy war for the defense of Islam."

However, the dark plots of the Afghan counterrevolutionaries have nothing in common either with Islam or with the interests of the Afghan people.

The Afghans Do Not Forget

How can those who let themselves be supported by imperialism--the ancient ferocious opponent of the free development and progress of the Islamic countries, which has always been trying to subordinate them to its predatory interests--speak about being dedicated followers of Islam? The Afghan people remember well that the British colonizers tried three times to enslave their country, but always met with determined resistance.

Now, the British prime minister defends and supports the so-called "fighters for religious belief," who are obstructing the building of life in peace in our country.

The anti-Muslim policy of another defender of the Afghan counterrevolution--Washington--is well known, too. Washington's assertions about the "defense of Islam" are not in the least in harmony with the U.S. position vis-a-vis Iran or with its support for and encouragement of Israeli aggression against the Arab countries.

Undeclared War

The forces of international reaction--and above all Washington--have unleashed an undeclared war against the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan

and have built up Pakistan into a bridgehead for dispatching armed gangs on to Afghan territory. In more than 80 camps and bases, set up on Pakistani territory, foreign instructors are training and equipping with arms persons who then murder our peace-loving population, steal their property and destroy industrial enterprises, schools, health and cultural facilities.

Attempts at Subversion...

Behind all this looms an experienced guiding force. The bandits' actions are damaging projects important for the developing Afghan economy, and their objective is to disrupt the peace-loving population's supply of food, fuels and vital goods, to create disruption and hunger in Afghanistan. For this reason the counterrevolutionaries have more than once tried to blow up our largest powerplant in (Nagla) and attacked the crude oil pumping facilities which ensure the fuel-energy and raw material resources for industrial enterprises in north Afghanistan. They have fired mortars at the Jalalabad irrigation complex, which supplies water for tens of thousands hectares of farmland and for the state citrus and olive plantations in the (Nangar) Province.

Of late there also have been frequent attempts at diversion in the textile enterprise in (Gulbahar), in the large poultry farms and textile combine in Baghlan, and in the (Kunduz) raw cotton-processing factory and butter factory. Enterprises were damaged, but also people working in them were affected. For example, bandits tried to sabotage the operation of a textile plant by mining the road to the factory located in (Kapsia) Province. A total of 14 male and female workers were killed by the subsequent explosion. Shortly afterwards, "Mujahidins" at night set afire a settlement in which the workers and clerical staff of the textile factory lived. The blaze destroyed 10 homes.

...And Murders

Cases are known of villagers being bestially tortured to death by bandits because they refused them food and to take part in their crimes. In (Bardak) Province, gangs encircled the (Sachri) settlement, located in a mountaineous hollow, which can be reached only with difficulty. Farmers living in that settlement refused to send their sons to join the ranks and participate in the actions of bandits. For this, the bandits threw 12 persons into a well and dragged the rest of them off to the mountains, where they threw them off the rocks.

They treat teachers and pupils with particular cruelty. During assaults they destroyed or considerably damaged more than 1,700 schools and various training facilities. In (Nangarhar) Province, these "fighters for religious beliefs" cut off pupils' fingers only because they, despite all threats, continued taking part in classes in schools set up after the revolution. In more than 100 cases, bandits murdered mullahs and other religious dignitaries who in their sermons refused to defend the crimes of the reactionaries.

In the past 6 months alone, more than 2,000 peace-loving citizens of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan were murdered by terrorists calling themselves "defenders of Islam." The total damage caused by the bandits to our national economy exceeds 3 billion Afghans (\$60 million).

The Enemies Will Not Stop Us

However, the raging reaction has been increasingly meeting with difficulties.

At the same time, the armed forces and the people's militia of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan delivered a number of heavy blows to big counter-revolutionary groups sent from Pakistani territory. In the provinces, in which the bandits had raged, life is gradually normalizing. The local population, which has established self-defense units and units for the defense of the revolution, is participating in fighting the bandits to an unprecedented extent. Groups of counterrevolutionaries in the (Pander) Valley, and in Ghasni, Kandahar, Herat and (Badakhshan) Provinces were smashed with the population's active support. Many Afghan farmers, incorporated into the gangs by force or through deception, are--in accordance with the amnesty--voluntarily surrendering and returning to life in peace.

In this changed situation the bandits are resorting to terror against peace-loving population, to attacks on plants and civilian facilities. This is their last gamble and an attempt to somehow prove that the huge military and financial aid provided by Washington and other international reactionary forces has some effect. But also this tactic is inevitably doomed.

/The Afghan people have made their historical choice and their enemies cannot prevent them from continuing on the path of progress./

CSO: 4600/182

SWEDISH AID OFFICIAL: HARD WINTER BRINGING STARVATION THREAT

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 15 Dec 82 p 15

[Article by Ingemar Lofgren: "Swedish Aid Official on Afghanistan: Starvation Threatens Millions"]

[Text] Ten million people in Afghanistan are threatened by a starvation catastrophe. Soviet military operations which includes, inter alia, systematic destruction of the wheat harvest and food supplies is now beginning to have an effect. Thousands of homeless families are trying to flee up to the mountains or to Pakistan, but the frigid winter has blocked means of escape, and the mountain passes are closed by snow.

"The situation is incredibly serious. It is therefore necessary that, for example, Sweden go directly to the UN Secretary-General and direct his attention to the country's hardship."

Those were the words of Carl Schonmeyr in a telephone interview with DAGENS NYHETER. He is vice-chairman of the Swedish Afghanistan Committee, and bureau director in the Swedish foreign aid agency SIDA [Swedish International Development Authority]. At present he is located--just like ten million Afghan refugees--in Pakistan.

Carl Schonmeyr has previously lived and worked in Afghanistan for three years as the representative of the UN agency UNICEF. Today he is disappointed with the UN and its member states.

It is a shame that the UN has for three years hushed up the situation in Afghanistan. Attention has instead been directed toward the political situation and the refugees in Pakistan.

Carl Schonmeyr sees it as a moral necessity that attention now be directed to the situation facing the population in Afghanistan, a population forced to flee by the frigid winter and the Soviet occupation forces.

Children Are Dying

"A team of French doctors who are at present in the province of Logar, reports that they have seen children left behind in the snow; children who have died of hunger and exhaustion."

The army of starving and homeless Afghans are a result of Soviet military operations according to Schonmeyr.

"Since it has not been possible to force the guerrillas into submission by military force and a high-technology military machine, the Soviets are trying to starve them into obedience."

The Soviet tactic since last summer has aimed intentionally at the destruction of the peasants' harvest, food supplies, and irrigation system. After the bombardments Soviet and Afghani government forces enter the towns. The rural population is forced to leave their farms and flee up to the mountains.

During the summer they could survive in caves, but now that cold weather has come, it is the weakest that perish first. The Soviet tactics appear to be effective.

Russian tactics

"A former Afghani army colonel, who is now wounded and lives in Pakistan, says that he was urged to use this tactic by Soviet advisers already in 1979.

"Since then the method has been introduced gradually, probably to avoid international reactions. But since no one cares about the civil population in Afghanistan, the Soviet terror has been expanded throughout the country," says Carl Schonmeyr.

Contributing causes of the approaching catastrophe are, in addition, that the Karmal government in Kabul has limited the transportation of food to areas of need, that there was too little rain last spring, and that supplies of seed corn and fertilizer are insufficient.

The quantity of seed corn for example has declined by 50 percent since 1978. Simultaneously the price of wheat has increased by 100 percent since 1980.

This has brought difficult social and economic problems for small and landless farmers. Wheat is the most important subsistence food in Afghanistan, and many families are forced now to live on only bread and tea.

Social Misery

"One asks how long the food crisis and the social misery must go on inside Afghanistan before international indifference ends," Carl Schonmeyr says.

"A guerrilla leader from the heavily besieged central provinces of Ghor and Bamyan reports that if the Soviet tactic is allowed to continue through next spring and autumn, Afghanistan will sink into an incredible state of hunger with starvation deaths as the result already by next year."

Those who will be hit hardest are the children. Over 40 percent of the approximately ten million people who live in the rural villages are children.

"The combination of undernourishment and poor natural immunity makes children the group most exposed and vulnerable to disease and poor living conditions. And the conditions will rapidly worsen during the coming winter months," Carl Schonmeyer says.

Bitter at SIDA

Lack of funds, lack of means of transportation, long distances, lack of international understanding together with Soviet terror against relief efforts to the interior of the country have, according to Carl Schonmeyer, greatly limited the possibilities of bringing food in from outside the country.

In addition, Carl Schonmeyer is bitter at SIDA. Not very long ago the Swedish Afghanistan Committee asked for additional assistance from the Swedish aid organization. It was stressed that the need was urgent, that workers were ready in the country, and that the shipments could be delivered as quickly as possible before snow blocked mountain passes.

Now it is too late. SIDA had difficulty deciding, and the snow has already fallen.

"It appears that the last chance is for the UN Secretary-General to intervene. If this does not happen, the silence about Afghanistan will continue, and then a new catastrophe will strike the people next year," Carl Schonmeyer concluded.

9906

CSO: 3650/74

AFGHANISTAN

OFFICIALS GIVE VIEWS ON ELECTRIC POWER FAILURES

LD162138 Kabul Domestic Service in Dari 1600 GMT 16 Jan 83

[Interview by Engr Mohammad Hashem, head of the department of electricity, and Eng 'Abdol Satar Safi, head of Kabul city's electricity administration, with unidentified reporter--date and place not specified; recorded]

[Text] [Question] Esteemed Eng Mohammad Hashem, many power cuts have occurred recently in Kabul City. Could you please explain the reasons for these disruptions?

[Answer] [Hashem] The main reason for power cuts in Kabul City's power network is the cutting of cables and pylons carrying 110,000 volts by the counter-revolutionaries. In less than (?1 month) more than 12 [words indistinct] and 110,000 volt pylons have been destroyed.

The cables and pylons were cut by counterrevolutionaries when the weather becomes very cold, the cost of fuel increases and fuel cannot be found in sufficient quantities. This action is far from (?mercy). Cutting these 110,000 volt cables and pylons causes problems for thousands of families and citizens, particularly those families whose economic situation is not good. They are facing extreme problems.

[Words indistinct] there are many problems in repairing these pylons, in particular the pylon on Mahipar Mountain, especially under wintery conditions. As you know most of the power cables and pylons pass over terrain which is difficult to traverse, such as mountains and [word indistinct]. Thus repair work is not a simple and easy task, particularly in those parts where vehicles cannot go. Therefore we have to carry out such repairs by personnel without the help of vehicles.

Of the pylons which have been destroyed, nine have been so far repaired and two have not yet been repaired--in particular the pylon situated on Mahipar Mountain. Conditions for it's repair are extremely difficult because the mountain is very high and vehicles cannot reach there. We have made every effort to carry out the repair of this pylon. The Ministry of Electrical Energy used helicopters to carry equipment and repair materials. Work on the pylon has been underway for some days now and on one of its cables work will be completed possibly by Friday, 21 January.

[Question] Could you please tell us when the repair work on the 110,000 volt cable and its pylon will definitely be completed?

[Answer] Repair work on all the cables and pylons carrying 110,000 volts power will be completed in 10 days. Providing counterrevolutionary elements do not embark again on subversive actions the power supply to Kabul City will then be normalized.

[Question] Could you please tell us which units are now supplying power to Kabul City?

[Answer] At present Kabul City's power is supplied from the hydroelectric power station at Nughlu and the hydroelectric power station in Sarobi. The power supplied from the Nughlu Hydroelectric Power Station is very limited because production of power in this station depends on the amount of water in the rivers. As you are aware, during the past year the level of water in the Kabul River and the Panjsher River has been very low. Thus we are faced with a series of problems. But by making the appropriate decisions and by taking the necessary measures we have been able to keep the level of water in the Nughlu Dam up to last year's level.

The Nughlu Power Station, as one of the largest hydroelectric power stations in the country, generates 100,000 kw of power, but it cannot produce power at its maximum capacity. The Sarobi Hydroelectric Power Station, which generates 21,000 kw, is always active and supplies electricity to Kabul City as normal. The reason that serious power supply problems have arisen in Kabul City is that, as mentioned before, the Mahipar Hydroelectric Power Station was put out of action due to the destruction of its pylon on Mahipar Mountain. Therefore, at present the Mahipar Hydroelectric Station is not active. On the other hand the supply of power from the Nughlu Hydroelectric Station is not sufficient for citizens' needs. We have to implement powercuts in Kabul City during the day. But during the night the Nughlu Hydroelectric Power Station is working to its fullest capacity; as a result it provides 70,000 kw of electricity. We can run the Nughlu Power Station for several days at its maximum capacity, but this would result in completely putting it out of action after a few days. The depth of water in the Nughlu Dam at the moment is only 8 meters. If we do not make careful use of the Nughlu Hydroelectric Power Station, it is possible that a time will come when the station will work with a very small capacity.

[Question] The final question I would like to ask you is: please tell us something about thermal power supply? And if it is not already available in Kabul, then when will it be supplied?

[Answer] Kabul Thermal Power Station, with a capacity of 43,000 kw, was built as a reserve station and in past years it has been used as a reserve station during droughts. When a power cut happened this station was put into operation, but during the past 2 years this station has been used often at its maximum capacity. The thermal power station provides very expensive power, but since the citizens are very much in need of electricity, we have used this station when reserve power was required.

[Question] I would like now to ask Eng 'Abdol Satar Safi, head of Kabul Electricity Administration, to answer a few of our questions. During the present conditions in which a severe power shortage exists, you could please first of all explain to us the method of use and the distribution of existing power resources in Kabul?

[Answer] As was said previously, since technical problems have occurred in the power production installations and in the transmissions lines and pylons, the present power capacity is not sufficient for the city's demands. Therefore, an orderly plan has been prepared in Kabul City Electricity Department in which power consumers are divided into four categories in accordance with their political, social and economic importance and also according to social services. The categories are ranked according to their importance as first, second, third and fourth. I would like to briefly list the consumers of the first category. They are: the PDPA Central Committee Building; the Republican Palace; the Prime Ministry; HAQIQAT-E ENQELAB-E SOWR daily; press and government departments; all hospitals in the city; large clinics; radio stations; the television station; the city party committee; centers for the city's water supply and reservoirs, communications centers; the government press; central departments of the ministries; central banks; the fire service; large state hotels; large production installations; some embassies, centers of the military forces; the city's oil distribution centers and tanks; the general medical depot; the National Fatherland Front Headquarter; the central silo; the Watan Kindergarten; Jangalak industrial plant establishments; central heating for microrayon and water reservoirs; the Khad [State Information Service]; trolley-car depots; Pol-e Charkhi Prison, and other similar places. Regular power supply is provided for the above mentioned places. The places that I mentioned above are instructed that in the event of a power cut or emergency conditions they must make use of power only for very important and necessary work. About 19-22,000 kw of power is needed for these places and they come within the first category of consumers in our plans.

[Question] Could you please say something about the distribution of electricity in various parts of the city besides those that you have mentioned?

[Answer] As I said before, when electrical power supplies cannot meet demands in the city then we act in accordance with the program we have prepared. But we have other periodical power cut programs in Kabul's power network. Periodical power cuts occur because of two reasons: one, whenever power capacity does not meet the city's demand then we have a plan which is at the disposal of the central department of power distribution according to which it acts. And, as the citizens are aware, for example every 3 days electricity is supplied to some part of the city. Another periodical power cut program is implemented in circumstance when there are no incidents in the transmission lines, production installations or in the Kabul electricity network, and are solely due to overload and increased use by some establishments. Then we have to cut power in some places. In this case, in 24 hours we have peak loading three times, or so to say, maximum expenditure in the power network. These peak times are at about 0800; 1100 to 1300; and then from 1800 to 2000 or 2030. In this case we cut power to some parts of the city and to those establishments who are using more than they need. These power cuts are for 1 hour,

1 and 1/2 hours or even 2 hours and supply to certain consumers, about which they are informed. The power cut program is at the disposal of our substations and supply centers.

[Question] And finally, considering the existing situation, what do you expect of Kabul citizens regarding the use of electricity?

[Answer] As I have said before, power consumers in the first category who are distributed over various parts of the city--and in accordance with the regulations of the electricity network we have to supply them with power--then when the citizens notice that electricity is supplied in a part of the city which happens to be the consumer in the first category--it may be an establishment, a department and/or a center--then immediately they began squabbling with the staff of the electricity department, asking them why in such and such place there is electricity and why they do not have it at their house. [passage as heard] We request all citizens to consider this problem: as is usual throughout the world, power consumers are divided into various categories according to their political, economic or social importance. So please do not disturb our staff on duty, and do not disturb or create obstacles by making useless telephone calls or by going to electricity power supply centers and interfering in our work.

CSO: 4600/217

AFGHANISTAN

BRIEFS

REVOLUTIONARIES ATTACK JALALABAD AIRPORT--Afghan Muslim revolutionaries attacked Jalalabad Airport, in the western region of Afghanistan, killing 50 occupying troops from the Soviet Union. In the course of this battle the Muslim Afghan revolutionaries shelled Jalalabad Airport for 6 hours with mortars and missiles. As a result 13 helicopters, 5 trucks and 1 radar [as heard] were severely damaged. [Text] [LD191820 Tehran Domestic Service in Persian 1630 GMT 19 Jan 83]

CSO: 4600/217

NABAVI DISCUSSES DOMESTIC ISSUES, PRESENTS TUDEH PARTY AS MARXISTS

Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian 25 Nov 82 pp 3, 15

[Interview with Behzad Nabavi, date and place not specified]

[Text] Engineer Behzad Nabavi, the minister of heavy industry in a special interview with our reporter, answered questions regarding limits of the activities of the private sector, the labor bill, problems related to the Islamic Republic Mojahedin Organization, the Tudeh Party, and the Majority Feda'ian. The text of the interview is as follows:

A portion of this interview dealing with vehicle distribution at the national level has been previously printed in this newspaper.

Bill Specifying Limits Of Private Sector's Activities

Question: The bill specifying the limits of private sector's activities has recently been presented to the Islamic Consultative Assembly by the Supreme Council of Economics and Government. What are your views about this bill?

Answer: The main portion of the bill contains the Islamic orders relating to the extent and means of the activities of the private sector in connection to industry, agriculture, hunting, forestry, etc. Government policies, especially in regard to industry are defined in articles 6, 7, 8, 9 of this legal bill.

Certainly the policies mentioned above are mainly general, and the details are not considered. But we had lengthy and detailed discussions for a few months in the Supreme Economic Council. In this regard, and the brothers deemed it advisable, to present the bill to the Majlis in the same general manner. In the bill, some authority has been given to the government, which on this basis can assert rules for capital investment in the private sector. For example if dangers of hoarding, monopoly, or improper use of storage facilities exist, the government will be able to control and direct these areas with its sound policies, and legally sanctioned regulations. The government, with its authorized potential is able to control the capital investments of the private sector; meaning that if it is recognized that some investments

are not in the interest of the Muslims, it will not provide them with public facilities like water, electricity, and raw materials. On the other hand if the government recognizes the investment is in the public interest, it will encourage and protect it.

It is necessary to mention that the issuance of the bill of the activities of the private sector will not be completed until the bill limiting the activities of the cooperatives and government sectors is also studied and discussed by the Economic Council and is presented to the Majlis and is ratified. At present the Supreme Economic Council is studying the bill related to the cooperatives.

The Ministry of Heavy Industry

Question: How do you see the condition of the heavy industries at present? Are these industries meeting their full capacity and making occasional profits? What are your problems and obstacles in this regard?

Answer: The heavy industries, in a complete sense, do not exist in our country at the present time. The units which could be called heavy industry are relatively few. There are very small units which have worked in the area of heavy industries, and fall under the area of heavy industries. But in general the heavy industry in our country is weak and impoverished, and is not yet shaped. It is necessary to mention that our product in the existing situation is better than before, and in numerous cases, better than (before the revolution) and is getting better every day. But as a whole, we do not meet our expectations, certainly, some of our industries are making profits, but, many of them have suffered great losses. We hope with the efforts and struggle of our Muslim and devout brothers, these units can make a profit as soon as possible. The problems facing our existing national industry are common problems of industries, and do not pertain to heavy industry alone. These problems result from the lack of planning on one hand, and the lack of specified rules and legal limits for industrial activities on the other hand. The next problem is management. This arises from the flight of managers, and the lack of working possibilities for non-Hezbollahi managers. Lack of experience, has caused many changes and repeated replacements in the factories and at the industrial center level. Recently published statistics indicate the average stay of managers in the reconstruction and development organization under the Ministry of Industries, to be 11.2 months and in the national industries, 12 months.

Industries like the Tabriz Automobile Company have changed managers 9 times. The industry in this country needs stability, peace and establishment. Today's managers are mainly devoted Muslim brothers, but they have little experience. After working six months or one year in a factory, and learning their right hand from their left, they are replaced and a new manager comes and starts from ground zero and learns the same steps again. Since no plans are available, the new manager is not able to follow his predecessors programs, and has to proceed the best he can. Some of these changes are connected with upper level changes, and some are related to the managers themselves. The majority of the Hezbollahi and devout managers are restless and cannot stay in one place.

In their opinion if the factory is in working order, it is time to move to another factory. They leave their previous responsibilities in the hand of God and leave. Another problem in industry is the lack of raw materials which our units are faced with. This is the result of foreign exchange difficulties and problems with ports. The problems inherited from the previous regime has caused today's industrial units to be stagnant. In every factory we locate the bank says that these units are bankrupt, and cannot give them credit. The balance sheets indicate that the bankruptcy is related to the previous regime. These are some of the industrial problems we face. God willing, in the near future, with stability created in the society, these problems will be solved. It is natural that three or four years after the revolution and the instability and political difficulties we will be able to solve these problems one after another.

The Islamic Revolution Mojahedin Organization

Question: Up to now we have heard many rumors, true or false, about the Islamic Revolution Mojahedin Organization, and there was even a time that two statements with two signatures were issued by this organization, and since you are one of the members and responsible authorities of this organization, could you explain the history and events taking place up to this day which have helped to aggravate rumors of disunity?

Answer: I also regret all these words and rumors very much. At one time the head strong enemies of the Islamic Revolution Mojahedin Organization were liberals; hypocrites, Bani-Sadr, leftists and hundreds of left and right revolutionaries. But unfortunately, these days we heard adverse comments even from some devout Muslims and Mezbollahis. This is all attributed to a lack of information.

I, as a small member of the Islamic Revolution Mohahedin Organization, believe that this organization, like many serving Islam and the Islamic revolution of this period, has been mistreated. These active and generous true Mojaheds have always in the course of their activities and campaigns tried not to go after publicity and self recognition, and have been treated unkindly by some of their friends. Whatever the enemies have done, or said about this organization is not important since we do not expect more than that from them.

Since this organization, along with its members and other genuine Muslim forces and followers of the Imam's line, had inflicted severe physical blows and had aggravated them and provoked their anger.

I remember that the Mojahedin-e Khalq, were calling the Islamic Revolution Mojahedin Organization as a "super reactionary organization," or "post Islamic Revolution Mojahedin," or "Falangist," or "mace bearers," or "military arm of the Islamic Republic."

Everyone remembers that damned Bani-Sadr, in the gathering of September 1979, at Martyrs' Square (Meydan-e Shohada), without mentioning any names (from fear of the party), how much he castigated the Islamic Republic Mojahedin Organization. He called the organization "doup d'etatist," and he even

criticized the ten article declaration of the organization, which was issued against him a few days before. It was feared that the very same day, he would instigate some people against the organization, and make them attack the office of the organization which was near the Martyrs' Square. You are aware of the animosity of the liberals, especially the Freedom Movement, to the organization. They, too, in revealing their faces, and overthrowing the previous government, consider the organization as a participant of that event. They were accusing these generous people of being like those who opposed the Prophet Mohammed, and were repeating the accusations of the hypocrites. All that animosity was expected and accepted in the view of the organization. Since any person or any movement who moved in the correct and just direction, will also have enemies, and in case it meets decisiveness its enemies will increase, they will be fiercer and imprudent. Those movements and individuals without enemies are without views and direction. The encounter with Mottahari, Martyr Beheshti, the Islamic Republic Party, and Revolutionary organs, indicates the correctness of this analysis.

It is evident that in the days of the late Taleqami's absence, which was caused by the plot and instigation of the hypocrites, all the groups of left and right, hypocrites, and liberals, took advantage of the opportunity that his absence had created. They were using all their efforts for the dissolution of the committees, the corps, and the revolutionary organs. Everyday they were organizing demonstrations, and were shouting slogans against the revolutionary organs and the sanctities of the revolution, and to sum up, they had deceived the vigilance of the party. The Islamic Revolution Mojahedin Organization, by the sudden arrangement of that gigantic rally paralyzed all the plots, and whatever they had planned, was brought to nought. Therefore, one must expect the use of bad language, insults and enmity. It was arranged that on the pretext of the absence of the late Taleqani, the army of the so-called "Mojahedin-e Khalq," and "The Muslim People's Republic Party," be placed in their disposal and replace the corps and the revolutionary committees!!

As a whole, paralyzing this American plot would have caused the anger of America. When in the declaration of the same rally, the organization for the first time after the eminent Imam (the Imam previously had condemned the provisional government as being weak and incapable), in April 1979, attacked the nationalist line of the provisional government and its cooperation with the nationalist wings and non-fundamentalist believers, was expecting the opposition of the liberals, and the Freedom Movements.

The confrontation of the organization with Bani Sadr, revealed the true face and nature of the counterrevolution united front (hypocrites, and leftists, Bani Sadr, and the liberals) and his coalition with them, and also revealed the Tabas Plot in different stages, as everyone recalls.

Naturally, we did not expect anything from Bani Sadr except enmity, and his claim that "they plan to assassinate me." But, as I mentioned before, what hurts is the opposition of some of the unaware friends, and the repeat of the same accusations against the Islamic Republic which is also aimed against the organization. These kinds of attacks and confrontations in reality

dishonor the blood shed by the martyrs, who gave their lives for this cause, and makes the efforts of a group of generous Hezbollahi brothers worthless. It was these efforts which formed the Islamic Revolution Mojahedin Organization, and started their activities. Everyone has perceived the necessity of the existence of such an organization. For the sake of informing the people about the party and to confront the statements, and rumors which have been referred to, I state some of the operations, and services of this organization which is done only for God's sake. I mention these operations of the organization which have never been discussed publicly and explicitly. The Islamic Revolution Mojahedin Organization, formed the committees (Central Committee) and revolutionary guards corps of the Islamic Republic. It confronted the "foreign" group of Forqan, in establishing a Kurdish Muslim "pishmargan" organization, and the start of the military operation following the participation of the three member mission in Kurdistan, which resulted in the final military victory on that lost territory. Neutralizing the American coup of Nujeh, the members of the organization had a very active role in confronting the armed operation of the hypocrites also. Certainly all these operations were done under the cover of official and revolutionary organs, and the organization has never been after a name or recognition. One of the brother members of the organization, in the first successful attack, after the defeat of three member Kurdistan peace missions in Kamyaran, carried by the Kurdish Muslim "pishmargan" and by our extensive cooperation, was killed. But our brothers never mention this martyr as a member of the organization, although the attack on Kamyaran, was the start of the military victories of the Kurdistan war. Among other things, this was the first organized confrontation of our Kurdish Muslim brothers with counterrevolutionary mini groups.

Belief in Theocratic Rule (Velayat-e Faqih)

It is not fair for some people to compare this organization, with such a record, to hypocrites or future hypocrites, and even impudently accuse them of being anti-theocratic rule, and anti-clerical. This organization perhaps was the first organization to discuss officially in its constitution, in its announcement of its entity, and its stand, its "heartfelt belief, and practicable understanding of theocratic rule."

In the draft of the constitution presented to the assembly of experts, it was suggested to insert an explanation of the origin of the theocratic rule, and during the period of its activities, it has not once deviated from Islamic jurisprudence and the Imam's line. In some cases, in face of Bani-Sadr and the Kurdistan question, it had become intemperate, which offended the Imam. In this case, the organization immediately after being informed corrected itself. How could this organization be accused of being anti-theocratic rule? This organization which is eradicating the anti-clerical group "Forqan," has had a fundamental role. This organization which when the clergy were being under the extreme attack of the left, the right, the hypocrites, and the liberals was a sincere follower of the clerics, is called "anti-clerical"? How could an organization be tested? Accepting theocratic rule, supporting clerics, confronting hypocrites, liberals, Bani Sadr, in existing condition is not a paragon, and even any opportunist could pretend like that. To defend the origin of the theocratic rule at a time when counterrevolutionaries call it a dictatorship, and are discussing the dissolution of the assembly of

experts, is being a true follower. To confront the hypocrites, at a time when even some friends accuse the organization of being "anti crusader" was a sign of deep belief.

Overtness of the Organization

The other question which these days is the target of rumor is the half secrecy, and half overtness of the organization. The organization, due to the nature of its activities, has to some extent military, propaganda and security phases. Considering the conditions of the first year of the revolution, it was not advisable to reveal everything to everyone. (You must recall the insistence of Bani Sadr and the liberals, who were backed by hypocrites, to make the organization open.) The plans and the members of the organization were all in danger of being attacked by the counterrevolution, and this was not deemed advisable. Certainly the "semi-secret" and "semi-overt" aspect of the organization was not such that no one knew about the plans, the councils and the members of the organization. Almost all the nationally responsible authorities following the Imam's line were familiar with the organization, and were aware of its activities. Even the formation of the organization was deemed advisable and expedient by the beloved martyrs like Motehari, Beheshti and Raja'i, and great brothers like brother Hashemi. The eminent Imam was personally in the course of the events, and did not have any objection to formation of the organization. Therefore the secrecy of the organization was to blind the counterrevolutionaries and make it only open to its friends. Because of the present situation, the military, propaganda and security operations are not in the previous position of being semi-secret and semi-open, but have become overt. You might have noticed, that in all my previous interviews, I have not introduced myself as a member of the organization, and when asked, I have avoided the question. However, in this interview, I have introduced myself as a small member of the organization, and this suggests that the organization is an overt organization.

Question: You have spent years in the political and struggle arena and naturally you have plenty of experience in this regard. We would like you to explain all you know about the present political groups, such as the "Meisami" group, the Fedaiyan (majority), and the Tudeh, discussing both political and ideological issues for the young generation, especially since recently the revolutionary public prosecutor has also made statements about the activities of these groups.

Answer: I consider all these groups you mentioned extremely anti-Islamic, anti-revolutionary, and anti-Islamic rule which is based on the theocratic rule. Based on my previous understanding of these groups, I know that even if their political stand is apparently in the direction of protection and adherence to the Islamic Republic, their true natural instinct is such that they cannot be in accord with the Islamic Republic, and the Islamic rule in the long run. Based on what we know about their thoughts, ruling beliefs, history, and their previous record, it is certainly possible that some of them claim that they have changed their previous views. They must officially announce this change of views, and they must be judged again. Regarding the Mojahedin-e Khalq movement which is an extension of the hypocrites, the reminder below is necessary:

I was in contact with the members of this group in prison, and according to them, their main difference with the Mojahedin-e Khalq was that they were stating that the followers of Mas'ud Rajavi and Musa Khiabani do not continue the path of Hanifnejad, and are not the just heirs of the first Mojahedin-e Khalq. They did not have any objection and criticism of the original beliefs and views of the organization. Meaning the pamphlets such as "Economics in Simple Language," "The Road to Evolution," "The Prophet's Way," which were compiled and prepared by the hypocrite organization were accepted by them and they only had discussions about understanding these publications.

Apparently, they had denied the "Dialectic" but were actually accepting it in another manner. In prison and even out of prison, they announced that they were the true followers of the Hanifnejad's views, which is the same as the Imam's line. Certainly they consider that Rajavi deviated from the Hanifnejad way, and they opposed him. In our discussion I used to tell them that the main diversion of thought is indeed in the Hanifnejad trend. The eclectic school of thought in the Mojahedin-e Khalq organization, and the introduction of Marxism occurred at the same time. The instructive publications of the organization, which were written by the original members, state the essence of the deviation of the foundation. Certainly these gentlemen, in our discussion, never admit the deviation in the initial ideas of the organization, and they consider themselves the followers of the same path. Even at the last minute when the prison doors were opened by the Muslim revolutionary people, and they left, their policy was close cooperation and complete closeness with Marxists, and their slogans were unity of all the forces, and unity with the Marxists. After the revolution I have not noticed any new changes in their course of thinking. After hours of talk with them, I believe that the basic foundation of their beliefs is no different than the Mojahedin-e Khalq. However, their policy, and their approach towards the Islamic Republic is different than the hypocrites. The hypocrites believe in having armed confrontation with the Islamic Republic, but the others believe in political confrontation. The views of this group is that they are not willing to accept "theocratic rule" and the Islamic Republic system with the Imam concept and views. Thus, their confrontation with the system is a political confrontation.

Tudeh Party and the Majority

In the case of the Tudeh Party and the Majority, the true nature of these two groups is evident. Both are Marxist, and definitely they cannot adhere to the ideals of the Islamic Government. We state that we lead the nation where the divine orders rule in all aspects of the society. It is natural that these two organizations with their Marxist nature are not able to follow the Islamic Republic system in the long run. The confrontation of these two groups with the Islamic Republic is based on the specific ideas which the minority guerrilla, Peykar and hypocrites have, and is a political confrontation. They consider the regime a "petty bourgeois regime" and do not consider the Islamic Government an ideal system. However, they believe in political movements rather than armed confrontation. They do not disapproved of armed confrontation for the sake of Islam and the Islamic Government, but because it would be against the best interests of the so-called Communist and

and Marxist Movements. In the final analysis, these groups will definitely oppose the Islamic Republic.

Certainly this does not mean that we believe in accelerating this opposition. Considering the previous record of the Majority, I have to state that during the Shah's regime, they struggled against that regime. However, in our opinion whoever opposed the Shah, is not necessarily righteous. If Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin were fighting against Hitler, and British Colonialists and Russia confronted America, it does not mean that they are justified [as published]. They also are oppressors.

The question is, what were their motives, and for what purpose did they struggle? Whoever fought the Shah's regime in order to establish another bad system (like a Marxist system) is not considered rightful. Considering the Tudeh Party, whoever is old enough is familiar with the Tudeh Party's previous record such as their confrontation with the Tungal Movement, the division of Azarbaijan, the movement to nationalize the oil, up to the so-called Arya Mehr White Revolution. Everyone is familiar with this situation, and to discuss it again does not suit this interview.

The Labor Bill

Question: The bill pertaining to the workers, although not published, has been discussed by the associations and Islamic Councils in workers' homes. What is your view of this bill?

Answer: My views are very similar to those of our brother, Prime Minister Musavi. I do not find it necessary to repeat it. Basically this bill is in draft form, and since it has not yet been discussed in the cabinet, it is not proper to discuss it on the national level. When this bill is approved, after discussion in the cabinet, and the prime minister finds it necessary it could be discussed. It is possible that some of the bills will be discussed publicly after it has been discussed and approved by the Majlis, so that it is not exploited by the counterrevolutionaries. Certainly it is useful to ask the people and the workers for their opinion regarding the labor bill. However, it is not necessary to discuss a draft whose approval or disapproval is not yet clear, publicly.

In my opinion any law which is contrary to Islamic jurisprudence and against the interests of the oppressed and social justice, will not be approved by our government and our Majlis. We must not permit the counterrevolutionaries, especially the leftist groups, to exploit this discussion.

Question: Sometimes a way of thought is propounded that all economic activities, business, and work must continue its natural and free course, and the government must act as an impartial observer between workers and employers. If the government states that the economy must be directed in such a way as to benefit the oppressed, it is against Islam and Islamic order. What do you think about this in terms of Islamic standards and views?

Answer: I do not accept such a view even if it exists. Principally, the meaning of Islamic Government is that it is the protector of the Muslim treasury and is the protector of the Islamic society. Therefore naturally it cannot act as an impartial observer. A government of Islamic justice must have a direction, and administer the society on the basis of Islamic order. To administer justice, protect the oppressed, fight against the enemies, oppressors, and the concentration and circulation of wealth in the hands of special classes is the special responsibility of the Islamic Government. The Islamic Government, in the same manner, is not in accord with "political liberalism," and does not reconcile itself with economic liberalism and the transformation of the Islamic Government to an impartial economic observer.

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GENERAL SOCIAL, POLITICAL DYNAMICS OF REVOLUTION SURVEYED

Brussels LE SOIR in French 15, 17, 18/19, 20 Dec 82

[Articles by Claude de Groulart]

[15 Dec 82 p 5]

[Text] A year ago we were reporting, as we are here, on a country, Iran, that had become almost entirely taboo for the international press and from which, today, we alone are still receiving war communiques, all of them tinged with a triumphal note of command. A year ago, however, a quiet rumble was mounting, caused by exploding bombs, the rattle of terrorists' submachine guns or the guns of firing squads, even the groans of mutilated thieves, of homosexuals being flogged or stoned. The regime that seemed to be on the point of faltering under the blows of Mojahedin terrorism was retaliating with a veritable holocaust of adversaries shot, often by the dozens or even by the hundreds. The world was pricking up its ears.

Today it hears nothing more than the echo of the cannons thundering over Iraqi soil. Iran has loosened the stranglehold of its foreign enemy, and the increasingly heavy lid of the ayatollahs' regime allows no sound to filter through from the inside. The bureaus of foreign press agencies have been closed or, like AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, reduced to their simplest expression: a single person, who is closely watched.

We have since then, to learn more and answer the insistent question, "Where is Iran going?", begun as we did a year ago a long "tracking down" of voluntary or involuntary exiles and refugees of all kinds, or rare travelers still authorized in that forbidden country, on which might be written the words used by Middle Ages geographers to describe innermost America or Africa: Terra Incognita.

For us Iran will once more be reduced to the bunker-villa at Auvers-sur-Oise occupied by the leaders of the armed

resistance, to the bars, restaurants and bistrots of Paris and brussels, or to living rooms in the homes of friends. However, a framework is taking shape, as it did a year ago, from scattered evidence, despite contradictions that exist here and there between speeches by militants and the observations of those who remain above the melee. It is this framework that we have tried to bring out in the following articles.

This scholarly, eminent physician, who was occupying his leisure time by translating Sartre into Persian, intersperses his short, precise sentences with long silences.

"You know, it's hard to know what the Iranians are really thinking. The legacy of despotism and foreign occupations has accustomed us to give the answer the questioner wants...And then, it is true that the population is tired of the war and the convulsions the country has been going through for 4 years. This lassitude 'objectively' benefits the regime, even though it wins no additional adherents."

Other testimony supports that assertion; a broad "swamp" has formed in Iranian opinion, made up of people who simply want to live by escaping as best they can from the murders and harassments committed by the Islamic zealots.

A Strict Rationing

"And to live," says a Belgian traveler, "isn't so easy. The wartime economy and the import restrictions have led to rationing with distribution of tickets that may not be honored, as in Poland.

"The rationing is harsh: 250 grams of poultry and 250 grams of meat per person every two weeks, a 90-gram bar of soap and one pair of socks a month. Even nailfiles are rationed. The lines form at dawn in front of the butcher shops and dairies.

"Of course, there is a free market where prices are two to six times higher than on the official market, but it is accessible only to the wealthiest. Also, many families no longer eat meat more often than once a week. The paradoxical result of this shortage is that the Iranian women whom the religious wanted to cloister in their dwellings, to confine them to educating their children, have never been so numerous walking up and down the streets," the speaker observes sardonically, and he adds:

"The shortage also brings out the emergence of a new privileged class formed by the unofficial government police, the Islamic committees, the revolutionary guards, the mullahs, etc. For them and for those close to them, merchants are eager to take the best bits from their meager deliveries..."

"No social class," observes Dr Hezarkami in his turn, "is really profiting from the regime's policy, but some are getting more business than others. This is true of the merchants and the professions. The former benefit from the existence of the black market and the latter can exceed with impunity the officially-fixed fees for their services. A new bourgeoisie is taking the place of the

of the 'compradores' who were connected with the all-powerful multinationals under the shah's regime.

"The regime that nationalized the banks and foreign trade favors, by means of a very selective granting of import licenses, a small local industry protected against competition by the isolation in which the country finds itself. Thus, they have returned to manufacturing in Iran the washing powder that was hitherto imported, and they have perfected an 'Iranized' version of Pepsi-Cola. A whole class of 'bazaris,' who had the right idea in financing the religious movements during the period of resistance against the shah, are being paid back today by the regime. Likewise, some who were able, thanks to well-placed friendships, to hoard stocks, are taking advantage of the shortage to sell them at high prices. Thus, a 90-liter freezer is selling today in Tehran for 10,000 Belgian francs!"

Another witness, better versed in sociology, notes, "The regime holds three weapons that it uses in combination: shortage, arbitrariness and oil. The first enables it to form a clientele for itself among the poor classes, which are the most affected by the crisis; the second helps it to form friendships in other classes and make henchmen; and finally, the third gives it the means of implementing such a policy."

No one dies of Hunger

For, it is correct to say that the Iran of the ayatollahs is living on nothing but pure water and prayers. At present it is in a position to export some 2 million barrels of black gold per day and its monetary reserves again amount to \$6 billion, despite the costly purchase of arms amounting to \$400 million monthly. The drastic reduction in importation of luxury products and many equipment goods in favor of basic raw materials and food products enables it to withstand the blow. No one is dying of hunger in Iran, which continues to enjoy an average standard of living higher than that of its neighbors and many third world countries.

"That doesn't prevent the new regime," a member of the opposition continues on a sour note, "from having its poor people." In general, these are the white collar workers, who are not directly connected with its politico-repressive apparatus. The former regime, which wanted to gain their loyalty in that way, had granted civil servants all kinds of premiums, bonuses or allowances for transportation, housing, distance from home, etc. The civil servants, who today are reduced to their basic wages again, are one of the principal breeding grounds for recruitment by the Mojahedin. Similarly, firms that work mainly with the foreigner and use what are deemed to be non-priority raw materials are on the edge of bankruptcy. Others are seeing their operations seriously disturbed by the brain drain. Seventy thousand Iranians, nearly all of them qualified managers, have fled the country, thus mortgaging that industrial and technological independence that the regime it so passionately desires.

The peasantry too, another speaker emphasizes, have seen part of their hopes disappointed. In the beginning, it benefited from better purchasing prices for its products from the state, as well as the huge highway system repair program and the electrification program launched under the "holy reconstruction war." But the rise in the prices of equipment goods annulled the monetary gains realized, and above all the promises of agrarian reform vanished when the regime took its turn to the right.

The Green Ballets

"That turn," someone else explains to me, "leads it to constantly accentuate the rigidity of its morals to the detriment of the commandments of authentic Shi'ism in social matters. However, the brain drain and the mounting opposition of all kinds has led it to moderate somewhat the repression in that area; court verdicts are being made less harsh on the morals score, and the "tracking down" done by Islamic committees a little less fierce. Hypocrisy and rigorous moral standards that are pure facade are being substituted little by little for the fervor of the early days, even among the regime's dignitaries. Thus, one of these, the minister of national orientation, was found with a lady friend in a genuine party of green ballets (the color of Islam) by a squad of pure-hearted, tough soldiers. Severely beaten to the point where he had to be hospitalized for two weeks, Mr Minister resigned two weeks later "for reasons of health." But history had turned Tehran around and added a little more discredit to the power of the mullahs.

The average Iranian man, and above all the Iranian woman, while they are not turning to debauchery and orgy, are nevertheless finding some compromises with heaven. Thus, austere Islamic clothing often assumes bright colors; chadors and dust veils of better cut leave the more imaginative to guess about the treasures formerly buried in the gloomy black robe. In a nutshell, one does one's best to live--or to survive.

[17 Dec 82 p 5]

You change at Pontoise for Auvers; you have trains at St Lazare and the gare du Nord. At Pontoise I am under November's penetrating drizzle. It seems to be almost over, Allah be praised. Meanwhile, a taxi takes me to Auvers-sur-Oise, where darkness hides the celebrated church that Van Gogh painted. But what suburbs am I in? Paris' or Tehran's? Khomeyni was in Neauphle; Bakhtiar, it seems, was near Versailles. Here in Auvers it is every bit as serious: Ex-President Bani Sadr, and above all the man I am going to see, Massoud Radjavi, the supreme head of the Mojahedin, the man who popped the ayatollahs like a newly rich man pops champagne corks. Six of the seven principal politico-religious dignitaries of the regime, he will soon tell me proudly.

France, which is giving him asylum, is not anxious to see him suffer the same fate he inflicts on his enemies. To get into the large villa on the edge of this suburb of a suburb, one must submit to two searches, one with a Geiger counter and the other a "manual" one; gendarmes, walkie-talkie in hand and submachine gun slung across the shoulder signal my progress from the barrier set up across the street to the entrance grill.

The man who is suddenly going to appear before me in the house that serves as a kind of audience chamber is a contrast to this sinister scene. He is young, dynamic-looking, displaying an Anglo-Saxon cordiality and speaking excellent English.

The interview he grants me will be long, but briskly conducted. He has been well prepared: abundant documentation awaits me, which will relay the words of the leader. A large part of this voluminous literature is devoted to the more or less recent exactions of the mullahs' regime. Massoud Radjavi summarizes them

for me with a few figures, not without my entertaining frequent thoughts of Amnesty International; since June 1981 the regime has had to its credit some 50,000 arrests and 20,000 executions.

He brandishes a book completely filled with gloomy photos: "At War With Humanity." "For this one photo of an execution, I mean for taking it and getting it outside the country, several of our comrades are dead; one young girl of 16 was executed. Look at this other document, these are the testaments of children, written before their executions." An angel passes by [there is an awkward pause], an exterminating angel. For several seconds he lets me leaf through this book of good and bad fortunes of a country given over to the fiercest internal battles. Massoud Radjavi takes the floor again, fixing me with a pair of insistent black eyes; he will not relinquish the floor again for 90 minutes.

"This regime is worse than Hitler's (sic); one of the aspects of the first series of objectives we pursued was precisely to point out to the entire world its inhumane and medieval character. Another of our goals was to cause it to lose what remained of its legitimacy. That objective was achieved too, as was the one consisting of destabilizing the regime's politico-administrative apparatus. We liquidated 2,000 of its fatheads (sic) and removed six of the seven big ayatollahs who represented Khomeyni in the provinces. Almost every time, those liquidations were carried out by suicide commandos. Don't men who accomplish such feats deserve their freedom?"

He speaks calmly and this time in Persian, with the aid of an interpreter whose English he supervises slowly and melodiously. There is no triumph in the tone he uses.

"Today, Khomeyni knows that he has to reckon with us before everything else, and he knows he can't destroy us. The second phase of our action is going to consist of eliminating the fear of repression among the Iranians."

To Attack the Evil at its Root

He does not expand further on the modalities of this second phase, but some of its partisans whom I met with in Brussels were more explicit. For the Mojahedin at present it involves liquidating the regime's repressive apparatus at its base and challenging the militia and the members of the neighborhood committees. In this way ten of the regime's representatives fall every day under the blows delivered by the fighters in the shadows.

But Massoud Radjavi has already resumed speaking.

"It is not exaggerating to claim that this regime which, when it was installed, had nearly 98 percent of the Iranians behind it, can no longer count on even one citizen in 20 for support. Tangible proof of this is furnished by Friday prayers in Tehran, which brought together some 2 million persons when it was conducted by Ayatollah Taleghani 3 years ago, and where there are barely 20,000 persons today, many of whom are little more than people receiving welfare from the regime who have come there with the sole aim of receiving nourishment, for example the Afghan refugees."

He observes a short pause when one of his acolytes refills the teacups.

"This regime has to wage two wars at the same time: one is external, in which it is fighting Iraq. One is the internal one it is conducting with its own people, in which it must simultaneously confront the Mojahedin and the oppressed nationalities, such as the Kurds. Its position is made even more critical by the pitiful state of the economy, which is characterized by an inflation that reaches 100 percent a year and an unemployment that the minister of the economy himself evaluates at 3 million persons, but which we think in fact borders on the figure of 5 million (editor's note: there are 40 million Iranians). On top of all that are 4 million refugees, some of whom had to flee their homes because of the war with Iraq, the rest being victims of the conflict in Afghanistan."

The Relief is Ready

It requires a certain degree of imagination to recreate in one's mind, in this peaceful house in a European suburb, that twilight of the bloodthirsty gods that is being depicted for me. The book lying open on the table helps me a little, alas, with its photos of people hanging and bodies cut to pieces.

"Khomeyni has learned a lesson from the shah," my host continues. "He knows he has to keep increasing the repression if he wants to hold his own. 'His' revolution is devouring his children, as witness the putting to death of one of his closest former allies, Mr Ghobtzadeh. He is being driven to continue the foreign war. Three mediation attempts have failed; we had warned their authors that they couldn't exhaust Khomeyni's intransigence. However, the task of repression is becoming complicated because creaking is beginning to be heard in the very heart of the military-police edifice that was put in place to perpetrate that repression. The tension is stronger than ever between the army and the regime's militia, the pasdaran. Even the latter are victims of an internal malaise since the creation of a ministry in charge of 'being responsible' for them. Their commander in chief, who until now took his orders from Khomeyni himself is refusing to receive them from the minister!"

If the apocalypse of the false prophet is so near, are Massoud Radjavi and his people ready to take over? Everything is going on as if he were considering my question:

"We are now the principal factor for unity in the opposition. The alternative solution we have presented to the Iranians, as to the outside world, is the National Resistance Council, a confederation that now represents the majority of our country's democratic forces."

He enumerates for me a long list of organizations, mostly socialist, social-democratic or dissident communist, to which are added associations and professional groups as well as many prominent persons; from all this emerge, besides the Mojahedin, Ex-President Bani Sadr, the Democratic Party of the Iranian Kurdistan, the Democratic National Front of the lawyer, Martine Dafratari, the Writers' Union, the Lawyers' Association.

"And this list is not closed," Massoud Radjavi goes on. "It was quite recently enriched by several Iran Air pilots who flew away aboard their planes and landed in Europe, as well as a series of high-ranking diplomats, including the charges

d'affaires from Iran to Senegal and in Norway, and the same for the director of broadcasting. In general the intellectuals, the executives and the technicians have joined us en masse, and this exodus is an additional destabilizing factor."



He did not want to shout "Long live Khomeyni!" He was slaughtered by the Revolutionary guards.

Six Months and I Give you Democracy

Time out for a sip of tea and he moves on:

"As for our program, it is simple. As soon as Khomeyni is chased out of power, President Bani Sadr and myself and the Council of the Revolution give ourselves 6 months to get a constituent assembly elected that will give the country a new fundamental law genuinely reflecting the people's aspirations. Incidentally, on several occasions we have challenged Khomeyni to permit truly free elections to be organized, in return for which we were prepared to stop the armed fighting immediately, but Khomeyni always refused."

The Decisive Hours Will Arrive Soon

Which one of us, he or I, consulted his watch first? But he still has to pronounce the introduction to his long plea for the defense. Perhaps to dissipate the doubts nourished by some people about the secret connections of the Mojahedin with the totalitarian countries of the East.

"We do not seek to impose our concepts, our moral standards, our vision of the world. We do not reject any religion on the basis of the ideals it professes; we are in favor of an Iran that respects the fundamental rights of the nationalities that make it up. We are in favor of equality of the sexes, and it was that position that caused Khomeyni to call us hypocrites. We are not pushing either Western science, Western technology or Western cultural heritage. We are in favor of open international relations with all who are without hegemonic ulterior motives with respect to us."

I take note by my silence of this cascade of peremptory statements. This time, he has stood up:

"We have good reason to think that the end of the Khomeyni regime is near. It will be swallowed up in the chaos it has been forced to maintain to survive. The decisive hours are in sight when international opinion will be called upon to come down with all its weight on our side. Three hundred parties and movements are already supporting us throughout the world and I call upon public opinion in Belgium to support our fight in its turn."

We exchange a long firm handshake. The man is certainly impressive. Now just 35, he has spent 8 years in prison in the shah's jails, where he was savagely tortured. He has chalked up a president of the Republic, a prime minister and several of the principal leaders of the party he is fighting. Such men may perhaps delude themselves, but they do not bluff. Whatever may be the outcome of their struggle, it will influence the future of Iran.

[18-19 Dec 82 p 5]

The ayatollahs' regime, like all regimes, is seeking its point of equilibrium. And like all regimes it is attempting to position itself in reaction to the threats of which it is the object, at least as much as on the basis of its doctrinal principles. In this case, the ambiguities of the beginning of the Islamic revolution are facilitating its evolution on the world scene. By denouncing

American imperialism and the influence of foreign capital, by making itself the defender of the poor and the oppressed in the name of returning to Islamic sources, the regime marks itself leftist. It acted thus because it felt it was being threatened on the right. Today, the most virulent dissension of which it is the object comes from those who still intend to reconcile the demands of democracy and socialism with the teaching of Islam; now the regime is being carried off course to the right.

The man speaking to me about this is a European who has lived in Iran for more than 10 years and speaks Farsi. He adds, "You have to be mindful of the Western habit of sticking labels of right, left or center on persons or groups on the basis of speeches they make and the way they are transposed into the categories of European thinking. In this respect, the regime's stabilization is first and foremost its Iranization, by that I mean the gradual return to practices that have always been those of the people who held the power in that country. Thus, revolutionary purity has had to give precedence to the good old custom of charging brokerage commissions, which reappeared swiftly. Nepotism and the buddy system are also returning in force."

"Another error," a second witness continues, "is to imagine that all the clergy and politico-military apparatus of the regime, the Islamic committees and the revolutionary guards are all on the same side. Their allegiance to men and clans often counts for more than adherence in principle to the regime. Despite the personal ascendancy of Khomeyni, the religious who follow him unconditionally, that is to say those who support his theory of the all-powerful 'spiritual guide,' having the power to rule over temporal affairs, scarcely number more than 15 percent of the whole body. Add to this the fact that many more or less hidden ties and family relationships go back farther than the start of the revolution that overthrew the imperial regime."

"Thus," another good observer of things Iranian tells me, "many men who are currently rising within the regime belong more or less openly to the Hodjatis' sect, a powerful brotherhood that was formed 30 years ago to fight the growing influence of followers of the Baha'i religion on the Iranian society. This sect, which is looked upon with disfavor by the more radical adherents of the Khomeyni line, differs from the latter in many ways, particularly in its indifference to political affairs, or at least to the way the state is run. This indifference has led it to reject the supreme guide concept, and in the same way the Hodjatis, who attach great importance to the sacred texts, are more sensitive than the Khomeynists to the 'heresies' contained in the various forms of political thinking inspired by socialism, especially Marxist thinking. This makes them virulent anti-communists."

"This characteristic," the first speaker resumes, "causes them to be accepted by the most conservative elements of the regime, who find objective allies among them, despite the differences in doctrine. It was thanks to the Hodjatis, who never fought the shah, completely occupied as they were in combating the Baha'is, that elements of the former regime are gradually reappearing in the new one."

Recentering

"And now we come to the recentering we just mentioned. It has been seen for the last 5 or 6 months, that is to say since the time when the regime, already frightened by the brain drain, was in a headlong encounter with a staggering defection in the person of Ali Ahmad Babahi, a Khomeyni faithful and friend who fled abroad after publicizing a long letter in which he denounced the exactions, the turpitude and the budding corruption of the regime. This letter, which was widely circulated by the opposition with the aid of recorded cassettes, had the effect of a thunderclap; it was going to be the prelude to the most turbulent elements taking control again. Thus, the Islamic committees were placed under the authority of the Ministry of the Interior, the large foundations--really states within the state--such as the Martyrs' or the Underprivileged, which were managing very significant funds without any control and were connected with the Welfare Ministry. Finally, it is true, as Massoud Radjadi told you, that a Revolutionary Guards Ministry was created, with a moderate person at its head.

"Almost everywhere in the administration, incompetent officials who had been appointed solely on the basis of their religious zeal had been replaced by competent officials, most often laymen. This influx of laymen, whose activity under the old regime no one was concerned about, made itself felt very high up in the state apparatus, since today the government itself has no more than two religious at the top.

"Another example of the regime's reconciliation with reality will no doubt be furnished before long for the benefit of Belgium, to which Iran has already been proposing for some time, as ambassador, an eminently respectable personage, a highly-placed official in the PTT [Post, Telephone and Telegraph] (a sector that has been occupied in Iran by Belgium since 1980), educated in the West and fluent in French, who had, however, already found favor with the regime, since he was the president of the famous Foundation for the Underprivileged."

My second speaker continued:

"That appointment was not made by chance; it is the result both of the disappointment Iran suffered in its attempt to form privileged economic and trade relations with the Soviet bloc and the Third World, as well as the political impossibility of that country tying too openly to the great Western 'imperialist' powers such as the United States, Germany or England--or indeed to France, which is blamed by Khomeyni for taking in at present those who are fighting him. Since then Iran seems to have resolved to turn firmly toward the Far Eastern countries, but also toward the small and medium-sized countries of Western Europe.

"The regime's objective," adds another of my guests, "is to reach an oil production of 3 million barrels per day, which would give it enough resources to undertake a big economic revival, which has been made impossible up to now by the war..."

"Might this also be a sign that the regime intends to end the war?"

"The most moderate elements have been hoping for that for a long time already, but two divergent interpretations coexist on that point. The first, the interpretation of the opposition, says that the regime needs the war in order to

... it can use it as an alibi for its difficulties. For the moment, it seems to be a prisoner of its own bellicose rhetoric and commitments it has made at home and abroad to destroy the Iraqi regime. But let's not forget that in the hour of the American hostages the realists prevailed in the end.

The KLL, all the people I spoke with say, has certainly lost much of its popularity. In 1980, it has produced some 200,000 victims on top of those resulting from repression against domestic opponents. But in that overpopulated country, where more than 50 percent of the inhabitants are under 15 years of age, the regime still finds recruits to launch its murderous offensives. The offensives have sometimes led to terrifying massacres. But the very magnitude of these carnages might cause Khomeyni to stop and reflect, as well as the people around him, because it is chiefly the most fanatical of his partisans who are falling under Iraqi bullets. Thus, 40,000 revolutionary guards have perished, while the losses suffered by the regular army were much fewer. Many people think that if Iran were still to win one or two spectacular victories, even costly ones, it might in the end resign itself to coming to terms.

into the theory of the final quarter hour. The one for which too often the hands of the clock must be stopped.

[20 Dec 82 p 5]

It is really difficult to discern the contours of the opposition in Iran and this is partly because the border that separates those who support the regime more or less reluctantly from those who fight it more or less openly is imprecise and fluid. Sadegh Ghotbzadeh said one day, "The Imam's line is 1 km wide." This is still true today, even though the author of that aphorism is dead, a victim of his having joined the opposition, and even though a good many of those who formerly were on the line in question are now fighting against it.

There are of course those who are fighting with weapons in hand and who, outside the country at least, are waging the battle in broad daylight. These are the Mojahedin, whom we have mentioned many times. The size of their audience might be open to discussion--some would place it between 15 and 20 percent of the population, whereas they themselves take pride in having the support of the majority. But their determination and their perfect organization definitely make them a formidable force. They have forced the regime to go on the defensive and have largely cut it off from the people. Thus, the high dignitaries, when they are not going around in ambulances or anonymous taxis, hardly move these days except in armored Mercedeses flanked by several dozen bodyguards armed to the teeth. One comical detail in this dismal context: many Islamic soldiers have been ordered to shave their beards and wear Western blue-jeans, in order to pass unrecognized. But even at this level of fierce fighting, things are not always clear from an ideological point of view. Although the Mojahedin are positioned totally on the left, the Tudeh Communist Party continues to support the regime. However, it is the majority line of that party that is the victim of the ascendancy of the right within the regime. The general opinion is that there is doubt within the Tudeh Party, which has been deserted by many of the rank and file who are going to join the small leftist organizations; these organizations are opposed, for the most part, to the regime, but they carry on among themselves cliquish quarrels that take away any effectiveness they might have in the struggle.

The Radicals on the Sidelines

"Any solution to the problem of replacing the Khomeyni regime will have the benefit, somehow or other, of religious backing," says an Iranologist I met with in Brussels. "The weakness--at least the relative weakness--of the National Council of the Resistance is that it includes, as people come over to its side, a growing number of secular movements and personalities. It is a big head that is still looking for a body in its size...The successive severe purges conducted in the state's apparatus after the terrible attacks of 1981 and early 1982 seem to have reduced the extent of the secret conspiracies the Mojahedin had, even though a good many members of the Islamic committees and the revolutionary guards are often secret partisans of the resistance who manage to warn in time those who are being sought for arrest or search. But the ascendancy of the adherents of the Hodjati sect, whose right-leaning characteristics we have previously described, furnishes the regime with new auxiliaries in its struggle against Islamic or non-Islamic adversaries.

"A long, patient decoding of the results of the elections to the college, done by experts, which took place on 10 December, should make it possible to take a better measure of the increased importance of this group within the government," my expert continues. "The college is actually an essential cog in the Iranian theocratic regime, since it is these members who must verify that the laws and regulations conform to Islam. They must also appoint the leadership college that is called upon to select the successor to the 'supreme guide,' in case he is not spontaneously chosen by the people."

The Hodjatis already hold solid positions in the government, where their leader is Dr Velayati, the minister of foreign affairs, who is very close to being prime minister in the Iranian Parliament, where the ideological and political dividing lines are the most blurred. This integrist right, which is more conservative in social matters than the Khomeynist faction, can count on the remnants of the traditional 'secular' right, whose leader is Dr Bazargan, who, since he left the post of prime minister after the taking of the American hostages, has been generally regarded as the leader of the moderate opposition. With the less radical elements of the Islamic Republic Party which dominates the Assembly, the Hodjatis and Dr Bazargan's partisans have succeeded to hold back the economic and social program of the Islamic radicals, especially the agrarian reform, as well as the nationalizations that were being pushed too hard in industry.

The Empire is Doing Well Under the Republic

As for the secular, democratic left center, it suffered a hard blow with the elimination of Mr Ghobtzadegh, who was caught in the snares of a dark conspiracy that certainly seems to have had ramifications in the army and especially in the air force, judging by the number of arrests and executions that followed the arrest of this minister of foreign affairs who formerly, at Neuf-le-Chateau, was one of Khomeyni's two accredited spokesmen. Moreover, the arrest and execution of Mr Ghobtzadegh were a prelude to an official denunciation of the Amal Shi'ite movement, which is very active in Lebanon, where it has been possible to note its secular and progressive character.

But another type of opposition, more surprising, is seeing the light of day at the other extremity of Iran's political and philosophical range. In fact, all

the opinions we were able to collect agree that a renaissance of the monarchist movement is taking place in Iran, where many do not hesitate any longer to say openly that they miss the times of the shah, forgetting the corruption and the exactions of the Savak (the former regime's sinister secret police) so they can remember only the flourishing economic activity of those days. This current is apparent, they say, among skilled workers who were formerly well paid and are unemployed today, in a fraction of the urban and commercial bourgeoisie, as well as among well-to-do farmers. All of these people are hoping more and more strongly for the advent of Reza II, the son of the late emperor who was so detested.

This is the way Iran appeared to us as we listened to the many testimonies collected from those who in their exile continue to influence events or are still in a position to comment on them: testimonies filled in by others from Belgians and foreigners who are still in a position to go and come in that country. Four years after a revolution that overthrew a several-thousand-year-old empire supported by the strongest army in the region, nothing seems to have been permanently settled there; conflicts over stakes that are not always discernible pit men and clans against each other whose language, always inclined toward political or religious hyperbole, makes it impossible easily to discern the objectives. Terror, bigoted moral strictness, the suffering attendant upon war and shortages of all kinds have led the increasingly numerous strata of the population to fall back on solving the problems of daily life. However, Islamic theocracy, despite the terrible blows inflicted on it and the defections it continues to be subject to, is still holding on. That in itself is already a reason for amazement.

8946

CSO: 4619/12

PRESIDENT CRITICIZED FOR SILENCE ON POLITICAL STRUCTURE

Lahore NAWA-I-WAQT in Urdu 22 Nov 82 p 10

[Editorial: "Crucial Promise: Mr President, Take The People Into Your Confidence"]

[text] President Gen Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq, addressing news correspondents in Lahore, said that the present conditions were not conducive to holding general elections. At the same time, he made it clear in unambiguous terms that the basic guidelines of the future political system he has in mind for the country will be made public next Independence Day (August 14) and said that the crucial promise he has made to the nation will definitely be fulfilled.

Everyone is aware of Pakistan's ideal and objective. Some circles and elements may disagree or reject Pakistan's ideal of an Islamic republic on grounds that their objectives are different. But an overwhelming majority of the people have no doubt about this ideal. The only cause of their perplexity and anxiety is that they do not know what path and course of action or system will be adopted to achieve this objective. Similarly, they do not know what will be the nature of the people's participation in the march toward this goal, what will be the nature of the common man's participation in the march toward this goal, what kind of measures will be taken for the common man's participation in the affairs of the government and the state and finally how and when these measures will be implemented. The authorities have declared that it is essential to maintain unity and unanimity for resolving internal problems and facing external threats. The delay in taking the people into confidence with respect to measures to be adopted for achieving national unity and unanimity is causing concern.

All of these basic questions have become the topic of the day. The authorities may defer answering these questions for a while, but they cannot do so forever. Delaying tactics on the one hand serve to increase restlessness and suspicion among the people and on the other hand can shake the foundation of confidence and trust. Difficulties created as a result of such a situation give rise to a series of abuses. To put an end to such a situation, the president should take necessary steps at the earliest to enlighten the people about the fundamental principles regarding the political system he has promised to reveal on 14 August next year. Such an action would pave the way for discussion and debate on these principles and help the people find the positive and

negative aspects. These debates will give the authorities an opportunity to learn the feelings and expectations of the people, thus paving the way for a general agreement that, despite differences of opinion on certain points, reflects national unity and unanimity. On the contrary, if the present state of affairs is allowed to continue and if the people have to wait until the independence day next year, not only will it not have a positive effect on the people but progress toward the cherished goal will be retarded. Thus, we suggest that the president and his colleagues acquaint the people without delay the plan or structure they have in mind for the future political system and save the people from further bouts of expectation.

9315

CSO: 4656/45

UNDERMINING OF DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS BY REGIME DEPLORED

Lahore NAWA-I-WAQT in Urdu 25 Nov 82 p 3

[Editorial: "Intentions Are Pious But Institutions Are Also Essential"]

[Text] "We are committed to the restoration of a civil government and gradually we are advancing toward this goal. Some of our measures in this direction are already visible while others will be discernible with the passage of time." These are the words of President Gen Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq during an interview with a journal. In this connection, he also declared: "I strictly believe in the principle that the military should not be involved in matters of everyday life, and should they get involved for some reason, they should be disengaged as soon as possible, and we are actively working toward this goal."

The president has already expressed such views on many occasions. He finds it necessary to reaffirm his views time and again because people have been telling him that the step-by-step progress toward the cherished goal that he has been talking about is not discernible; on the contrary, sometimes it seems that with the passing of time we are still at the same spot. This is because, aside from the effects of the measures that are talked about so much, there is not the slightest indication of any such measures.

The most recent example is his "most important pledge" that he will announce the basic guidelines of the future political system before independence day next year. Though it is 4 months since he made this pledge, no signs whatsoever are visible about any progress in this direction. Everyone is anxiously waiting to find out the nature of the structure the president has in mind. It is no secret that on the one hand people are extremely anxious and curious to find out what the mode of their participation will be in the affairs of the state and government and on the other hand because of the passage of time, the intensity of their feelings is also rapidly increasing. Since nothing has happened after so much time, God alone knows if anything will ever happen in the future. The resulting indifference reflects not only a loss of interest on the part of the people, it is also clear proof of their disappointment in the unfulfillment of their desires and a sense of inexplicable hopelessness.

During the interview, the president also said that "it has never been our desire to maintain the military government in power." These words no doubt

sound pleasing and free of designs. The fact is that any government wants to remain in power forever, but this desire can never be fulfilled. Just like the span of life, the duration of power (irrespective of being short or long) is also always limited. Rulers, military or elected by the people, because of the mere fact that they are human, cannot be immortal. Similarly, their desires and determination also perish with them and become extinct. What is really everlasting are the institutions that, rather than being based on human desires, are founded on basic principles. Now the absence of such permanent institutions is beginning to be felt more than ever in Pakistan's national life. One reason for the present state of affairs is that during the past 5 years, democratic institutions, instead of developing, have been on the decline. Some circles believe that these institutions are being destroyed as part of a wellplanned scheme. Such fears could be baseless. But it is also a fact that human intentions, however wise and strong they may be, cannot replace permanent institutions. It is on the basis of this fact that we feel the urgency to ask the president and his colleagues once again to present to the people, without any further delay, the basic elements of the structure of the future political system they have in mind or are contemplating. It is important that the people not be kept in the dark or become victims of uncertainties arising from speculation. Such an action on the part of the government will enable the people to assess for themselves the extent to which the system being worked out for their participation in the affairs of the state and government strengthens democratic institutions and conforms with their expectations, requirements and traditions.

9315

CSO: 4656/45

AFGHANISTAN NEGOTIATIONS FREE OF SUPERPOWER RIVALRY ADVOCATED

Karachi DAWN in English 3 Jan 83 p 7

[Editorial]

[Text]

THE Tass statement on Afghanistan, published on Friday, reiterates the position the Soviet Union has so far adopted on the Afghan question. It categorically reaffirms that the Soviet forces in Afghanistan will be withdrawn as soon as "external intervention" in that country ceases. This should put an end to the speculation that the new leadership in Moscow is inclined to modify its policy on South-West Asia. In a way, the Tass statement is timely. It should warn Islamabad against being overoptimistic in the forthcoming round of indirect talks with Kabul due to be resumed later this month when Mr Cordovez arrives here to continue his shuttle diplomacy. It would, thus, be unrealistic on the part of Pakistan to expect a dramatic shift in the Afghan position, given the Soviet stand on the issue. But it would be equally unwise if Islamabad were to abandon its effort to seek common ground from which Afghanistan and Pakistan should try to proceed towards a political settlement. The Soviet Government has time and again welcomed the

Cordovez mission and has also indicated that it could lead to "qualitative progress" towards a political solution of the Afghanistan situation. But that is by no means indicative of a change in Moscow's substantive position on the settlement of the Afghan crisis.

Since all the parties attach considerable importance to the talks being held under United Nations aegis, these must be sustained at all costs. Moreover, they offer, in the present circumstances, the only framework for a dialogue. It is, therefore, important that the process of negotiations be intensified. This will call for a more business-like approach to the holding of talks. The pattern so far has been that months are allowed to elapse in between the rounds of talks Mr Cordovez undertakes, which is really not quite understandable. As a result, the parties have not been able to move forward in devising modalities for regular negotiations. They have tended to get bogged down on legalistic hairsplitting on procedural arrangements

and no progress has been possible on the more important issues involved in the crisis. True, broad agreement has been reached on the four central issues to come under discussion, namely, the withdrawal of foreign forces from Afghanistan, the return of the refugees, trilateral guarantees of non-intervention and non-interference by Islamabad, Kabul and Tehran, and international guarantees for Afghanistan. But by itself a broad understanding of this nature does not amount to much because each side interprets these issues quite differently from the other. What is actually needed is a more concentrated effort by Kabul and Islamabad, and preferably Tehran too, to negotiate their differences. It is also important that the countries directly affected by the events in Afghanistan try to insulate their negotiations on the developments in South-West Asia from superpower rivalries. If East-West relations are allowed to determine the approach of the regional countries to the Afghanistan situation, the initiative will cease to be in their hands.

MRS GANDHI ACCUSED OF LIES, FALSE ACCUSATIONS, DUPLICITY

Lahore NAWA-I-WAQT in Urdu 26 Nov 82 p 3

[Editorial: "Mrs Gandhi's Allegations and False Accusations"]

[Text] U.S. Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Lawrence Eagleburger has said that he is impressed by India's stand on the Afghan issue because (according to him) India has realized that it cannot benefit from this issue and is also becoming deeply concerned and does not like to leave Pakistan all alone in this situation. Mr Eagleburger made these remarks on his return to the United States after touring both Pakistan and India. But the most disturbing part of the matter is that when Mr Eagleburger was busy making such optimistic remarks about the Indian Government's position in Washington, Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi was busy expressing contrary views and was reaffirming her old allegations that Pakistan was taking advantage of the Afghan issue by acquiring arms for itself.

The reason for the optimism expressed by the U.S. under secretary of state may be that when he went to India after his visit to Pakistan, Indian rulers impressed on him the views he voiced on his arrival in the States. This happens to be not only an old habit of the Indian rulers but their permanent policy. They keep both sides happy. In other words, in keeping with this policy, India has been displaying its best intentions in front of Pakistan's well-wishers, friends and allies and in this way has been playing down their concern for Pakistan so as to dampen their determination to help Pakistan. But in their own country, the Indian rulers continue their allegations and false accusations against Pakistan so that it cannot live in peace.

Mrs Gandhi's latest allegations and accusations against Pakistan in the context of the Afghan issue came at a time when Pakistan, together with 45 Islamic and nonaligned nations, raised the question of Russian military intervention against Afghanistan once again in the UN General Assembly. Mrs Gandhi, since her return to power in the beginning of 1980, has been actively engaged in advocating for Russia and pleading and defending Russian aggression against Afghanistan. She argues that Russia was forced to intervene in Afghanistan and that Russia will pull its troops out as soon as others end their intervention in Afghanistan, and besides, Afghanistan is not the only country that has become the victim of aggression--there are

many other countries in the same situation, but only Russian intervention is singled out for condemnation. She has also been saying that as soon as outside intervention is ended, Russia will recall its troops.

Mrs Gandhi repeated all these remarks in her most recent statement and has expressed allegiance to Russia just at a time when the international community of nations in the United Nations is about to ask Russia once again to withdraw its troops from Afghanistan. Against this background, Pakistan can only term the optimistic expressions of the U.S. under secretary of state on India's stand as a hastily formulated indiscretion. But India has been America's greatest weakness from the beginning. One single smile on the part of its rulers has been more than sufficient to dissipate not only the perplexity of American statesmen but their prudence as well. However, expecting positive trends from India is a matter that concerns only American rulers and as such it is their problem. But Mrs Gandhi's statement should elicit a moment of thought on the part of authorities in Pakistan including all those circles who casting aside all previous experience, have been expressing unprecedented optimism following the Zia-Indira minisummit in Delhi.

A desire for good relations with India is not only proper but is also essential. But relations can only be improved on mutual bases. Indian rulers sometimes talk of seeing a strong Pakistan, but this is only superfluous talk and it does not reflect their sincere desire and intentions. If India were truly perturbed about Russian military intervention in Afghanistan, it would not be raising such a big hue and cry at Pakistan's efforts to buy some arms from the United States to strengthen its security. But since its main desire is to keep Pakistan in a subordinate position and prevent it from becoming strong, it cannot tolerate even the least attempt on the part of Pakistan to reinforce its defenses. Mrs Gandhi, despite buying arms worth hundreds of millions of dollars from Britain, France, Germany and other countries, in addition to purchasing arms from Russia, objects to Pakistan's efforts to buy arms. She has rejected the disastrous aspects of the destruction caused by the Russian invasion of Afghanistan. These facts clearly indicate that her actions are a direct result of her opposition to Pakistan. This is a situation in which U.S. statesmen, under the influence of flattering rhetoric of Indian rulers, can become optimistic. But the people and authorities in Pakistan should under no circumstance allow themselves to become victims of self-deceit.

9315

CSO: 4656/46

INDIAN SECRETARY TALKS TO NEWSMEN IN LAHORE

BK171634 Karachi Domestic Service in Urdu 1500 GMT 17 Jan 83

[Text] Secretary of the Indian Ministry of External Affairs Natwar Singh, who arrived in Lahore this afternoon on his way to Islamabad, told newsmen at the airport that the atmosphere is completely conducive to the establishment of friendly relations between India and Pakistan. He said that the two countries have moved forward recently toward the establishment of better relations. He said that he is carrying a message of good will from Indian prime minister Mrs Indira Gandhi for President Gen Mohammad Ziaul Haq. The secretary of the Indian Ministry of External Affairs called on the Indian prime minister prior to his departure for Pakistan.

Natwar Singh said that his present visit to Pakistan is a continuation of the meeting between the Indian prime minister and the Pakistani president in November of last year, and the talks between the senior officials of the two countries last month. He said that he will hold talks with Pakistani officials in Islamabad on bilateral matters. He said that he will also hold further talks on a joint commission, which is aimed at developing mutual understanding and cooperation between the two countries in various fields. In addition, talks will be held on the formation of subcommittees. Views will be exchanged on the no-war pact and the friendship and cooperation agreement during the talks. Singh said that there have been some basic differences but efforts are being made to settle them. He added that detailed talks will also be held on the issues relating to the New Delhi Nonaligned Summit in March. He said that agreements were reached between India and Pakistan on a number of issues which will be discussed during the summit. He expressed hope that delegations of Pakistan and India will have closer cooperation at the summit as a result of the present talks.

In reply to a question on construction of a dam by India on the Chenab River near (Keshwar), he said that his country will not violate the India-Pakistan agreement. He added that the next meeting of the India-Pakistan Commission will be held in Karachi and should there be any such issue, it will be discussed at the meeting.

CSO: 4656/78

TIES WITH PRC DURABLE

GF161700 Karachi DAWN in English 14 Jan 83 p 22

[Text] The Chinese consul-general, Mr Wang Disan, said in Karachi on Wednesday that the recent visit of President Mohammad Ziaul Haq, had further strengthened relations between the two countries.

The consul-general who paid a courtesy call on the president of the Federation of Pakistan Chambers of Commerce and Industry [FPCC&I], said that the friendship between the two countries was time-tested and of long standing and would increase with the passage of time.

He referred to the setting up of a joint commission during President Zia's visit for promotion of economic, scientific and technical collaboration and said the two countries could learn much from each other.

Mr Wang Disan particularly mentioned the progress made by Pakistan and the assistance it had rendered to China in civil aviation and other fields. He referred to the increase in the two-way trade which stood around 300 million dollars in 1981-82. He expressed the hope that trade would increase further through increased opportunities for mutual discussion and exchange of views.

Mr Yousaf Zia said the two-way trade between the two countries had increased rapidly but could be further enlarged.

Apart from economic collaboration at the government level where China had rendered valuable assistance in key areas like heavy industry, steps would be taken to enlarge economic collaboration with the private sector also say through joint ventures where Pakistan could benefit from Chinese technology in a number of important field, he stated.

Mr Tariq Sayeed, vice president of FPCC&I mentioned that the private sector trade could be enlarged through personal contacts and suggested that the federation be notified about Chinese delegations which come to Pakistan.

CSO: 4600/218

CHISHTI'S PROPOSAL FOR UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN ADMINISTRATION, POLITICIANS

Lahore NAWA-I-WAQT in Urdu 5 Dec 82 p 9

[Editorial]: "What Happens Behind Closed Doors?"]

[Text] According to a newspaper announcement, the former Federal Minister, Retired General Faiz Ali Chishti, has proposed his services in arranging an understanding between the politicians and the administration. Before leaving for Jiddah on personal business he said that when the attempt to call a round table conference was unsuccessful, some circles had proposed that some individual should bring the administration and the politicians together on one platform. The proposal described above was in reference to this suggestion, and he made it clear that he wanted to perform this service not for any personal benefit but for the benefit of the country.

The gentleman's sentiments are worthy of admiration in their place, and our national interest demands that some sort of positive understanding be reached as quickly as possible between the government and the politicians in order to bring under control the drawing up of battle lines which seems to be increasing to the point of reaching a widespread and dangerous kind of extremism, but despite our full admiration for his proposal, it will not be incorrect or inappropriate to ask him when he was for so long not only an important and powerful pillar of the martial law administration but also a leader of the election cell which was established specifically to prepare the way for general elections and establish ties with politicians, why didn't he arrange for a national understanding at that time when that was his job? At any rate, whenever we are graced by a pious act we consider it good fortune. However, a better method to attain the national understanding for which General Chishti has proposed his unselfish services would be to establish ties with the government and the politicians without any publicity and find out what they have in common, on what matters they are in disagreement, how the agreement on shared matters can be increased and how disagreements can be made into agreements for the time being. If he had made a silent and serious effort along these lines there might have been some progress, but if it is attended by publicity right from the beginning, then this effort will be no different from the history of the attempt to call a round table conference. There was a great deal of propaganda about that, but no particular attention was given to the work necessary to prepare the way for it.

9914

CSO: 4656/53

WALI KHAN CRITICIZED FOR STATEMENTS

CF180610 Lahore JANG in Urdu 7 Jan 83 p 3

[Editorial: "Two Facets of Wali Khan Talk"]

[Text] The senior politician, Khan Abdul Wali Khan [leader of the National Democratic Party and the Movement for Restoration of Democracy], in a recent press conference in Karachi expressed his views on various issues facing the country and while doing so, he did not mince words. In fact, he spoke to our hearts. Regarding issues like the martial law, the Islamic system, and other such matters, he spoke as any other domestic politician would. Like so many other politicians he also warned that if the political freedoms are not restored, the people will spill into the streets.

While talking about such matters, Khan Abdul Wali Khan appears similar to any other Pakistani in the country. But not quite. When he is talking about the Afghanistan issue he sounds like a spokesman of the Kabul regime. At the press conference, with regards to Afghanistan, he spoke not one word which may have shown his displeasure about the presence of Soviet forces in Afghanistan or over the oppression of the Afghan people by Soviet forces. Also, Khan Abdul Wali Khan said nothing about the Karmal regime which has been planted by the Soviet Union. Although thousands of Afghans have died from the use of chemical weapons by the Soviet forces, Wali Khan has taken no notice of them. However, like a Karmal spokesman or a Soviet propagandist, he did say that Pakistan was involved in supplying arms to the Afghan Mujahidin guerrillas. He did convey the message of [the] Karmal regime when he said that the Kabul regime desires to find a solution to the Afghanistan problem through talks around a table. However, he never mentioned if the Afghan Mujahidin may also be included in these talks. Wali Khan did reiterate the Soviet line that the Afghan forces have the right of hot pursuit into Pakistan territory while chasing the Mujahidin and warned of the effects on Pakistan if this happens. However, he failed to advise the Soviets that they should never make the same mistakes the United States made during the Vietnam war. Wali Khan did convey Babrak Karmal's message that Pakistan and Iran should guarantee noninterference in Afghanistan but he did not mention the armed interference and aggression into Afghanistan by the Soviet Union. These two facets of Wali Khan's talk are such that his talk falls upon deaf ears. We only wish Khan Abdul Wali Khan could talk like a Pakistani when talking about the Afghanistan crisis.

CSO: 4656/78

INEFFECTIVE USE OF FEDERAL ADVISORY COUNCIL CRITICIZED

Karachi JANG in Urdu 29 Nov 82 p 3

[Editorial: "Obligations of the Advisory Council"]

[Text] A move has been under way for the past few weeks to assign members of the Federal Advisory Council various responsibilities. Only recently they were given elementary judicial authority. A new report today said that members of the Federal Council have also been included in the committee for naming new residential developments and roads in Panjab Province. When the Federal Advisory Council was first formed, the general expectation was that efforts would be made through this institution to make up for the deficiency of a national assembly. Such claims were also made by government circles. When the members were nominated, preference was given to persons having connections with families who had traditionally represented their respective regions in the national assembly. Khwaja Mohammad Safdar, chairman of the Federal Advisory Council, later declared that the Council would have as its guidelines the rules and regulations of the national assembly. The privileges granted to the members of the Council by the treasury department are equal to those of the elected members of parliament. But despite the passage of so much time since this institution was established, it has virtually failed to assume any line of action for itself. Laws are being enforced without its approval. Discussions with an important neighboring country like India are carried out without consulting it. Similarly, it was not consulted before or after Geneva talks on Afghanistan. In short, there has not been a single instance when it has given the government advice on legal or policy matters with regard to any important internal or foreign issue. A bill relating to the appointment of an auditor general was the only bill ever passed by the Council, but no one has been appointed to this post so far. The Federal Advisory Council's lack of interest in national affairs does not seem to be abating, but reports about assignments of another kind for the members of the Advisory Council are certainly being published. But the nature of the duties being assigned to the honorable members of the Council are not such as to enable the nation to bear the burden of expenses that are allowed to the members of the national assembly. If the numerous privileges for travel, communications and lodging, as well as social activities and many other allowances provided, are only for naming a road or a development or for making his service available for settling some ordinary dispute in the region, then many dignitaries will be prepared to do this work on a volunteer basis. The effort spent and the pomp and show with which the Federal Advisory Council was formed demanded that this body perform more responsible and respectful tasks than just naming new roads or developments or settling disputes.

PEOPLE SHOULD WORK FOR UNITY OF COUNTRY

Lahore NAWA-I-WAQT in Urdu 5 Dec 82 p 9

[Editorial: "Have Politics But Don't Destroy the Country!"]

[Text] The retired chief justice of the Lahore High Court, Mr. Shamim Husain Qadari, has emphasized that the people of Pakistan should strengthen their country by means of national integration because it was the unity of Muslims which built this country and this should be the way it advances. He said that it is due to Pakistan's bounty that today we have judges and lawyers, doctors and engineers, businessmen and industrialists. If Pakistan had not been founded we Muslims would never have reached this position, but would instead be coolies at some railway station. So have politics, but don't destroy your home.

He said this in Lahore while speaking at a ceremony in honor of the deceased editor of CHATAN, Mr. Agha Shorish Kashmiri. Perhaps some circles will think his words merely the kind of advice one gives in speeches, but it is an undeniable fact that whatever status, honor, wealth, rank and office the people of Pakistan have obtained are due to the grace of God and the bounty of Pakistan. Ingratitude and lack of perception are another matter, otherwise, the truth is that if you look at this whole area, from right to left, from east to west, Pakistan is a land of plenty. The standard of living of the average inhabitant of Pakistan in regard to living conditions, food, dress, health, housing, etc. is better than that of the average man in all our neighboring countries. What could be a better, more obvious proof of Pakistan's abundance than that 3 million inhabitants of Afghanistan have sought refuge in Pakistan to save their lives and faith as a result of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, which is the largest number of refugees in any country in the entire world in human history, and despite its limited resources Pakistan is enduring the heavy expenditure of about 15 million rupees a day for the care of its stricken brothers, but still there is no sense of any shortage of anything or any kind of hardship. It would not be correct to claim that Pakistan is in every respect a heaven on earth, or that all its affairs are exemplary, but if it is compared with other countries in the region, Pakistan in fact appears a land of plenty.

Given this background, Mr. Qadari's statement can be considered an expression of the truth, as ungrateful Pakistanis should value Pakistan as well as giving thanks to God, and should not be guilty of ingratitude, because the

rateful are deprived of God's grace and mercy. Although 35 years have passed since the founding of Pakistan, and it is a great weakness of our educational system that the generation which has grown up after the founding of Pakistan has not been made aware of the truth of why Pakistan was felt to be necessary, of the extent to which the Muslims of the sub-continent had to struggle and sacrifice in order to establish their own free country, and how they surmounted region, language, color, etc. to give an inspiring demonstration of national unity, still there are large numbers of older people in every part of Pakistan who were eye-witnesses to the situation before the founding of Pakistan and who know what the status of Muslims in India was, even in those provinces and regions where Muslims were in a clear majority. They know how deprived, indigent and backward they were in employment, business, etc.

It is a characteristic of human nature to forget the troubles of a time of sorrow when one becomes happy, and there is an intoxication and pride in wealth and position, but it is also true that what Pakistan has given us--and it is a lot, whether we appreciate it or not--sticks like a thorn in the eyes of those elements and powers despite whose opposition and enmity Pakistan was created. The manner and methods of the opposition and enmity of these elements and powers have changed with the passage of time, but the Muslims' free and prosperous country of Pakistan pricks them like a thorn, so in order to maintain Pakistan and make it strong and firm, it is necessary to keep up that same vigilance and care which smoothed the path to the establishment of Pakistan.

It is natural to have disagreements on various affairs and problems, but by acting wisely we can turn these disagreements into agreements. We can criticize too, as this is not just a way to express an opinion. It is only by giving one's own opinion and hearing that of others that we can smooth the path for the result which will be acceptable to the largest number of people. However, the force of this criticism should not fall on the foundations of this country which is a place of refuge for us all. We can disagree on the forms of decoration and ornamentation of this house we all share, but there should be no cracks or fissures in our unity and agreement on maintaining this house and keeping it strong and firm.

While those in politics should consider this matter, the people in authority, who have undertaken the responsibility of administering the country, should also bear it in mind. The politicians who are constantly preaching democracy should reflect on its fundamental essence of tolerance as well. And similarly, those in authority should reflect that it is part of their responsibility to produce an atmosphere which will not weaken national integration or unity. They don't care for the argument which asks, "Since politicians are separate from each other and the path of each one is different, what can they do?" But putting this argument to one side, the politicians should also consider why those politicians who support, and have always supported, the ideologies the present politicians claim to protect and enforce, are not happy or satisfied with the present politicians. And if the present politicians can not gain their cooperation and confidence then how can they bring about the kind and degree of national unity and agreement which is necessary for the ideology which they have in mind? And if the situation stays the same as it is now, what elements will benefit by this in the future?

LAWYERS VOW TO CONTINUE STRUGGLE

Karachi DAWN in English 27 Dec 82 p 12

[Text]

Lawyers would continue their present struggle "for the restoration of civil liberties, independence of judiciary and the freedom of expression," Mr Hafeez Lakho, President of the Karachi Bar Association, said in Karachi on Saturday.

He was presiding over the inaugural session of the biennial delegates meeting (BDM) of the PFUJ (Barna group) at the Karachi Press Club.

Mr Lakho regretted that the lawyers' movement was being misinterpreted as an expression of resentment against the proposed Qazi Courts for fear of financial loss to them. He reminded the audience that the lawyers had launched a struggle three years ago, and the present one was a continuation of that.

The President of the PFUJ, Mr Nisar Osmani, in his speech, said journalists regarded freedom of expression as the basic right.

The Chairman of the APNEC, Mr Minhaj Barna, said that freedom of expression was the "mother of liberties," and added that the Quaid-i-Azam had never thought of its suppression.

Delegates from other parts of the country also spoke on the occasion.

Among those present at the inaugural session were MRD leaders Khwaja Khairuddin, Mr Mairaj Mohammad Khan, Mr Abid Zuberi and Mr Nafis Siddiqi, as well as Prof Ghafoor Ahmed (JI) and Mr Fasihuddin Salar (PNP).

Earlier, the Journalists/delegates offered Fateha at the Mazar of the Quaid-i-Azam and placed a floral wreath on behalf of the PFUJ.

CSO: 4200/276

AZAD KASHMIR LAWYERS TO IGNORE BAN

Karachi DAWN in English 5 Jan 83 p 12

[Text]

ISLAMABAD, Jan 4: The members of the Convening Committee of the Lawyers' Convention in Mirpur have decided that the convention will be held on Jan 6 as scheduled and that the ban imposed by the Azad Kashmir Government will be ignored. Ch. Abdul Majeed, Chairman of the Convening Committee, in a statement today said the decision has been taken in consultation with other committee members.

He said: "The announcement made by the Azad Jammu and Kashmir President that his Government had declared as unlawful the Lawyers' Convention has come as a rude shock. A number of lawyers have been arrested in Mirpur and warrants have been issued for the arrest of many others, including the members of the Convening

Committee. Government officials all over the state are threatening the participants that they would be arrested if they proceed to attend the convention".

"All these measures are acts of repression and high-handedness. The allegations levelled against the organisers of the Convention by Brig. Hayat Khan in his Press conference are factually incorrect and are just a propaganda stunt", he added.

He further said: "The Convening Committee wishes to make it clear that the Lawyers' Convention is a legitimate activity as guaranteed by Fundamental Rights and any announcement to the contrary is void and has no legal effect. The Convening Committee expects lawyers to attend the convention irrespective of the repressive measures being adopted by the Government."

CSO: 4200/285

RELEASED LAWYER TO CONTEST LAHORE BAR ELECTIONS

Karachi DAWN in English 5 Jan 83 p 12

[Text]

LAHORE, Jan 4. Mr. Abdur Rashid Qureshi of the defunct PDP, who was recently released following five months' detention, has announced his candidature for the presidentship of Lahore High Court Bar Association.

There are already three candidates in the field — Mr. Fazal Haider, Mian Sher Alam and Raja Afrasiab.

Although elections are scheduled for Feb 24, the campaign has already started and in all probability the contest is going to be very keen, as the office has gained increasing importance in view of

the lawyer "struggle for supremacy and independence of Judiciary."

Announcing his decision, Mr. Rashid Qureshi said he stood for the demand of the legal community as a whole — elections under the 1973 Constitution, withdrawal of Martial Law and the ban on political activities, lifting of censorship, release of political prisoners and withdrawal of amendments to the Bar Council Act. He made it clear that he had no affiliation to the rightist or leftist groups of the community.

Meanwhile, hectic campaigning is in progress for the District Bar contest, which is scheduled for Jan 13.

CSO: 4200/285

GAFFAR KHAN'S IMPRISONMENT FOUND TO BOOMERANG

Lahore NAWA-I-WAQT in Urdu 21 Nov 82 p 3

[Editorial: "What An Imprisonment It Was, What Freedom This Is!"]

[Text] The North West Frontier Province government has withdrawn the order under which, 3 weeks earlier, the Red Shirt leader, Mr Abdul Gaffar Khan, was imprisoned in a rest house when, despite being warned by the Frontier Province government, he failed to adhere to the schedule prescribed for his tour and speeches and further, refused to be imprisoned in his own house. Subsequently, he has sent to a hospital in Peshawar for treatment. This was a strange imprisonment. As in the rest house, in addition to his relatives, his followers also visited him in the hospital, and all of his orders and statements were made commonly known. Soon after he was imprisoned, the leaders of the Muslim League and Jamaat-e Islami began demanding his release. Nevertheless, the country's rulers are better acquainted with the underlying factors. Khan Abdul Gaffar does not listen to anyone, rather, he is an elder who keeps on telling others what to do. Therefore, it is preferred that he be left alone and not be prevented from voicing his feelings, because his so-called imprisonment becomes a source of "profiteering," if not for him at least for those who use his age for their own political ends. Across the Frontier Province, Mrs Gandhi, too, in the name of an expression of sympathy, gains an opportunity to needlessly criticize Pakistan.

9779

CSO: 4656/48

CHANGES IN ANTICORRUPTION MEASURES ADVOCATED

Lahore NAWA-I-WAQT in Urdu 21 Nov 82 p 3

[Editorial: "Change the Anti-Corruption Methods"]

[Text] According to a newspaper report, more than 400 officials against whom investigations are being carried out for corruption include 76 gazetted officers as well. The investigations are either in various stages of legal action against them or the anticorruption committees are examining their cases. This information is a part of that long and difficult process that has become routine for eradicating corruption and bribery. But the method of action and the form of legal proceedings are such that few corrupt people are caught in the first place and the legal proceedings against those "unlucky" individuals who are caught continue for so long that their fate and destiny do not teach a lesson to other bribe-takers. As long as the very foundations of the present system are not changed, despite the increase in anticorruption departments, institutions and committees, efforts will be limited and unsatisfactory, and the cycle of this curse will continue.

The real victim of bribery and corruption is the society. Therefore, instead of giving anticorruption efforts to government employees alone, responsible and active representatives of the people should also be included, so that it does not seem to be "a household affair" for only government employees. For example, the anticorruption committees appointed at the district and subdivisional levels, along with government departments, should have representatives from local institutions as well as lawyers, teachers, scholars and officials of trade and industrial organizations. Even the leaders of these committees should be non-official individuals. Their task should not be limited to studying the complaints or giving recommendations; rather, they should also be authorized to investigate on their own and mete out appropriate punishment. People who are deprived of their rights due to bribery and corruption or who are victims of excesses will turn with much more confidence to such committees. Also, the people's representatives in these committees would work with the deep sense of responsibility that if they do not pay immediate and strict attention to the complaints, the public would not only say things behind their backs but openly and right to their faces.

9779

CSO: 4656/48

LIST OF 500 SABOTAGE SUSPECTS PREPARED

Karachi DAWN in English 27 Dec 82 p 12

[Text]

LAHORE, Dec. 26: The Anti-terrorist Cell and other agencies in the Punjab have prepared a preliminary list of about 500 suspects, including some politicians, political workers and others, for their alleged involvement in sabotage and terrorism.

No fresh arrests have, however, been made in this regard.

Knowledgeable sources informed 'Dawn' here on Sunday that before any action against the suspects was taken, the agencies concerned would further investigate the cases in depth. Approval of higher authorities, in this regard, is awaited.

A final list of the persons allegedly involved in all such cases would be drawn on the basis of seriousness of a crime committed by them.

The Government has asked the

police and other investigating agencies about their requirements in terms of funds and equipment for an effective check and interrogation of such persons.

It was claimed that the official agencies had succeeded in revealing the connections of about 95 per cent cases of sabotage and terrorism, and a detailed report on the issue would be submitted to the high-ups in due course. The newly formed Crime Control Committees have been asked to assist the police and other investigating agencies. These committees also include Local Councils members. Orders have been issued for the interrogation of all such persons who were once involved in anti-State activities.

After the interrogation process is completed, details of the cases would be issued for publication, the sources added.

QUESTIONNAIRE ON ZAKAT AND USHR ISSUED

Karachi DAWN in English 3 Jan 83 p 12

[Text]

ISLAMABAD, Jan 2: The Central Zakat Council is to elicit public opinion on the functioning of "Nizam-i-Zakat-o-Ushr" in order to make it more successful and to achieve its objectives fully.

The council issued a questionnaire to this effect today. It is to be published in the national press in a couple of days.

The copies of the questionnaire both in English and Urdu will be made available to the public.

The last date for the receipt of replies to the questionnaire from the public has been fixed on Jan 20.

The topics of the questionnaire relate to the disbursement of Zakat, Nisab, Zakat o jozry basis, projection of the Nizam-i-Zakat-o-Ushr through mass media and

other media and other matters relevant to promotion of the Nizam.

The questionnaire will also be circulated among the Ulema, religious scholars, Islamic Research Institute, professors of the universities, heads of Deeni Madaris, Provincial District and Tehsil Zakat Councils.

The decision to invite public suggestions on the subject was taken at a meeting of the 15-member special committee of the Central and Provincial Zakat Councils held recently. The committee was set up by the President under the chairmanship of Mr. Justice Shafiur Rehman, Judge of the Supreme Court and the Chairman of the Central Zakat Council.—APP.

CSO: 4200/284

UNDERWATER FORCES' ROLE HIGHLIGHTED

Karachi DAWN in English 4 Jan 83 p 8

[Text]

Admiral Karamat Rahman Niazi, Chief of the Naval Staff, said in Karachi yesterday that the role of underwater forces is of paramount importance, and as such all possible efforts have been made to strengthen it, says an ISPR Press release.

Addressing a seminar on the Torpedo Anti-submarine and Diving at PNS "Karsaz" he pointed out that in this era of missile age, the role of underwater forces has become all the more important, "because we must keep a very close watch as to what is happening under the sea". He also said that in order to keep the channels open and clear of mines planted therein,

for smooth traffic for shipping, the role of underwater forces cannot be ignored.

He further said that in this respect some modern equipment is in the use of Pakistan Navy and more shall be provided within a short span of time. Admiral Niazi emphasised upon the officers and sailors to take full advantage of the training facilities available. "Your entire energy should be spent on training yourselves, with dedication and hard work", he said.

Earlier, a group of naval officers read out their papers highlighting the role and importance of Diving and Underwater Operations in the Pakistan Navy.

CSO: 4200/284

TASK FORCE SUGGESTS NEW DEVELOPMENT POLICY

Karachi DAWN in English 5 Jan 83 pp 1, 9

[Text] ISLAMABAD, Jan 4: A study on Pakistan's proposed Sixth Plan, prepared by the task force under Prof. Khurshid Ahmad, a former Deputy Chairman of the Planning Commission, has underlined the need to make a complete departure from the Western approach to economic planning and adopt a new development strategy which might lead the people towards the establishment of "a just and humane socio-economic order in conformity with the ideals and values of Islam."

Releasing the text of the summary of the task force study undertaken by the Institute of Policy Studies, Prof. Khurshid, the Chairman of the Institute, said at a Press conference here that the five plans which were formulated in Pakistan's 28 years had resulted in a distressing record of national economy. He said "Poverty is galore. Some 40 per cent of the people live below absolute poverty line, around 85 per cent of the rural population does not have even clean water to drink. Gross economic inequalities remain unrectified endangering the peace and tranquility of the society."

He further said: "A high-consumption elites economy has been super-imposed on a fragile base of mass poverty and technological backwardness. Country's dependence on outside world is increasing in more than one way. International dependence is over nine billion dollars making every Pakistan man, woman and child indebted to the world to the extent of 1,350 rupees."

Prof. Khurshid said that the study was meant to raise a debate on the strategy and objectives of

the Sixth Plan as they are about to be made public by the Planning Commission. In the meantime, the study gave its own projections for the next plan period by claiming that on the basis of statistically estimated incremental capital output ratio, the total Sixth Plan investment is estimated at Rs. 330 billion (at current prices) to support the proposed 8.5 per cent per annum real growth in the economy.

According to the study broad sectoral allocations in the Sixth Five-year Plan should be Rs. 27 billion for agriculture, Rs. 78.4 billion for largescale manufacturing and Rs. 230.2 billion for other sectors. A macro-economic framework for the financing of required investment, the study maintains, suggests a 15 per cent growth rate in public savings to meet the resource gap.

Describing the agriculture as kingpin of country's economy, the study emphasises that "we cannot develop without developing agriculture." It further states that a clear policy in respect of public and private sectors and their future roles and inter-relationship must be evolved, that the cost escalation in industry particularly has reached a point where real profitability of new projects and export competitiveness of new industrial products are becoming doubtful, that labour policy calls for thorough reappraisal realising that days of cheap labour are gone and that balanced regional development has been a disturbing missing dimension in Pakistan's planning strategy.

The Institutes's study more specifically proposed the following measures asserting that they were ur-

gent for devising an Islamic approach in economic planning:

1. Government's role in production should be limited to heavy and strategic industries. Government should gradually withdraw from medium and small scale production. Medium and small units nationalised in 1970s should be returned to the private sector. Efficient entrepreneurs must be sought out to reallocate these nationalised ventures in the private sector.

2. All public enterprises should be made efficient and oriented towards social needs. A foolproof method of monitoring the performance of public enterprises needs to be designed and management made strictly accountable for any inefficiencies.

3. Machinery for economic decision-making in the public sector should be diversified horizontally as well as vertically. The decision making process should not be allowed to succumb to the bureaucratic attitudes and procedures. The operation of the Planning Commission should be disengaged from the grip of the Ministry of Finance. Alongwith this horizontal freedom of economic decision, a vertical freedom should also be ensured. Planning Commission should not impose its economic decisions on provinces and provinces should not impose their decision on Local Bodies and so on. More of the decision making should be done at the grass roots level.

4. Size of non-development expenditure should be reduced.

5. Relationship between productive factors will have to be improved in the light of Islamic principles. Particular attention

needs to be given to the relationship between labour and other factors of production. Labour and other factors of production, labour capital relationship and labour entrepreneur relationships should all be exploitation free, based on the principle of justice and beneficence (Adl-wa-Ihsan).

6. Consumption pattern requires a lot of restructuring both in the private and public sectors, extravagance (Israf) needs to be

eliminated from private as well as public consumption.

7. The policy makers must avoid succumbing to international pressures from World Bank and IMF to raise domestic prices to international level (particularly of essential goods) because that will only create an inflationary spiral and lead to currency devaluation.

8. Insulation from instability in the real effective exchange rate is particularly required for export

promotion because investment in export activities can be undertaken more confidently and efficiently, only if exchange rate is stable in effective real terms.

The study also suggests what it described as an effective role for Army in increasing agricultural productivity and in reorganisation of agricultural trade proposing that the Army should acquire self-sufficiency by producing all its own food requirement and arms

CSO: 4200/285

BALUCHISTAN GOVERNOR DISCUSSES CHANGES IN THE PROVINCE'S ECONOMY

Karachi DAWN in English 5 Jan 83 p 4

[Text] QUETTA, Jan 4: Governor Baluchistan, Lt. General Rahimuddin Khan, yesterday said that tremendous progress in social and economic fields in the province during the last three years had been rendered possible through the special attention of the Federal Government.

Addressing the concluding session of the Provincial Council here yesterday, he said that the change in the economy of the province was like "silent revolution" which could be seen in the reduction of travel time between here and Karachi and Dera Ghazi Khan.

He said the progress made by the province was not on the official files, newspapers and speeches alone. It could be seen in the condition of the roads, safety in travel to the province, houses in Lasbela and Zhob and lush green fields of the Mangochar area in Kalat Division.

He said it had been the endeavour of the Government that progress should not be confined to the urban areas alone, but it should better the lot of the common man in the province living in the rural areas.

The Governor said to him discharging his official duties was also like saying prayers and that was why he had been able to serve to the best of his capacities the 43 lakh people of the province.

He said he had asked administration to work with the same missionary zeal so as to deliver goods to the common man. He however, said that his efforts alone would not have mattered much if the people did not cooperate with him. He said individual efforts could not do

much in determining the destiny of the people and thus he would always count on continued cooperation of the people in seeing this province progress with full speed.

Lt. General Rahimuddin Khan also said that the Federal Government had given preferential treatment to the province during the last five years and this year alone it had given a grant of about Rs 2000 million for the completion of the on-going projects. He said he wanted to thank President Gen. Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq on behalf of the people of the province for his personal interest in the progress of the province.

The Governor said the present Government took over in very trying circumstances to fulfil its constitutional obligations. He said the people of Pakistan wanted to lead their lives according to tenets of Islam and the Government was going ahead in that direction without caring for criticism from within and outside the country. He said the Government had made a beginning in the direction of setting up democracy and democratic institutions, from below upwards.

He said the Government changed the whole tinge of the country's polity and instead of beginning at the top where a vested interest would always come to power, it established the Local Councils to associate the general masses with the national development efforts.

Specially in Baluchistan, he said, a new tradition of taking the elected members into confidence for the development projects has been set. He said it was a departure from the past practice of official

interference in the development activity.

Even the inspection officers are the ones elected by the people and it was decided on the very first day that the political agent or the Deputy Commissioner would only be a member of the District or Divisional Council without the right to vote.

Gen. Rahimuddin Khan said that he had asked the Government departments and corporations to pay back their dues to the Local Councils and also asked the Businessmen and traders to pay their share of the octroi promptly so that the progress in the areas did not suffer.

He said more than Rs.300 million had been allocated to the Local Councils in the last three years for undertaking the development projects of which more than Rs.110 million went in for the development of industry, buildings and roads, irrigation, food, revenue, health and education.

He said the Union Councils were undertaking the development work and there was no limit to what they could take on. He said the Government granted incentives to the Union Councils in various shapes.

He said a Union Council could also have loans from a special fund created this year to carry out its development plans, provided the Local Council was prepared to allocate an equal amount.

He further said that the Government was consciously trusting the Local Councils and it would be only befitting on the part of the elected members of the people not to breach that trust reposed in them.

otherwise they would face an instability of the people during the imminent Local Council elections.

He said that during the last few years increase in the annual development allocations had regular feature but this year the allocation for the ADP had been twice as much compared with last year. Rs 16 million had been allocated for the rural development during the last year which had been increased to Rs 24 million. Rs 20 million had been set aside for providing clean drinking water and Rs 10 million for building new roads in the rural areas this year.

He said Rs 28 million were being allocated on the self-help basis out of the aid from the West Germany

for the small development schemes. He said it was therefore, decided the Union Councils should make well thought out plans and work very hard for bringing about progress in their respective areas.

He said that to encourage proper planning, the Government would not allocate any amount for the Union Councils not carrying out instructions of the jointly evolved Local Councils.

He said that was why no allocation was being made for the District Council, Nasirabad, Zhob, Panjgor, Gwadar and town committee of Dhadar, Machhi, Turbat, and Ormara. He said the principles and rules were not good for the books only, those were to be acted upon and the responsible members of

the Local Councils should keep that in view so that they could come true to the people's expectations.

He said the law and order situation in the province was generally very good. He warned the handful of those elements as were opposed to the progress for their purely selfish reasons.

He said the Government would not permit those elements carry out their designs and would do everything to see to it that the province stayed on the road to progress.

He called upon the members of the Local Councils to help Government achieve the targets of social and economic changes executing the projects with top speed and minimum expenses. —APP

EFFORTS FOR BALUCHISTAN UPLIFT DISCUSSED

Karachi DAWN in English 5 Jan 83 p 10

[Text]

QUETTA, Jan 4 The Federal Minister for Health and Social Welfare, Dr Naseeruddin Jozegai, while addressing Councillors, and notables at Jirga Hall, Zhob, has said that present Government, was trying to do its best to accelerate the process of development in Baluchistan so that this backward province could be brought at par with the developed areas of the country. For this purpose, electrification in Baluchistan has been given top priority.

Zhob has been linked with the grid system, while Loralai will be linked through this system by the end of next year. Sui gas supply to Baluchistan and completion of RCD highway upto Karachi and the

Loralai-Dera Ghazi Khan road were clear proofs of the sincerity of the regime with Baluchistan, the Minister said.

He said that freedom is a great blessing of God, therefore, all of us as true Pakistanis should be ready to defend the security of our country at every cost.

The Minister said that Afghan refugees have been forced to leave their homeland as a result of foreign aggression against that country. The only solution of this crisis is that these uprooted people along with other Afghan citizens be allowed to form a Government of their own choice and thus they would be able to return to their homes honourably. —PPI

CSO: 4200/285

OFFICIAL POLICY ON ABOLITION OF INTEREST DEBATED

Karachi JASARAT in Urdu 20 Nov 82 p 3

[Editorial: "Government Department and Interest"]

[Text] The Federal Shariat Court has recommended to the government that restrictions be imposed on the interest charged on personal loans. The chief justice of the court, Justice Aftab Hussain, has said that it is not possible to immediately abolish interest officially in Pakistan. He said that the reason for this is that interest has fundamental importance in the world economic structure. The entire business of our banks and insurance companies is carried out on the basis of the world economic structure. In his opinion, abolition of interest in Pakistan alone would create severe complications. To avoid them, only a gradual program can be advocated since, in his opinion, only such a program would be effective. Justice Aftab Hussain has also said that his court has no jurisdiction over this matter, but nevertheless, it is recommending that restrictions be imposed on interest charged on borrowing and personal loans.

We have great respect for the Federal Shariat Court and hold its chief justice in high esteem. We do acknowledge the role played by this court in enforcing shariat laws in the country. However, regarding the stand and recommendation on abolishing interest, we cannot understand how an administration that is not in a position to abolish interest in its own institutions can abolish it in the private sector. As for the private level, it would be impossible to detect the giving and taking of interest, to stop this practice and to punish those who engage in it as long as one party does not complain. Even if any person or party did complain formally, the government's proceedings would be without any moral validity. Immediate restrictions should be imposed on the giving and taking of interest in the private sector. But along with that, the administration itself, to some extent, should start lending and borrowing money without interest. Is it not possible to abolish interest charges on official secured capital, taxes and amounts collected for charity? Is it also necessary to charge interest on these amounts that are returned in the original amount to the citizens after a time, without adding interest?

We ask the Federal Shariat Court to examine in detail the giving and taking of interest in government departments and to instruct the administration to immediately abolish interest in those government departments that are not affected by the customary obligations of world economic institutions, banking and insurance. Only after this will it behoove the government to act on the recommendations of the Federal Shariat Court concerning interest on the private level. Otherwise, all of its actions will be ineffective and meaningless.

RUMORS OF RETRENCHMENT IN RAILWAYS DENIED

Karachi DAWN in English 5 Jan 83 p 10

[Text]

LAHORE, Jan 4 Pakistan Railways administration has vehemently contradicted the news published in a section of the Press about the termination of services of 32,000 railway employees.

The news is baseless and unfounded as no such proposal is under consideration, a railway Press release issued here on Monday said.

The Press release said on the contrary, the railway administration has decided not to retrench even such staff as have become surplus after the recent reorganisation of the Railway Board and other economy measures. They are being

absorbed against the existing vacancies and alternative posts. In addition, the administration is taking appropriate measures to find suitable jobs for railwaymen outside the country.

"The decision of the railway administration to stop recruitment of non-essential category and not to fill up vacancies from normal attrition and retirement should not be misconstrued, as appears to have been done in the present case.

"Pakistan Railways administration, therefore, reiterates that neither the termination of the services of any railway employees nor any proposal of retrenchment is on the anvil."—APP

CSO: 4200/285

AFGHAN TRANSIT TRADE RULES TO BE CHANGED

Karachi DAWN in English 26 Dec 82 Economic and Business Review p 1

[Article by A.S. Yousufi]

[Text]

MAJOR changes have been made by Pakistan regarding transit trade to Afghanistan in an attempt to control irregularities and stop pilferage of goods in transit into Pakistani markets through clandestine methods.

Effective January 1, 1983, the Customs authorities in Peshawar are introducing new measures to tighten their grip. Henceforth only those imported items for transit to Afghanistan will be cleared which will be appropriately covered by Afghan letters of credit.

Moreover abundant proof will be required by the Pakistan authorities to show that payments for the imported goods have been made in foreign currency through Afghan banks.

If put to strict practice, these measures would eliminate almost the entire smuggling trade of appliances from the tribal areas of Pakistan as well as other cities where smuggled goods find their way.

Presently the authorities check only the documents of export by the suppliers. It is not ascertained as to how and where the payments for the incoming goods were made and by whom.

Fake addresses

Goods are marked for addresses inside Afghanistan, mostly fake. Pakistan cannot interfere with these consignments under the agreement with Kabul Government allowing transit of Afghan goods through Pakistan.

Tribal and Afghan dealers now pay cash for their imports in free ports. Letters of credit are issued by Afghan banks for goods ordered by the Government or those officially permitted and their clearance is handled by the Afghan National Bank in Karachi.

There are numerous private clearing agencies in Karachi which handled consignments booked by private Afghan importers — goods which are meant primarily for the Pakistani markets. These companies will, after implementation of the Pakistani decision simply go bankrupt because if L/Cs are required for all imports, then they will be handled by the Afghan National Bank.

Escorts

New measures to check pilferage of these goods between Peshawar and Torkham, the Pak-Afghan border, are already in force. One includes the new system of "escorting" the truck convoys right upto the border by customs officers.

While this system seems good enough on its face, it has a deeper dimension as well. Given the degree of corruption and malpractices within the Customs, this system may prove counter productive if a single officer is made responsible for seeing through "convoys" of imported goods. Room is thus created for greater degree of corruption.

The procedure now adopted at Peshawar is that a thorough check be made at Peshawar on all goods in transit and if suspected, even at Torkham. Customs authorities can also refuse delivery of goods in case documents are suspected to have

been forged to evade levy of proper duty in Afghanistan.

Informed sources say provisions of Customs Act have also been made binding on the transit goods when these are still in Pakistan so that chances of misdeclaration are minimised.

Traders in Bara and Landikotal say the prices of imported goods have registered a 30 to 40 per cent increase although the range and variety of the goods is still the same. A marginal reduction in the inflow has also been reported.

The new measures will almost bring the misuse of transit trade facilities to a bare minimum although a new route for imported goods flow into Afghanistan and then onwards to Pakistan is also in operation — through the Soviet Union.

It will remain to be seen whether greater checks on flow through the Pakistani territory will boost the quantum of goods coming via the USSR.

ILLEGAL TRADE IN NWFP DISCUSSED

Karachi DAWN in English 26 Dec 82 Economic and Business Review pp I, IV

[Article by M. Ziauddin]

[Text]

TRADING activity in NWFP is very pronounced. But most of it is carried out through illegal channels. Legitimate trading is so insignificant that the province does not have a single exporting house. Even those who deal in trade with Afghanistan have their main offices in Karachi as there are no shipping offices in NWFP.

In view of the very low level of industrial activity, the province imports industrial raw material in very insignificant quantity. In fact, no chemicals are imported by NWFP. There are some art silk importers but they allegedly sell their licences to commercial importers outside the province.

Those who are engaged in legitimate trading find it very difficult to operate because, as a leading businessman said, they are treated by the concerned law enforcement agencies with the same abruptness as the common smugglers are treated. The same businessman went to the extent of accusing the law enforcement agencies of killing the initiative of legitimate traders.

He said those who indulge in smuggling escape checking by paying bribes but those who deal in legitimate trading, too, are made to pay bribes at important check points and if they do not comply they are harassed mostly on cooked up charges. Since to challenge these actions in a court of law usually involves time and money, many prefer to comply with the demands of unscrupulous elements in the law enforcement agencies.

The provincial Chamber of Commerce and Industries is dominated by traders and some of them are said to be in favour of things remaining as they are for reasons of their own. The Chamber is said to be divided in three groups and each of these groups is said to have its own axe to grind. In view of the lack of unity among the Chamber members, many of their legitimate grievances fail to get the attention of the concerned quarters and difficulties continue to persist.

No responsible person who was approached would deny the existence of illegitimate trading in the province. But most of them were of the opinion that the extent of smuggling was not as extensive as is generally believed. All of them took pains to stress that the entire smuggling activity was being carried out in the tribal belt. As far as

general smuggling is concerned, they think following the Afghanistan crisis the centre of operation has shifted to Karachi.

With respect to heroin smuggling, all of them were of the opinion that the entire operation was in the hands of European and American smugglers, with the poppy cultivators inside tribal belt getting only the crumbs. They thought the poppy cultivated in Afghanistan and Iran is smuggled in the tribal belt for converting it into heroin because the heroin producing labs in Afghanistan and Iran were closed down following the disturbances in the two countries.

What they meant was that the bulk of heroin produced in the tribal belt did not belong to this side of the border. Therefore, they think, heroin smuggling activity cannot be said to be originating from Pakistan.

Weapons

Another major smuggling item of the area is armaments. This is said to be in the hands of people from outside the province. Unscrupulous elements among the Afghan refugees reportedly sell sophisticated arms in Darra which are said to be sold in turn to groups of mujahideen fighting in Afghanistan. Some of these items are reportedly bought also by anti-social elements in Pakistan and some reach the hands of some sections of students.

Sophisticated weapons also come and go out of Darra through wagons used in the transit trade for Afghanistan. General items are also

smuggled in and out through this method. The incoming items are either pilfered en route by smuggling organisations operating inside the country or go all the way to Jalalabad and come back with full knowledge of Afghan officials who look the other way because these items neither go inside their country nor is Afghan money involved in these operations.

Benefit to few

There is, however, no visible trickle-down effect of this massive smuggling operation going on in the area on the economy of NWFP. Poverty is very much visible and so is unemployment. On the other hand population-wise, the number of cars in Peshawar appears to be more than in Karachi. Shops are full of electric appliance and other costly luxury items. Informed circles said that the cars belong to only about a small fraction of the population most allegedly engaged in smuggling operations. They said the luxury items seen in the shops are also consumed by this small percentage of the population.

They also point to the unexplained jump in the prices of land in recent years and say this has happened mainly due to increased circulation of black money in the province.

As the billions of rupees that are flowing in the illegal channels cannot come into the legitimate chan-

nels most of it is being transferred outside the country. According to one informed source, this money is

safely deposited in the Gulf banking system.

Dry port needed

Responsible persons do not appear concerned about the menace of smuggling. They tend to treat it as a very insignificant factor. Those who are anxious to enhance legitimate trading activity in the province believe that the establishment of a dry port in the NWFP will help in giving a fillip to this activity. They think setting up of a dry port would encourage the establishment of shipping office and export houses in the province. They point out that about 100,000 tons of goods are flowing in and out of Afghanistan which pass through NWFP. Then there is transit trading, too, which takes place through the province. They said this activity could keep the dry port engaged to a considerable extent.

Besides, most of the personal baggage of people from the province who are working abroad are warehoused in Karachi and to get them cleared people have to go all the way to Karachi and spend a lot of money and time and face unnecessary hardship. This business can also be looked after by the dry port, they said.

Those who have studied the pros and cons of the idea believe that it would not be a profitable proposition in the beginning but in view of its long term benefits for the province, the Government could launch it with a subsidy for about three years.

INDUSTRIAL FINANCIAL AID AND RECOVERIES SHOW GAIN

Karachi DAWN in English 27 Dec 82 p 8

[Text]

The Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan recorded "significant improvement" in the approval of financial assistance, disbursement and recovery of loans, and implementation of approved projects and disbursement of loans throughout the country during 1981-82, according to the Bank's annual report released after the annual general meeting of the Shareholders in Karachi yesterday.

The amount of approved financial assistance during 1981-82 aggregated Rs 605.05 million as against Rs 453.30 million in 1980-81 (up 33.5 per cent) and was the highest ever in a single year.

New projects sanctioned during 1981-82 numbered 162 involving Rs 450 million and constituted 80 per cent of the total projects sanctioned during the year.

As against this, 150 new projects involving Rs 389.9 million were approved during the preceding year. The remaining 20 per cent of the projects were for expansion, balancing and modernisation of ongoing projects involving loans aggregating Rs 155.05 million.

In the total amount of loans ap-

proved in 1981-82, the relative share of Baluchistan increased to 6.9 per cent from 3.4 per cent in the previous year and that of NWFP to 22.2 per cent from 21.8 per cent.

Local currency loans disbursed during the year registered an increase of 14 per cent over last year but disbursement of foreign currency loans declined by 34 per cent as the foreign exchange resources of the Bank were completely exhausted and the fresh IDA credit of US dollars 30 million became operative late in June 1982 and could not be utilized during the year. The disbursement of foreign currency loans is expected to pick up in 1982-83.

The share of NWFP in total loans disbursed by the Bank during 1981-82 increased by 343 per cent and of Baluchistan by 155 per cent over the disbursements during 1980-81.

During the year under report, 93 projects involving loans of Rs 214.6 million were completed as against 65 projects involving Rs 178.7 million completed during the preceding year. The Bank financed projects completed during the year are estimated to have created about 2,500 new jobs. The foreign exchange earnings through the ex-

port oriented projects completed during 1981-82, are estimated to be around Rs 117.8 million.

During 1981-82, the Bank took concrete steps to recover maximum amount of outstanding dues as a result of which recoveries increased to Rs 273.7 million from Rs 242.1 million in the preceding year, registering a rise of 13 per cent. It was the largest amount of loans ever recovered by the Bank. At the same time, intensive efforts were made by the Bank to revive sick and closed units by formulating rehabilitation package deals under the Beg Committee constituted by the Federal Government for the revival of sick units.

With a view to enable the country to save foreign exchange, the Bank continued its efforts in promoting the use of locally fabricated machinery. The sanctions for projects based on locally fabricated machinery during the year, increased to Rs 184.09 million from the last years level of Rs 146.89 million indicating an increase of 25 per cent.

The Bank earned a net profit of Rs 17.2 million during 1981-82, as against Rs 14.3 million in 1980-81.

MINISTER ON OVERSEAS REMITTANCES

Karachi DAWN in English 5 Jan 83 p 10

[Text]

SIALKOT, Jan 4: Pakistani working overseas are remitting foreign exchange to the tune of Rs 22 billion every year, said Sheikh Ishrat Ali, Advisor to the President on Trade and Business Coordination.

Addressing a seminar on the role of small industries in the promotion of exports from Sialkot, arranged here on Tuesday by United Bank Ltd.

He said that foreign exchange was as important for the economy of the country as blood is for human life.

He said foreign exchange was needed at every stage in national developmental projects. He, however, expressed satisfaction that "our beloved country" has bright future as it had registered achievements in every walks of life and paved a way for further progress and prosperity.

Mr Ishrat Ali, deplored the mentality of those industrialists who had established their business units in foreign countries but were not

sending any foreign exchange to Pakistan, quite regardless of the fact that their wealth and everything they possessed belonged to Pakistan and their mother land had certain claims upon them. He said that Pakistan had made tremendous progress in every field since its inception.

He said that it was a matter of great pride that Pakistan-made hockey sticks and footballs were very popular all over the world and these were used in test matches and international tournaments.

APP adds: Mr Ishrat Ali said only through collective efforts and planning we stabilise our country's economy.

He described the small industries as the backbone of the national economy and said that small industries in the Punjab and the Northern Areas could make quick stride if central offices of at least two commercial banks started functioning in Lahore.

CAUSES OF LACK OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT ANALYZED

Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 14 Dec 82 p 4

[Editorial]

[Text]

MANY developing countries are anxious to invite foreign investment for a variety of reasons. They want not merely industrial expansion but also the new technology and Western marketing methods. And the Western countries interested in investing abroad want to be assured of not only security of capital but also steady profitability and commercial expansion. In addition, they seek real political stability and freedom from fear of external aggression. They also seek steady and liberal official economic policies along with adequate infra-structure facilities, like roads, water, power, gas and telephone facilities. President Ziaul Haq has appealed to the U.S. entrepreneurs to invest more and more in Pakistan. He has asserted that Pakistan has the right political climate and the requisite infra-structure or other essential facilities for very substantial foreign investment. The policy of President Reagan is to reduce foreign aid because of the sustained deficit in the U.S. budget, which is tending to increase rapidly, and promote rising investment in foreign friendly countries by the private sector and U.S. banks. The U.S. is agreeable to guarantee safety of capital, give tax credits to the investors in some select cases, and has set up a special organisation for the purpose with a fund of 18 million dollars initially. And Pakistan is among the 12 countries selected for promoting U.S. investment through such incentives. Gen. Zia has now offered the U.S. Chamber of Commerce not only guarantees for safety of capital but also the right to repatriate as much of their profits as they liked and sell their assets when they wanted it.

But foreign capital does not go to a country because of political considerations alone. Western capital is now enjoying the benefit of the high interest rates prevailing there as well as the increasing concessions being given to the investors. And borrowing credit for making investment abroad is costly for them for the same reasons. Hence developing countries keen on attracting substantial foreign capital have to make such investment not only safe but also very profitable. The basic question is whether the objective political and economic conditions in Pakistan provide the best opportunities for foreign investors, particularly those from the U.S. A large delegation of U.S. investors visited Pakistan recently. The arrival of

another U.S. delegation has been held-up for some unexplained reasons. And two Canadian delegations have been in Pakistan to explore investment opportunities. A South Korean delegation, too, visited Pakistan recently. Such delegations had been struck by the fact that Pakistan's own private capital had been shy and there were severe constraints in the infrastructure sector. The leader of the second Canadian delegation said publicly that Pakistani entrepreneurs were less keen on genuine joint enterprises and more anxious to get only funds from Canadians for investment by them.

The Annual Report of the State Bank of Pakistan for 1981-1982 shows that while private sector investment in manufacturing increased by 38 per cent in 1979-80, it dropped to a 25 per cent increase the next year, and the increase in the last financial year was a nominal 4.9 per cent — far below the inflation rate. And a new study of foreign investment in Pakistan published by the State Bank shows that if that investment fell from Rs. 467 million in 1977 to Rs. 133 million in the following year, it dropped from Rs. 433 million in 1979 to Rs. 293 in 1980. A sizeable part of that was re-investments of the profits made by foreign companies in Pakistan. Evidently a great deal more has to be done to attract not only foreign capital but also Pakistani capital into the industries. The State Bank of Pakistan in its latest report has spoken of the need for increasing the profitability of the private sector by reducing corporate taxes, simplifying and reducing controls and offering new incentives for more private savings to come into industry. If such concessions are given and the stock exchanges are revived, and investments in NIT and ICP are made far more attractive, certainly more savings and investment would take place. Speaking of the need for cutting red-tape and eliminating the necessity for investors to run from pillar to post for obtaining the requisite investment sanctions, Gen. Zia has promised to have "a single window" operations for foreign investors.

Undoubtedly real political stability has to be ensured through legitimate institutional process instead of the political uncertainty with a host of questions if large foreign investment has to come. Simultaneously the threat from the north-west has to be played up less. And the infrastructure facilities have to be increased positively and rapidly. The promised de-regulation should come not only for the benefit of the foreign investors but also the Pakistan entrepreneurs. Foreign companies in Pakistan have been arguing that while they pay their staff and employees well, full taxes at all levels and fair dividend to the share-holders most Pakistani companies do not do likewise. They seek uniformity in this regard or substantial tax relief for themselves, so that they can save more and re-invest. But some Pakistani industrialists want foreign companies to declare less profit and give lower dividends. This aspect of the problem too must receive earnest attention of the government if the drive to attract more foreign investment has to be successful.

WAYS TO CREATE EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES SUGGESTED

Karachi BUSINESS RECORDER in English 27 Dec 82 p 2

[Editorial]

[Text]

The prospect of a developing nation depends, above all things, on the progress of its people. The problem of widespread unemployment in our country is one of the major causes of discontent. Some members of the Sind Council drew the attention of the Provincial Government towards this problem and asked for its solution. The Governor duly announced that a provincial Commission for Youth Employment would be set up to compile statistics and suggest measures to solve the unemployment problem of youth.

Manpower planning means scientific development of human resources of the community. Considerations regarding the factors like capital, prices, wages, are no doubt very important during the course of planning, but at the same time importance

of people who take decisions regarding investment, buying and selling, choosing their vocations and labour cannot be under-estimated. In a growing economy, conscious and planned efforts have to be made to influence the factors which have got an impact on the decisions of people. Investments, direct or indirect, that should be made in people in order to rebuild their value structure, to make them more responsive to the development effort and to ensure that the necessary skills required for economic development are available, are as productive and useful as direct investments for the development of physical resources. There is also the problem of utilisation of unemployed and partially employed manpower.

In a predominantly agricultural country where more than 75 per cent of

the population lives in rural areas, the unemployment problem is very acute. The imbalance between the incomes of urban and rural communities is becoming intolerable, and there are visible signs of discontent. Unfortunately our politics has been of no-social change with the result that majority of the rural population lives below poverty line and its contribution to the national economy is nil. If agriculture has to be improved, if cottage industries have to be developed in rural areas and if the level of economic, social and cultural life in rural areas has to be improved, rural areas should receive a very large slice of the total investment. We should guard against any tendency towards pre-occupation with the urban sector to the neglect of the vast majority who are living on farms, where

most of them will have to remain indefinitely.

The problem of adult education and literacy, that of development of primary and secondary education and the general problem of moulding the outlook and attitudes of a large mass of manpower of rural areas so as to make it more responsive to planned efforts are the important problems relating to manpower development in rural areas. Development programmes, apart from mobilising local resources, can be effective agents in the process of manpower uplift. These programmes can develop appropriate value structures in rural societies, make them more responsive to plan efforts and help in tackling the prob-

lem of adult education and literacy.

As regards unemployment, it is not possible to ascertain the magnitude of the problem. The census reports also do not say anything on the subject. The reason is that it is a direct result of the past obsession with growth-manahip. Employment creation was never the primary investment criterion. In the urban areas it was a by-product of industrial programmes. Moreover, we preferred to import capital intensive technology without caring for the growing population. This is a problem which needs to be solved in a planned way on national level. The Provincial Governments cannot do much in this respect because of financial cons-

traints. It is the responsibility of the Federal Government to so devise development strategy as to help create more employment. This means that we should go in for labour intensive projects.

A massive effort is needed to achieve full employment of the work force as soon as possible. It will involve the choice of appropriate techniques and sectors, as also a balance between the supply of and demand for work. It is to be realised that the employment creating capacity of industry is lower than that of agriculture. This point has so far been neglected. If we are sanguine in this regard proper steps should be taken to create more employment in agriculture through land reforms.

STRATEGY FOR RURAL EMPLOYMENT STRESSED

Karachi DAWN in English 4 Jan 83 p 7

[Editorial]

[Text]

THE Director-General of the International Labour Organisation has appealed for more employment opportunities on the ground that increasing world unemployment may give rise to dictatorships and war. In an effort to substantiate the theory he referred to the decades of the twenties and thirties which, he said, led to the rise of a number of dictatorships and to the Second World War. Phenomena like the rise of dictatorships and the outbreak of wars have several reasons to explain them, of course, but it is certainly correct that economic factors like unemployment have much to do also. The Director's plea that the world is running this risk because of rising unemployment is also likely to be ignored, and especially in the developing countries which are most affected by poverty and ill-planning. According to him, there are at present 500 million people in the Third World who are "vegetating in misery, without work or fixed income" and he likened the plight of labour to that of the depression of the 1920s and 30s. The situation in Pakistan may not be as bad as in many other developing countries, but it is certainly not one which is very optimistic.

What makes the outlook on the domestic scene even more pessimistic is the fact that no work, or very little work is being done on programmes which normally lead to employment generation on a large scale.

It hardly needs to be pointed out that this country is fortunate in more ways than one. Although population pressures are no doubt serious, the land available for cultivation is still capable of coming up with large production surpluses if it is properly utilised. If the intention is really one of providing full employment to all those who are at present unemployed or under employed, then there is no real alternative to instituting reforms in the rural areas on a large scale. The most important component, of course, should be the introduction of land reforms — reforms that are genuine and really effective. The last two main attempts at bringing land reform did not really do much and most of the ills of the system of absentee landlordism still persist. Among these the increasing number of landless peasants is possibly the more serious, especially because the economy has not developed in other areas to be able to provide them with adequate employment.

If we are to be saved from the horrors which increasing unemployment can bring in terms of social turbulence, strife and instability, then new strategies must be evolved and new measures taken to meet the rising demand for jobs and means of subsistence. This is not to say that attempts at dealing with unemployment have not been made in the past. They have been, but it is equally obvious that they have not come up to the required level and have not been successful in reversing the trend of unemployment. Where land reform is concerned, the most important prerequisite to success is the political will, and this will obviously be present in governments which have their roots in the masses or are committed to an ideology which is opposed to the concentration of land and money in a few hands. This has been lacking so far and the result is that there are appalling examples of absentee landlordism in this country. While, on the one hand, we have large tracts of land lying unutilised or under-utilised, on the other, there are virtually millions of people who feel the pinch of land hunger and have perforce to quit the village and migrate to the city in search of means of

landless. The answer to the problem lies in changing the machronistic pattern of land ownership and effecting redistribution of land on an equitable basis. The task calls for a strong political will backed, of course, by adequate infrastructure, so that the ability to capitalise on the results of

land reforms is also provided to farmers. Apart from land reform — which must be at the core of any attempt to generate more employment — importance should also be given to creating more employment opportunities in rural areas. Providing off-farm employment must be an important part of

any rural development programme. But here again our governments have failed to make much headway. It is possible that the current drive to attract investment, with some importance being given to agriculture-based industries, will create jobs in rural areas.

CSO: 4290, 284

PRIVATE SECTOR ENCOURAGED IN BALUCHISTAN

Karachi BUSINESS RECORDER in English 27 Dec 32 p 6

[Text]

QUETTA, Dec. 26: The provincial Secretary for Industries, Commerce and Labour E. B. M. Ghani said that the government has provided ample incentives to the entrepreneurs who want to install any industrial unit in private sector in Baluchistan province.

Addressing a radio press conference at Quetta Radio Station tonight he pointed out that government had granted tax holiday and exempted on all the industrial machineries in the private sector besides these entrepreneurs could have the facility of loans to the tune of 60 per cent from the Industrial Development Bank.

He further said the World Bank had recently provided a loan for boosting small industries.

In this connection the interested persons could take loan for industrial unit upto Rs 50 lakh at the rate of 8.5 per cent interest.

While detailing the overall performance of his department in order to develop industries, the Secretary said that free industrial estates at Quetta and Uthal and Hub already been completed.

At Quetta, 30 small and big industrial units who started functioning. The industrial estate of

Hub had been completed at the cost of Rs 17 crores whereas 132 industrial units were functioning. 102 more industrial units would start functioning within the next two years.

In the power sector, he said Quetta had been linked with Guddu by 132 kv transmission line, similarly Sibbi would be linked with Guddu and Khuydar with Dadu through 220 kv transmission line in the next years plan, he said.

Answering a question, he said 50 centres were functioning under industries where boys and girls students were being trained. Besides, two technical centres were functioning in Quetta where 500 students got training every year.

Referring to the labour welfare work he said that the provincial government had allotted Rs two crores for the financial year for the construction of labour colonies and dispensaries etc. Replying to another question, he said there was no hurdle in getting no objection certificate by the entrepreneurs who wanted to install any industry in Baluchistan.

Replying yet another question, he said it was under the active consideration of his department to make the bank procedure for advancing loan more simplified.—PPL

MARKET NETWORK PLANNED FOR SIND

Karachi BUSINESS RECORDER in English 28 Dec 82 p 1

[Article by G. N. Mughul]

[Text]

A network of markets all over the province will be laid under a plan prepared by the Sind Bureau of Prices and Supplies, with the aim of bringing uniformity in prices and facilitating smooth supply of various daily use commodities, it was reliably learnt here yesterday.

A separate Mini-Plan has also been prepared to establish wholesale markets in Karachi for various commodities, like Sabzi Market, Cereal Market and Live - Stock Market. It has been forwarded to Karachi Development Authority for consideration and execution.

The markets which will be established at various places of the Province will not only cater for the needs of the respective districts but will also feed the markets of big cities, particularly Karachi.

By adopting the new structure, the Government wants to not only provide commodities in big cities at reasonable prices and without any hindrances but also to enable the producers to get good returns.

According to the relevant law which has already been enforced, Market Committees will charge

a fee at the rate of 25 paise per 50 k.g. besides collecting licence fee from the traders.

The Market Committees will contribute a percentage of their collections to an account which will be opened on provincial level. The Funds so collected will be used to meet the financial needs of the officials of Market Committees besides granting aid for establishment of markets to the Market Committees which may not be self-sufficient.

Market Committees have already been set up and some have applied to acquire land needed for the markets.

However, the local councils all over the province have challenged the Market Committees' right to levy taxes in their jurisdiction. The issue was also raised in the session of Sind Provincial Council recently and the Governor has appointed a committee to look into it but the system has been allowed to work as decided.

According to the sources of Bureau of Supplies and Prices, the markets will be set up on the modern lines and store houses, processing facilities and other allied arrangements would also be provided there.

For Karachi, the Bureau does not consider the present location of Sabzi Market as suitable and proposes to shift it to some other place.

PAKISTANI OIL MINISTER ON FUEL SHORTAGE SITUATION

GE161702 Karachi DAWN in English 14 Jan 83 p 1

[Text] The federal secretary, Ministry of Petroleum, Mr Mukhtar Masud, is rushing to Karachi from Islamabad today to review the situation arising out of gas shortage in the city and the increase in gas and petroleum prices.

Mr Masud will preside over a meeting of officials of all the allied gas and petrol distribution agencies on 15 January.

The Karachi Gas Company will hold a meeting with the officials of Pakistan Steel and Karachi Electric Supply Corporation [KESC], the main consumers, also on 15 January, to devise ways and means to overcome the present shortage of gas.

The managing director of Karachi Gas Company, Khan Tariq Hamid, said yesterday that Karachi was facing additional shortage of 20 million cubic feet of gas daily due to rise in demand. Among other things, a number of closed textile mills had begun operations since last month, he said.

He said the Sindh Government had also been approached to find ways how to adjust the distribution of the available supply of gas.

The Karachi Gas Company had suggested closure of about 50 industrial units every day on rotation basis to overcome the existing crisis, official sources said.

They said the problem had aggravated owing to increased demand of about 18 million cubic feet gas daily in the industrial sector. The only solution was closing down of industrial units on rotation basis.

The sources attributed the shortage to increased demand by steel mills from 16 million cubic feet of gas a day to its allocated quota of 26 million cubic feet a day; revival of sick industrial units; normal expansion and commissioning of new industrial units, etc.

The allocation was 60 million cubic feet daily [MCFD] to KESC which is under-utilising its quota, 26 million cubic feet daily to steel mills, 16 [MCFD] to factories; and 76 MCFD to industrial, domestic, and commercial consumers.

sources said the present gas supply crisis was foreseen by the gas distribution agencies as far back as the middle of last year and the government officials informed.

As a consequence, they said, the economic coordination committee of the federal cabinet took the decision of load-shedding of gas in November last, but with clear instructions that bulk consumers like KESC and steel mills would not be affected by it.

However, the load-shedding of gas, they said, had to be borne by the industrial, commercial and domestic consumers.

Oil and gas had also approached owners of industrial units individually to curtail gas consumption so that pressure could be maintained in the pipeline, but there was no response from them.

In such circumstances, the sources added, there was no alternative but to curtail the gas supply to industrial units and hence the cement factories were denied gas during the last two days so that pressure could be maintained in the pipeline.

— ANI/218

FUEL SHORTAGE BLAMED ON FAULTY PLANNING

GF171400 Karachi NAWA-E-WAQT in Urdu 14 Jan 83 p 3

[From the "International" edition--editorial: "Fuel Crisis or Lack of Correct Planning"]

[Excerpts] The gas company has officially notified its "dear customers" that due to limited supplies from the source, it is forced to cut down on gas supplies to consumers and small industrial units, and it greatly regrets the inconvenience caused to the parties affected. In this notification, the consumers are duly reminded that they should economize in the use of gas for conservation of energy.

The case of the other energy-supplying organization the Water and Power Development Authority is similar, as it has started a mass campaign of "load-shedding" all over the country, under which the power supply to various areas and districts is switched off for 1 or 2 hours. It is also asking the consumers to avoid wastage in the use of electricity due to a cutdown in production.

This energy crisis in the supply of gas and electricity has not occurred suddenly, but has been going on for the past 3 years. It only seems to intensify during the winter months and is aggravated when the use of both the energy resources increases. The concerned government organizations know full well how much and at what rate the demand for energy is increasing and it should increase production and distribution in the same proportion.

As regards electricity production, it can safely be said that by 1990, the setting up of nuclear power units will become essential and the necessary measures as well as lofty proclamations are being announced from time to time, but it is not known how long the consumers will have to bear the brunt of the power shortage in winter. [passage omitted]

This tragic state of affairs is due to the fact that needless and unproductive expenditure is increasing and exceeds the income of the government sector and is becoming the fashion in the private sector. As a nation we are becoming inclined toward an artificial standard of living which we do not need and cannot afford. This kind of schizophrenic avarice is creating a chasm and a

...in the minds of the various classes of our society. [repetitive
passage omitted]

In order to counteract the deleterious effects of this rat-race it is essen-
tial to withdraw on "necessities" and is the only way for reducing unproductive
expenditure in the government sector, and ostentation and extravagance in
the private sector. Secondly, when after 10 or 12 years of "deceptionism"

[passage omitted] the need for concerted planning has been felt at last, prior-
ities will be specified in the interests of the country and the nation and
these will be adhered to, regardless of any individual or collective pressure
[passage omitted] arbitrary and without discrimination of any kind. [passage omitted]

... 1958

PAKISTAN'S STEEL PRODUCING CAPACITY DISCUSSED

Valetta JAMAHIRIYA MAIL in English 27 Nov 82 pp 6, 10

[Article by Iqbal Haidari]

[Text] Pakistan joined the ranks of steel producing countries of the world with the formal inauguration of the country's first Rs 26 billion Steel Project by President General Mohammed Zia-ul-Haq at Bin Qasim, 40 km east of Karachi in August last year. The commissioning of Pakistan Steel with the firing of its first blast furnace was an important milestone in the economic development of the country. The Steel Project has been set up with the assistance of the Soviet Union. The Soviets have provided a state credit of Rs 4,824 million repayable in 12 years. It has already cost Rs 16 billion.

The coke oven and by-products plant consists of two batteries. Their combined capacity comes to 970,000 tons annually. The first battery will produce 485,000 tons of coke out of which 340,000 will feed the first blast furnace while 375,000 tons will be used in the sintering plant, the rest will be exported after meeting the country's requirements. This battery will also yield 8,500 tons of ammonium sulphate and 23,000 tons of coaltar. The billet mill will also commence production in March this year while the Steel Plant will come on stream in September 1982. In June 1983, hot rolled sheets will be in production to be followed by cold rolled sheets a year later in June 1984. Pakistan's first integrated steel mill will then be completed.

The growth of industrial production during the year 1980-81 showed a rise of 9.2% with a marked rise in the output of cotton yarn, cigarettes, refined sugar, vegetable ghee, cement, fertilizer, chemicals, paper board and chip board, mild steel products, jute goods, safety matches and bicycle tyres and tubes. Output of refined sugar increased markedly by 43.4% to 840,000 tons. Output of fertilizer rose sharply by 31.6% to 1,549,200 metric tons in 1980-81 due to better capacity utilization of Pak-Arab Fertilizer and coming into production of Pak-Saudi Fertilizer Ltd., in October 1980. Production of mild steel products increased by 17.8% to 495,900 tons. Vegetable ghee by 11.7% to 503,500 metric tons, cement by 5.8% to 3,537,000 tons.

production of cotton cloth and yarn was affected by the stiff competition in the international textile market coupled with tariff and non-tariff barriers imposed by the developed countries on the exports of developing countries.

□ INCENTIVES

The Government provided a number of incentives for industrial development in the last four years. These included simplification of sanctioning procedure, tax holiday of 5 years for setting up industries in specific areas, reduction in import duty on the import of machinery and abolition of import duty on machinery not locally manufactured for balancing, modernisation and replacement of tanning, cutlery, surgical goods, sports goods,

and leather garments and government industries.

The share of manufacturing sector in the GDP increased from 15.0% in 1976-77 to 16.1% in 1980-81. The share of manufactured goods in exports has also substantially increased to 44.9%. The export performance of the major manufactured items showed: cotton yarn 207 million dollars, cotton cloth 241.4 million, leather 90 million, carpets and rugs 226.6 million, petroleum and its products 169.2 million, synthetic textiles 128.5 million, ready-made garments 75.2 million, knitwear 32.1 million, surgical goods 26.7 million, engineering and electrical goods 25.4 million.

Pakistan has been able to establish a significant nucleus of engineering industry in the country. The industry is now capable of producing a wide range of products from the light engineering goods to the heavy steel structures as well as shipbuilding. In the field of light engineering Pakistan produces such items like diesel oil engines, centrifugal and turbine pumps, agricultural machinery and implements, radio and TV sets, bicycles, sewing machines, machine tools and ancillary equipments, textile machinery and accessories.

In the electrical engineering sector the products are transformers and switch gears, electric motors and electric generating sets, wires and cables.

Karachi Shipyard and Engineering Works has been building bridge structures, communication towers, ships, crafts, barges, launches and ferries. The Shipyard, besides catering to the local demand, has successfully built fish carriers for Iran, twin screw tugs for Saudi Arabia and single screw tugs for Abu Dhabi.

The Karachi Shipyard has in hand orders for two 4,500 dead-weight tonnage mini bulkers for the People's Republic of China. China is likely to place order for eight more bulkers of different sizes, specifications and deadweight tonnage. The Shipyard has already built five ocean-going vessels. All these vessels were of 13,500 dwt and the first three were for the National Shipping Corporation and the fourth for Sharjah. The Shipyard has delivered 15 out of 19 vessels ordered by Iran. This included a garbage disposal barge. The total value of these vessels was 93 million German Marks.

Pakistan's first polyester plant in the public sector set up by the National Fibres Limited has gone into trial production. The plant, set up in Korangi industrial area in collaboration with West German and Swiss firms in Karachi, will have a capacity of 12,000 tons of staple fibre and 3,000 tons of filament yarn per annum. The project so far has cost Rs 550 million.

SOPHISTICATED

ICI Polyester staple fibre project costing \$65 million has brought to Pakistan a sophisticated chemical technology developed after years of research. The spinning plant of this complex has already been commissioned in January 1982 and polymerisation plant is planned to be commissioned in March 1982 when the entire plant will go on stream. The staple fibre production capacity of the ICI project in the private sector is 12,000 tons per annum. Together, ICI and the National Fibres plant in the public sector, which was commissioned in October 1981, will soon be in a position to meet most of the demand in Pakistan for polyester staple fibre.

Yet another polyester plant costing Rs 564 million with a foreign exchange component of Rs 250 million is being set up in the private sector near Lahore. The plant, a joint venture of the Pak-Libya Holding Company and the Pakistan Industrial Credit Investment Corporation is expected to go into trial production next year. On completion in 1983, it will have an annual production capacity of 6,300 tons of yarn.

Electronic industry remained neglected for quite a long time. Pakistan Government set up several Committees to enquire into the problems of the electronic industry. Some progress appears to have been made in the implementation of the recommendations of these committees. The Fifth Plan was aimed at basic development of the electronic industry both in the public and the private sectors. A sum of RS 1,055 million has been provided for the development of this industry.

Telephone Industries of Pakistan Ltd. (TIP) established in 1952, manufactures, telephone, telegraph switching equipment, telephone sets, and teleprinters, including typewriters. Carrier Telephone Industries Ltd. (CTI) established in 1967, manufactures semiconductor components, carrier multiplex equipment and small capacity VHF radio system. Both TIP and CTI work in technical collaboration with Siemens of West Germany. National Radio Telecommunication Corporation, which is wholly owned by Government, manufactures 5 types of wireless sets. It has a technical tie-up with Nippon Electric Company Limited of Japan. For solid-state radio transceivers in HF and VHF band it has technical collaboration with Cincinnati Electronic Corporation of

U.S.A. Pakistan Broadcasting Corporation has also set up a production unit which manufactures electronic equipment for its own use.

An assembly plant for microchip modules, first of its kind in the country, is being set up by the Fauji Foundation with foreign collaboration. The total cost of the plant will come to ~~about 16 million~~ rupees, including a foreign exchange component of nearly Rs 8.9 million. With the setting up of this plant, Pakistan will enter into the era of modern technology which any other developing country in this region has ever entered. It is also unique that the production of the plant is 100 per cent export guaranteed. The order for the machinery of the plant is expected to be placed shortly and it will be commissioned into full production by September this year.

The component produced by the plant will be used mainly in computers besides household equipment, electronic equipment and above all, in modern weaponry. The plant, besides producing the components, will help provide necessary skill and technical know-how and a base for future development in micro-electronic field of the 20th century era.

The Suzuki car project is being implemented by the Pakistan Automobile

Corporation (PACO). The project will cost Rs 542.8 million, including foreign exchange component of Rs252.7 million. The foreign exchange component of Rs 252.7 million would be met through Rs 15.00 million as equity of Suzuki Motor Co. of Japan Rs 100 million as Suzuki credit for tools and jigs, and Rs 137.7 million will be raised through a loan from credit institutions.

Pakistan Automobile Corp., which is responsible for this project, would provide Rs 61 million as equity out of total local component of Rs 290 million.

The rest will be arranged through loans. Production of 10,000 cars initially will generate a vast range of fabricating work and provide boost to vending units and allied technical units throughout the country. The tremendous amount of saving in foreign exchange will also be a big benefit to the country when PACO will be able to meet the bulk of the local demands and possible export to the Middle East markets. Feasibility studies indicate that Suzuki cars, jeeps, vans, pick-ups, which will be manufactured in Pakistan, will be quite competitive in prices and could even be a big attraction for the Middle Eastern countries.

Industrial Investment Schedule allocated a sum of Rs 850 million for the manufacture of components and parts and Rs 80 million for bus bodies including bodies for other vehicles. Several new units have been sanctioned in the last two years. These units include automotive gaskets, batteries, automotive wheels, diesel engines, shell and roller bearings, tyres and tubes.

Automotive wheel plant envisages an investment of Rs 207 million and will be set up in collaboration with Guest, Keen and Nettlefolds of U.K. A number of battery units have been sanctioned. These included Yussa battery project to be set up at Hub Chowki at an estimated cost of Rs 12 million and Chloride expansion project to be set at an estimated cost of Rs 10.80 million. Two projects for the manufacture of motorcycle parts are in the offing. One project is being set up by Dawood Group in collaboration with Yamaha Motor Company, Japan, while the other envisages progressive manufacture of Kawasaki motorcycles. Three separate projects are being set up in the private sector for the manufacture of different types of bearings which are used in the automotive vehicles and other machines.

INCREASING AGRICULTURAL YIELD STRONGLY FAVORED

Karachi MORNING NEWS in English 2 Jan 83 p 4

[Editorial: "Bridging the Gap in Agricultural Yield"]

[Text]

AGRICULTURE is the single largest industry in Pakistan, sustaining and providing jobs to a larger number of people than does any other industry. It is natural, therefore, that this sphere should receive the maximum attention both from the public as well as the private sectors. Happily for the country and its citizens, the concerted efforts of the Government during the last few years have produced very encouraging results. Speaking at the two-day seminar on the "Strategy for Accelerating Agricultural Development—Sixth Plan" on Friday last, the State Bank Governor said that the four per cent growth rate attained by the agricultural sector in Pakistan "was one of the highest in the world". He advocated that more incentives ought to be sustained the present growth rate. The keen interest shown by the Government in maximising the agricultural output indicates that the authorities are already aware of the need to provide all the required incentives to this sector. The holding of the present seminar to evolve proper strategies in this connection is in itself an indicator of the vital importance attached to agriculture by the Government.

Agriculture is now one of the most flourishing industries in the country. Pakistan is an exporter of rice, cotton, wheat etc. But considering the potentials of this industry, there is still tremendous scope of its development. As the Federal Minister for Food, Agriculture and Cooperatives, Vice-Admiral Janjua, had said a few weeks ago, "the perceived potential for agricultural production in Pakistan is three times more than the actual performance. It is the Government's strategy in the field of agriculture to close this performance—potential gap. The Minister had pointed out that the gap would be reduced by "undertaking research, giving purchase price incentives, better availability of basic agricultural inputs and necessary institutional readjustments."

Quite obviously, the achievement of the desired goal depends upon providing proper incentives and creating the best possible infrastructure to support the industry. One of the speakers at the seminar has suggested mechanisation of agriculture, renovation of canals system and changing the crop pattern during the next Plan period to create conditions conducive to the achievement of the target. To ensure the production of quality goods, it was also suggested that on the pattern of Tobacco Boards boards ought to be set up for other crops as well. We are sure, the relevant authorities would examine all these suggestions and take the necessary measures in this connection.

One of the hurdles in increasing the agricultural output in Pakistan is the damage done to the crops by pests. There is no doubt that with the elimination of the waste caused by pests, the crop yield in the country would register a sizeable rise. It now lies with our agricultural scientists to take up the challenge in right earnest. Already, their contribution in this field is very valuable, but it is certainly not the end of the journey for them. The per acre yield in Pakistan is still far from satisfactory when compared to that in the developed countries. The battle will be considered to have been won only when Pakistan achieves the same output per acre as do the most developed countries in the world.

The private sector has to play a big role in the development of the agricultural industry in the country specially in the sectors allied to it such as poultry farming, fisheries, livestock, forests and dairy farming. The Government is keen to encourage the moneyed people to invest in these sectors, and more and more people are turning to it. The affluence of the people connected with poultry farming, gardening, vegetable growing etc is an encouraging thing for the prospective investors in these fields. But as things stand at present, the opportunities for carrying on the operations in these fields are generally available in areas away from big cities and towns, creating a host of problems for outside investors. We are sure, a large number of people would be attracted towards these industries if the best possible infrastructure, — good and easy communication, power supply, drinking water, comfortable and safe living conditions and security of the investment—is ensured. We are sure a greater attention to this aspect will engender a keener interest in city dwellers for taking to agriculture and its allied sectors.

FOUR MORE CEMENT PLANTS PLANNED

Karachi: BUSINESS RECORDER in English 27 Dec 82 p 1

Article by Anwar Raiani

T-44

Four complete cement plants are scheduled to arrive in Pakistan soon for installation at the sites of four cement factories being set up in the private sector. It is reliably learnt.

The plants are being shipped from France, West Germany and Italy. The factories are: Cherat, Pakland, Dadaboy and Serala.

The total cost of the plants is reported to be over Rs. 1,900 million. The rupee financing arrangement has been made by Bankers Equity Limited (BEL).

It may be mentioned here that foreign exchange to the tune of Rs. 2 million has been saved on transportation of the machinery to Pakistan as the shipment is being made on Pakistan flag vessels.

The Bankers Equity with the assistance of the Finance Ministry has recently finalised contracts with foreign suppliers of machinery on f.o.b. basis. Therefore, the freight charges will be paid to Pakistan National Shipping Corporation in Pakistani currency. This arrangement has saved the foreign exchange which would otherwise have gone to foreign shipping companies.

A freight agreement has recently been concluded between the Bankers Equity and the PNSC.

The first consignment of the machinery has been loaded on PNSC vessel m.v. Hyderabad from Marseilles in France. The other shipments will follow soon.

The Cherat plant is being set up in the NWFP with a capacity of 1100 tons per day. Its cost is reported to be about Rs. 600 million. Its machinery is coming from France.

The Pakland plant with its capacity of 1,100 tons per day is being set up in Thatta district. Its cost is Rs. 606 million. Dadaboy cement plant is being set up in Dadu district with its total capacity of 1,000 tons per day. Its machinery is coming from France and West Germany. The cost of this project is reported to be Rs. 508 million.

The Serala cement factory is being set up in Baluchistan with its capacity of 250 tons per day. With a cost of Rs. 190 million, the plant will have its machinery from Italy.

Ground work on all the projects is reported to be complete and the machinery will be installed as soon as it reaches Pakistan.

All the four projects are expected to go into production by the middle of 1984.

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1. The following is a summary of the information received from Khwaja Khairuddin, President of the National Muslim League (Khairuddin group), who was here on a mission to visit the Frontier Province. His visit turned out to be a failure. During his stay in Peshawar, he claimed that he had brought a message from Wali Khan to Begum Bhutto and that he was anxious to deliver the message as soon as possible. According to the political workers who were interviewed and exchanged views, he claimed that Begum Bhutto in her message to Wali Khan had asked him to disregard the past political differences and start the movement for the restoration of democracy. Wali Khan is reported to have told Khwaja Khairuddin that he belongs to a different party, that he is only a member in the party, that Sherbaz Mazari will be the party's spokesman, that Khwaja Khairuddin should contact Sherbaz Mazari and that his instructions will be carried out. One of the political workers with whom Khwaja Khairuddin met in Peshawar said that he believes that the Government will be starting a hunger strike effective 4 December but did not say how long this hunger strike would continue. Reliable sources in Peshawar would like to know in what capacity Khwaja Khairuddin contacted the Government and Begum Bhutto and not send the message to the Government on behalf of his own party. This leads one to believe that Khwaja Khairuddin's own lies or that the leader that Begum Bhutto would contact in connection with the message may have been barred from contacting the Government. Begum Bhutto could have sent the message through her own party or through one of her own leaders. It could not be ascertained whether or not Begum Bhutto was responsible for sending the message to the Government. (Text) (Source: LANC in LRA 29 Nov 52, p 1, 13) (951)

2006-01-10 09:00:00 AM (UTC) -- Pir Pagara, speaking to reporters in this party, said here that the Muslim League will not enter into any political alliances with the defunct People's Party because this party had been involved in serious bribery and corruption in the past. Pir Pagara criticized the present government for not fulfilling the promises it made to the people, including the one for holding elections within 90 days after the general election. He said that he stands ready to be in sight for holding elections within the next 90 days. Pir Pagara, speaking to correspondents at the headquarters of the Muslim League leader Ahmad Mansoor Pirzada, also said that the Muslim League is prepared to form an alliance with any other patriotic party except with the PPP because it is not a patriotic organization.

Part of the round table conference, invitations will be limited to the patriotic parties only. According to a JANG correspondent, the political processes should not be stopped, but they are placed on political parties. When we demand a political government, then a nonpolitical government is established. When we demanded a national assembly, the Federal Advisory Council was formed. But there was a time when the mere glance of the faithful was enough to be faithful to the destinies of the people, but nowadays the glances of the faithful are to be faithful to the destinies. [Text] [Karachi JANG in English 12 pp 1, 12] 93]

AFGHAN REFUGEES VISITED--The visiting British parliamentary undersecretary of state for foreign affairs and commonwealth, (Reiskind), visited an Afghan refugee tented village at (Padaber) near Peshawar this afternoon. Talking to the refugees, he said the British Government was greatly concerned over the hardships done to the Afghan people over the last years and watched with admiration and courage the spirit with which they were struggling to regain their destiny. Earlier, he was briefed by the NWFP [Northwest Frontier Province] governor for Afghan refugees on the influx and the relief operations undertaken by the Pakistan Government in collaboration with the UNHCR and other international voluntary agencies. [Text] [BK190254 Karachi Domestic Service in English 1700 GMT 18 Jan 83]

CORDOVEZ REVIEWS AFGHAN DISCUSSIONS--The personal representative of the UN secretary general on Afghanistan, Cordovez, left for Geneva today for preparation for a new round of talks in Tehran, Islamabad and Kabul to find a negotiated settlement on the Afghanistan issue. In an interview with the Associated Press of Pakistan before his departure, he said he saw his mission as a continuation of the on-going diplomatic process. He said he drew particular satisfaction from the wide support enjoyed by the UN-sponsored indirect talks among the parties as well as the desire for a negotiated political solution and said this constitutes a firm basis to continue the discussion. Cordovez restated the four points that have been agreed upon by all sides as the basis of a negotiated settlement. These are: the withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan, the restoration of its nonaligned status, the right of the Afghan people to have a government of their own choice and the return of nearly 3 million Afghan refugees to their homes in safety and honor. [Text] [BK190307 Karachi Domestic Service in English 1700 GMT 18 Jan 83]

AL-ZULFIQAR OPEN UK BANK ACCOUNT--London, 14 Jan--The self-confessed terrorist organisation, Al-Zulfiqar, it was gathered here, has opened an account in National Westminster Bank's Piccadilly Branch. One Mr Latif Abbasi is looking after the account and the organisation in London and he is reported to have circulated a letter on behalf of Al-Zulfiqar, asking Pakistanis to contribute to its fund. He says that the fund thus collected would be used to finance the organisation working in Pakistan for the restoration of democracy. He is also believed to be looking for a building to set up Al-Zulfiqar's office in King's Cross area. [Text] [By DAWN special correspondent] [GF181308 Karachi DAWN in Urdu 14 Jan 83 p 1]

AFZAL SINDHU ARRESTED--Lahore, Jan 4: Mr. Afzal Sindhu, leader of the defunct PPP, and a former member of National Assembly, was arrested at Bahawalnagar last evening and was brought to Lahore today under police custody. He has been detained under M.Rs 8, 13, 33 and Section 302 Cr PC. [Text] [Karachi DAWN in English 5 Jan 83 p 1]

'P' FORM ABOLITION DENIED--The State Bank of Pakistan on Tuesday expressed its ignorance about the abolition of "P" form system reported in a section of the Press. State Bank sources told APP that they had no knowledge of any such move. The sources were asked to confirm the Press report that the system of obtaining permission from the State Bank of Pakistan for booking air and sea passage to travel abroad, generally known as 'P' form system, is shortly to be abolished.--APP. [Text] [Karachi DAWN in English 5 Jan 83 p 1]

LOANS FOR INDUSTRIAL UNITS--Loans amounting to Rs. 67.51 million were sanctioned by the Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan (IDBP) at their Board of Directors meeting in Karachi on Sunday for eight industrial projects, the IDBP said on Monday. The projects are: the establishment of a steel alloys casting unit in District Sheikhupura, a sugar mill in Badin and cotton ginning units, one each in the districts of Hyderabad and Multan. Other new projects sanctioned include an adhesive tapes manufacturing unit in Lasbela district and export oriented packed food manufacturing unit in Karachi. The plants and machineries of these projects would be imported under non-repatriable investment scheme by the sponsors of the projects out of their savings abroad. The IDBP also approved loan for balancing and modernisation of an existing cotton textile spinning unit in District Multan and an additional loan for an asbestos cement pipe manufacturing project in District Sheikhupura.--APP. [Text] [Karachi BUSINESS RECORDER in English 28 Dec 82 p 1]

BALUCHISTAN COAL RESOURCES--Quetta, Dec 27: The Federal Government has approved a scheme to explore and evaluate Baluchistan coal resources to meet increased demand of coal for energy purposes. According to Geological Survey of Pakistan there are about 83 million tons of coal reserves in the Sor range, Digari and Sharigh coal fields, Quetta, Kalat and Sibi divisions, where mining by private and public sectors is already in progress. To start with the Pakistan Mineral Development Corporation has decided to undertake coal exploration work in Digari coal fields area of Kalat district. The Corporation has already set up a coal washing plant at Sharigh, another coal field area where medium cooking coal is available. According to feasibility studies carried out by the foreign experts, Sharigh coal could be used for the production of metallurgical coke by Pakistan Steel. The Rs 7 million coal washing plant is designed to produce about 75,000 tons of washed coke for the manufacture of metallurgical [as published] coke. As a result of this plant, the country could save Rs. 52 million annually through import substitution.--PPI. [Text] [Karachi BUSINESS RECORDER in English 28 Dec 82 p 1]

SHIPPING SERVICE TO WEST AFRICA--Pakistan National Shipping Corporation has commenced monthly service from Karachi to all important ports in West Africa including Lagos (Nigeria), it was officially learnt yesterday. The service will be performed by conventional vessels of the corporation

which can also accept a number of containers--both 20 and 40 footers. Vessels on this route would load from Karachi for Jeddah, Casablanca, [as published] Nouakchotti, Dakar, Bissau, Conakry, Free Town, Abidjan, Accra, Lome, Contonou, Lagos, Oula and Point Moire, which are subject to inducement in the initial stages of service. On her return voyage, the vessel will load from West African ports, cargo destined for Karachi or Barcelona, Genoa, Leghorn and Piraeus.--APP. [Text] [Karachi BUSINESS RECORDER in English 28 Dec 82 p 1]

MURTAZA BHUTTO'S WAR COUNCIL--London, 27 Dec (Special Correspondent)--According to reliable sources, Mir Murtaza Bhutto has established a war council with the purpose of strengthening and solidifying the al-Zulfiqar organization. The most important member of this council, Altaf Abbasi, has returned here after participating in the recent al-Zulfiqar conference. Affirming the formation of the war council, he said that within a few days Murtaza Bhutto will announce very important decisions. Abbasi said that he travelled from London to Delhi and from there to Kabul, where he stayed with Murtaza and Shah Nawaz and was introduced to their families. Murtaza Bhutto's young daughter is named Fatima and Shah Nawaz's daughter has been named Sami. The wives of both brothers are real sisters and are the daughters of Mr Abdul Rahman, one of the directors of Afghanistan's Ministry of foreign Affairs. [Text] [Lahore NAWA-I-WAQT in Urdu 28 Dec 82 p 10]

SPECULATIONS ON INTERIM GOVERNMENT--Karachi, 30 Dec--According to reliable sources, after President Zia's return from the United States, contact has been established between the administration and Pir Pagara. It is said the defunct Muslim League and the government will hold talks early next month to consider the formation of a national (civilian) government. If the talks succeed, it is speculated that an (interim) national government will be formed before 23 March 1983. Maulana Shah Ahmad Noorani of the Jamiat-e Ulema-e Pakistan (JUP), before he left on a foreign tour, assured the Muslim League leadership of JUP's full support and cooperation. He said that though Jamiat will not accept any position in the national government, it will cooperate with such a government as a matter of principle, so that within a year or year and a half of its formation, general elections may be held in the country. According to the Muslim League sources, the national government will have its own head; it will work under the umbrella of martial law, but it will not yield to any pressure as far as the elections are concerned. It was further learned that the Jamaat-e Islami was also willing to cooperate with the proposed national government. The JI will join the cabinet if needed and will take steps to accelerate the democratization process. [Text] [Lahore NAWA-I-WAQT in Urdu 31 Dec 82 p 1 & 8]

NEW URDU WEEKLY--Islamabad, 6 Jan (PPI)--The Urdu weekly MUSALMAN made its debut here today. Mahmud Ali, federal minister for social welfare and chairman of the National Council, inaugurated the weekly in Abpara Market. This is the first Urdu weekly to be published from Islamabad. Its editor is Tikka Khan and Azhar Suhail is the associate editor. [Text] [Lahore NAWA-I-WAQT in Urdu 7 Jan 83 p 8]

BRITISH OFFICIAL ON VISIT--(Malcolm Reiskind), British parliamentary under-secretary of state for foreign affairs, called on President Gen Mohammad Ziaul Haq in Rawalpindi last evening. They exchanged views on bilateral relations and matters of mutual interest. They also discussed matters concerning the Afghan refugees in Pakistan. [Text] [BK190257 Karachi Domestic Service in Urdu 0200 GMT 19 Jan 83]

JUI LEADER BETTER NOW--Dera Ismail Khan, 6 Jan (PPI)--Maulana Fazalur Rahman, leader of Jamiat-e Ulma-e Islam (JUI), who is these days imprisoned in Dera Ismail Khan central jail, is suffering from dysentery and also has cold and fever, but his ailment is said not to be severe. The authorities have refuted reports which said that the Maulana was seriously ill. The jail physician has said that such reports were baseless, adding that Maulana Fazalur Rahman was slightly indisposed because of fever and cold, but was recovering well in response to treatment. [Text] [Lahore NAWA-I-WAQT in Urdu 7 Jan 83 p 8]

WELFARE OF OVERSEAS PAKISTANIS--Islamabad, Jan 2: Mr Ghulam Dastgir Khan, Minister for Labour Manpower and Overseas Pakistanis, said here on Saturday that Government is making concerted efforts for the welfare of the overseas Pakistanis. Talking to the newsmen, the Minister said that the overseas Pakistanis Foundation (OPF) has prepared a number of schemes for the welfare of the overseas Pakistanis and their dependents in the country. But for this purpose the Foundation should possess enough funds. He regretted that more than 1.5 million Pakistani working abroad, only 4.5 lakh of them have registered themselves with the OPF. He said that the registration fee of the OPF is Rs 550 which is a nominal amount which every overseas Pakistani can pay. He appealed to the overseas Pakistanis to register themselves with the OPF and help generate funds for the foundation so that it could make maximum contribution for the welfare, of individuals and the country.--APP. [as published] [Text] [Karachi DAWN in English 3 Jan 83 p 4]

MINERAL CRUSHING PLANT PLANNED--Quetta, Jan 2: A mineral crushing plant will be set up at Lasbela under a project approved by the Government with the capacity of one ton crushing into powder of various minerals including barytes. The project will provide gainful employment to over 1,000 persons in the plant and in feedstock industry.--UPP. [Text] [Karachi DAWN in English 3 Jan 83 p 4]

SHOORA MEMBERS JUSTICES OF PEACE--Lahore, Jan 2: The Government of the Punjab has under Section 22 of the Code of Criminal Procedure appointed the members of the Majlis-i-Shoora from the province of Punjab to be Justice of Peace. The delegation of special powers to the members of Majlis-i-Shoora seeks to ensure quicker justice to the people besides helping them to have their day to day affairs resolved." [as published] [Excerpt] [Karachi DAWN in English 3 Jan 83 p 4]

PIA MANAGING DIRECTOR-DESIGNATE--Islamabad, Jan 2: Air Vice Marshal Waqar Azim has been appointed Managing Director-designate of Pakistan International Airlines Corporation. An official handout issued here today, said the Federal Government is pleased to appoint Air Vice Marshal Waqar Azim as Managing Director-designate of Pakistan International Airlines Corporation. He will assume responsibilities of his new assignment on the expiry of term of Mr M. M. Saleem this month.--PPI [Text] [Karachi DAWN in English 3 Jan 83 p 12]

SRI LANKA ON VERGE OF FOOD SELF SUFFICIENCY

Colombo DAILY NEWS in English 23 Dec 82 p 9

[Text] KURUNEGALA--The deputy Minister of Plan Implementation and MP for Kurunegala D. B. Welegedara addressing an agricultural seminar held at Saragama Model Village Kurunegala said an international food report stated that Sri Lanka today was on the verge of self-sufficiency in rice and had it not been for the drought early this year, there would have been for the first time in this country no need to import rice.

This was a powerful testimony to the effectiveness of the government reforms since 1977 as well as the responsiveness of the private sector he added.

He went on to say the report had also mentioned that paddy statistics had averaged 7.4 per cent growth since 1977, achieving record harvests in every single year, although rain had been less than average in some years.

As a result rice imports which earlier averaged 33 per cent of total rice consumption in 1970-1977, and never declined below 23 per cent, dropped to only 13 per cent of consumption during 1978-1981.

He also said the report stated that probably the important factor had been the decision taken in September 1979 to replace the previous rice rationing scheme by the Food Stamp Scheme and the move to full cost pricing on imported rice and wheat flour.

He remarked that as a result retail prices for rice rose significantly giving the private sector profitable opportunities while maintaining farm gate prices in general well above the guaranteed price scheme level. This in turn had led to reduced government procurement and an increase in competition costs and helping to maintain and even increase the farm incentives.

CSO: 4200/253

ACCUSATIONS LEVELED AT COMMUNIST NEWSPAPER

Colombo SUN in English 18 Dec 82 p 3

[Article by Milinda Rajasekera]

[Text] Deputy Solicitor-General, M. S. Aziz told the Supreme Court yesterday that there was credible information that the articles published in the "Aththa" paper were in fact fanning unrest and dissention among various communities in the country.

Mr. Aziz was continuing his submissions in the "Aththa" sealing case in reply to the submissions made by counsel for the petitioner, S. Nadesan, Q. C.

The petition has been filed by the Editor of the "Aththa" paper and four others citing the Secretary to the Ministry of State, the Inspector-General of Police and the Attorney-General as first, second and third respondents respectively.

The bench of the Supreme Court comprised Justice D. Wimalaratne, Justice B. S. C. Ratwatta, Justice P. Colin-Tnome, Justice Abdul Cader and Justice H. Rodrigo.

Continuing, his submissions, Mr. Aziz, referred the court to a number of articles and cartoons published in the "Aththa" paper which showed a strong tendency to create violence and dissention among people.

Mr. Aziz pointed out that criticism whether constructive or destructive is allowed within the bounds of decency and public order. A line has to be drawn when it tended to go beyond and provoked people. For example, the government has allowed criticism of its policies even over the state television.

Answering a question from the bench whether he could cite any articles which directly caused violence after the Emergency was declared, Mr. Aziz said it was a difficult thing to establish that a particular article caused a particular instance of violence, but he said referring the court to the affidavit filed by the I.G.P., that there was enough material to establish that the total effect of the articles was towards creation of violence.

The I.G.P. in his affidavit had stated that he was prepared to submit the notes of investigations for perusal by court, Mr. Aziz pointed out.

Further hearing was postponed for January 10, 1983.

S. Nadesan, Q.C., with Attorneys, S. H. M. Reeza and R. K. Hemamanna appeared for the petitioners.

Deputy Solicitor-General, M. S. Aziz, Senior State Counsel, K. C. Kamalasabayson and State Counsel, D. M. G. Dissanayaka, appeared for the Attorney-General.

CSO: 4200/253

JAFFNA RESIDENTS LIVE IN FEAR

Colombo THE ISLAND in English 19 Dec 82 p 1

[Article by B. C. Perera]

[Text] A top police report submitted to Deputy Inspector General of Police (Ranges) Mr. R. Sundaralingam, states that people in the Jaffna police division live in fear and mostly stay indoors because of terrorist activity. This is because there is very little or hardly any police patrolling evident in the area. The report urges that this aspect of the maintenance of law and order be given serious attention.

Dealing with other aspects of security and the crime patterns peculiar to the Jaffna Peninsula, the report says that large sums of money and valuable jewellery are kept, with minimal security, not only in the houses of the rich but even in low-income homes. In many of these houses, the only inmates are elderly people and children. The householders are either abroad or live away from Jaffna. Most of them are either in employment or business.

According to the report, cash and valuables in many houses are kept in the shrine rooms of houses in the hope that they would be safe. But burglars seem to be aware of this as they usually make a beeline for the shrine rooms.

Temples and churches in the region too have recently become the targets of robbers and burglars. The report also says that when robber gangs knock on doors, they are readily opened without precaution being taken. Among the occasions when robbers usually strike are when marriages are about to take place, and jewellery and large sums of money are kept at home to be given as dowry. This is often common knowledge in the neighbourhood. The report says people do not have much faith in banking valuables and cash. This is particularly serious in rural areas.

Public money such as the cash of Multi Purpose Co-operative Societies as well as Banks still continues to be transported without adequate security.

In one instance Rs. 122,719 had been transported by lorry and was robbed without much difficulty.

Other vulnerable areas mentioned are goldsmiths' shops and shop keepers who lock up their shops for the night without making adequate security arrangements.

CSO: 4200/253

TAMIL TERRORISTS BLAMED FOR UNREST

Colombo SUN in English 22 Dec 82 pp 1, 3

[Article by Sinniah Gurunathan]

[Text]

TULF MP for Koppu Murugesu Alalasunderam has denounced terrorist activities in the northern province and accused extremist Tamil organisations for the present volcanic situation in the peninsula where every Jaffna man and woman lived in fear daily.

Mr. Alalasunderam told a TULF meeting in Trincomalee town last Sunday that Jaffna residents were today paying Rs. 400 for their electricity per month as they had been forced to keep their lights burning throughout the night to safeguard their properties and lives from robbers. He said in the past a Jaffna resident paid only Rs. 40 for power.

He said that Tamil youths misled by some extremist organisation which claimed that the TULF leaders were slow in achieving the Tamil Eelam demand, had become robbers as they had no other alternative. These thieves had brought disrepute to those youths who had dedicated themselves towards the liberation of the Tamil speaking people and to the establishment of a Tamil Eelam.

Referring to the statement made by Tamil Congress Leader G. G. Ponnambalam (Jr.) that President J.R. Jayewardene would not have got 52.9 percent of the votes at the Presidential election if the TULF had contested the election, Mr. Alalasundaram said that only a simple minded individual would say so. If Mr. Kobbekaduwa had won, Mr. Ponnambalam would have come with a different story that the TULF had helped Mr. Kobbekaduwa by not contesting that election.

The TULF had talks with the present government leaders in order to solve some problems of the Tamils in the country. The results of these talks included the establishment of Development Councils. Several victims of violence had also been compensated due to the talks between the TULF and the government. Those who criticised the TULF for opening a dialogue with the government should know that solutions could be found for some problems by having an understanding with the rulers he said.

Referring to the establishment of a Tamil Constituent Assembly for the proposed Tamil Eelam and the unilateral declaration of Tamil Eelam, Mr. Alalasundaram said that time had not ripened for the setting up of a Constituent Assembly as stated in the TULF manifesto issued in 1977.

Action in this regard had been postponed and would be pursued once the safety and the security of Tamils living in other parts of the country excluding north and east were ensured. Likewise the unilateral declaration of Tamil Eelam would also take place at the appropriate time and at the appropriate place. Some extremists said that the TULF had forgotten the ideals it stood for and was

engaged in having talks with the rulers. That was not so. Who would bother about the unilateral declaration made by a handful of extremists outside Sri Lanka? he queried. Tamils should be in a position to sever all connections with the other parts of the country and the government when the unilateral declaration is made. This was not the time for that move, he added.

The benefits of the action taken by the TULF during the last five and a half years in pursuing the proposal for a separate state for Tamils in this country would be reaped by the Tamil speaking people at the appropriate time. The TULF was not hiding anything from the Tamil people, he said.

TULF MP for Trincomalee R. Sampanthan, Eelathunathan and P. S. Ganeshalingam also spoke — (0034).

CSO: 4200/253

CONTAINER TERMINAL CONTRACT FOR JAPANESE

Colombo THE ISLAND in English 18 Dec 82 p 1

[Text] Two Japanese firms have been awarded the contract for undertaking civil and building works in the construction of a fully equipped container terminal in the Port of Colombo.

Contract documents for this purpose were signed yesterday between the Sri Lanka Ports Authority and M/s. Penta Ocean Constructin Co. Ltd. and Wakachiku Construction Co. Ltd. of Japan (partners in a joint venture known as Penta Ocean/Wakachiku joint venture).

This is the first stage of a three stage development of the Port of Colombo where three similar container terminals would be built. The project is funded by the Japanese Government under an aid programme. The cost of the present project with equipment will be about Rs. 1,000 million out of which Rs. 200 million is provided by the Sri Lanka Ports Authority's own funds.

Whilst Mr. Wimal Amarasekera, Chairman and Mr. K. S. C. de Fonseka Managing Director, signed on behalf of the Sri Lanka Ports Authority, M/s. Nozomu Matusumoto, Deputy Executive of Penta Ocean Construcion Co. Ltd., and Kazuyuki Hisatomi, Executive Director of Wakachiku Construction Co. Ltd., signed for the contractors.

Mr. Wimal Amarasekera, Chairman of the Sri Lanka Ports Authority after signing the contract stated that signing of this contract was of historical significant as it was the biggest ever single contract involving such large financial commitment in the history of Port development in Colombo and would serve to promote the Port of Colombo as a leading port in South Asia.

He added that this container terminal, once completed, would enhance the container handling capacity of the Colombo Port and would further promote its growing transshipment trade.

CSO: 4200/253

DETAINED SLFP MEMBERS TO BE RELEASED

Colombo THE ISLAND in English 20 Dec 82 p 1

[Article by Ravindran Casinader]

[Text] Several opposition members who were detained under the Public Security Act following the imposition of a state of emergency on October 20, will be released today as the emergency lapsed at midnight yesterday.

Similarly, the Communist Party newspaper 'Aththa' and a number of printing presses that were sealed under the same laws will be free to start functioning once again.

According to informed sources, the Government had decided to have the referendum on December 22 and not on December 17 as discussed earlier, because it was planned that the emergency should not be extended beyond December 19.

This means that the referendum will not be held under a state of emergency.

However, the lapsing of the emergency coincided with the last day for referendum campaigning, which was yesterday. According to the Referendum Act no public meeting shall be held forty-eight hours before the date fixed for the poll.

While the Government has decided that the referendum should not be held under a state of emergency, it has discussed the possibility of re-introducing the emergency on the evening of December 22, at the end of the poll, to prevent any acts of violence.

According to SLFP sources, about 200 SLFP members have been detained without trial under the emergency laws. About fifty of them are said to be prominent party organisers, and include the SLFP leader Mrs. Sirima Bandaranaike's son-in-law and party Assistant Secretary Wijaya Kumaranatunge, Mr. Mervyn Silva, SLFP Organiser for Tissamaharama, Mr. Felix Perera, SLFP Organiser for Ja-Ela, Mr. Ossie Abeygunasekera, SLFP Organiser for Kelaniya and Miss Kamala Rana-tunge, Secretary of the SLFP Women's Organisation who was also the chief witness in a case where Mrs. Bandaranaike had complained of insult and abuse.

In filing Habeas Corpus applications on behalf of some of these detainees, Senior Attorney Mr. Nimal Senanayake has claimed that "these arrests are not legally valid, and have been carried out primarily to impede the SLFP campaign in respect of the referendum".

The Opposition parties also told "The Island" that although the printing presses that were sealed could be used once again, it would not be of any benefit to them for the Referendum as the campaign had wound up yesterday.

According to a spokesman for the Communist Party of Sri Lanka (CPSI) the party's Sinhala daily 'Aththa' which was sealed under the emergency laws will immediately start publishing again. They were waiting for the Government to officially 'unseal' the press.

Meanwhile, there is speculation in political circles that some of the Opposition detenus that are expected to be released today might be re-arrested under the Prevention of Terrorism Act.

CSO: 4200/253

BRIEFS

INDIA-SRI LANKA RAIL LINK--NEW DELHI, 14 Dec--Sri Lanka High Commissioner in India, Bernard P Tilakaratna, said direct rail goods traffic link between Sri Lanka and India is likely to be established next month. The envoy told the Press in Madras that railway authorities of the two countries had discussed the subject and sorted out the problems. There was, however, some delay as the customs authorities wanted to strengthen their systems to cope with the burden of work on account of the scheme. When the link is established goods can be booked from any point in India to any point in Sri Lanka by rail and vice versa. Earlier, speaking at the Indo-Sri Lanka Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Tilakaratna said there was great scope in his country for additional trade and investment from India, especially in view of the liberalization policy for economic cooperation with its neighbours. [Rangoon THE WORKING PEOPLE'S DAILY in English 16 Dec 82 p 2]

RICE SUPPLIES UNCHANGED FOR '83--Rice supplies for the coming year will not be affected by last week's floods, the Ministry of Agriculture has announced. "most of the crop was able to withstand it and there was not very much damage, Ministry Secretary N. V. K. K. Weragoda told "SUN" yesterday. He said an extent of 22,500 acres had been affected--5000 acres in Batticaloa, 10,000 acres in Trincomalee, 7,000 acres in Matale and 500 acres in Polonnaruwa. Farmers in these areas have been instructed to re-plant their fields with a quick yielding variety of paddy. This three and a half month variety will be ready for harvesting during the Maha season, Mr. Weragoda said. He announced that the ministry had finalised arrangements with the Bank of Ceylon to provide farmers with loans for the purchase of seed paddy. Two bushels are required to plant one acre and each bushel costs Rs. 37.50, he said. Agricultural Development Authority Chairman Ranjan Wijeratne confirmed that there would be no shortfall in the Maha crop next year, although a late harvest may be experienced in the flood damaged areas. He added that there would be no need to import extra rice as a result of crop damage, since there was time to re-plant their fields. [Minoli de Soysa] [Colombo SUN in English 21 Dec 82 p 1]

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